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Chapter 1
Introduction
The 2010 midterm elections saw the Republican party gain more than 60 seats in the
U.S. House. Invigorated by their newfound majority party status, House Republicans set
straight to work implementing their Tea Party-influenced electoral mandate, which included
eliminating so-called “job-killing regulations.”1 Rules issued by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) seemed a particular favorite, with the chair of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee promising EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson that she would be called
to testify before Congress so often that she should reserve her own parking space on Capitol
Hill (Economist, 2011). True to this pledge, in the first year after Republicans took control
of the House, Administrator Jackson testified before the House a total of twelve times.2
Yet in spite of this increased congressional scrutiny, under Jackson’s leadership the
EPA issued a number of critically important environmental rules during the 112th Congress.
These included a rule to curb greenhouse gas emissions from new coal-fired power plants, a
rule that addressed air pollution associated with hydraulic fracturing (or “fracking”), and
1The term “job-killing regulations” captures the zeitgeist of the 112th Congress; in the first twenty days
of the session, the House convened twenty hearings that explored the link between regulations and the
country’s job numbers.
2By contrast, her predecessor Stephen Johnson testified before Congress only four times in his two-and-a-half
year tenure.
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a rule that required power plants in 27 states to cut their emissions by between 54 and 73
percent. These were not trivial policy changes. For instance, the fracking rule was considered
by most observers to be the first federal foray into regulating this emergent drilling technique.
The rule was ambitious too; the agency used its extant authority under the Clean Air Act
(P.L. 91-604) to issue the rule against the opposition of industry and many in Congress.
Meanwhile, the agency did not slow the rate of its regulatory activity, issuing more than 150
“significant” rules during this time period.3
The EPA’s ability to use rulemaking to flout Congress is not uncommon. For instance,
Fritschler (1969, 11) describes how the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) used rulemaking
to require cigarette manufacturers to provide health warnings, even though such action was
clearly against congressional intent: “Congress would not have done what the [FTC] did.
The [FTC] rule called for a warning in advertising and on packages. Congress wanted neither,
but the [FTC’s] action forced Congress to accept half the ruling.”4
In fact, agencies have an impressive batting average when it comes to rulemaking; by
my calculation, nearly three quarters of the more than 4,000 rule proposals that agencies ad-
vanced between 2000-2010 went on to become binding law. The fact that agencies persevere
is surprising given that Congress and the president frequently decry agency decisionmaking,
as well as the red tape associated with regulations. Further, agency success with regard to
rulemaking is not necessarily the outcome predicted by political science theories about over-
sight of bureaucratic agencies. For instance, in the case of the EPA, theories of congressional
3I define “significant” rules as those that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) selected for review.
This figure is on par with EPA’s regulatory volume in previous congresses.
4Congress responded to the rule by temporarily stripping the FTC of its oversight over cigarette advertising,
which prevented that half of the rule from taking effect. The packaging part of the rule, however, stood
firm.
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control of the bureaucracy would predict that the agency would have reduced the volume
of rules produced or at least curbed the ambitiousness of their rulemaking proposals given
congressional hostility (e.g., Olson, 1996; Weingast and Moran, 1983; Wood and Waterman,
1991).
In this dissertation project, I seek to understand why agencies are so successful in
this policymaking venue. I address two specific questions:
• How does the structure of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process affect the in-
centives of agency bureaucrats?
• Given these incentives, how do agency bureaucrats ensure that their rules become
binding policy?
The results of this study provide insight into the role of unelected bureaucrats in the
United States. My theory emphasizes the early stages of rulemaking, because these early mo-
ments are a key agenda-setting phase for the entire process. The implication is that agencies
that want their rulemaking proposals to succeed must do their homework and invest consid-
erable resources in the early phases of the process. The argument highlights how agencies
use the tools at their disposal (proposal power, outreach with stakeholders, control over tim-
ing, etc.) to shepherd their preferred policies through this important process. I argue that
expert bureaucrats have preferences over the selection of policy in the rulemaking process,
but must be artful in employing these tools in light of oversight scrutiny from Congress and
the president. These arguments contrast with the top-down view of agency rulemaking that
3
dominates the literature and have implications for the democratic accountability of unelected
bureaucrats. To support this argument, I employ a variety of research methods, including
a game theoretic model, statistical methods, and interviews with bureaucrats and interest
group officials.
This introductory chapter proceeds in five sections. I begin by providing an overview
of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. This primer is necessary, not only because
the process is esoteric, but also because the details of this process matter a great deal for
the arguments that I make in this dissertation. I then explain how my argument regarding
strategic proposed rules fits into the broader literatures on political oversight of the bureau-
cracy and agency rulemaking. Next, I explain the arguments that I make about strategic
anticipation and the importance of the early stages of the process. The penultimate section
discusses how this work contributes to our understanding of rulemaking as a political pro-
cess and the final section lays out the plan for the dissertation, offering a roadmap to the
arguments and evidence in each of the subsequent chapters.
1.1 the nuts and bolts of notice-and-comment
The focus of this study is “notice-and-comment” rulemaking, the most common form
of rulemaking in the United States.5 Rules created through this process carry the full force
and effect of law and touch on nearly every aspect of our lives, from the fuel standards
in the cars we drive to whether the “Plan B” morning-after pill is made available at the
5Notice-and-comment, or informal, rulemaking is not the only type of rulemaking, however. There are
many other forms of rulemaking, including formal rulemaking which proceeds in a manner akin to a judicial
hearing. There are also exceptions to notice-and-comment, such as the “good cause” exception which allows
an agency to waive the proposed rule stage of the process and proceed directly with an interim final rule.
For a thorough discussion of alternate forms of administrative rulemaking, see Kerwin and Furlong (2011).
4
Figure 1.1: Map of the Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process
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the proposed rulemaking procedures under the
Administrative Procedure Act provisions
(explained under step three) or under other
statutory authority, an agency may:
• promulgate a final rule omitting steps three
through six, or 
• promulgate an interim final rule omitting steps
three through six, but providing a comment
period and a final rule after step nine.
Also, if an agency determines that a rule likely
would not generate adverse comment, the
agency may promulgate a direct final rule,
omitting steps three through six, but with a
duty to withdraw the rule if the agency receives
adverse comments within the period specified
by the agency.
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601–612)
Is a notice of proposed rulemaking required by law?  ! If yes
Would the rule “have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities”? ! and yes Prepare regulatory flexibility analysis.
Note:  Under limited circumstances analyses also are required for certain interpretive rules 
involving internal revenue laws (5 U.S.C. 603, 604). 
The Reg Map
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Act Provisions  
Under the Administrative Procedure
Act provisions that are included as
part of the Freedom of Information
Act at 5 U.S.C. 552, agencies are
required to publish in the Federal
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Proposed Rule
A notice of proposed rulemaking
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Executive Order 12866 
OMB reviews only those rulemaking
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Independent agencies are exempt
from OMB review. 
Administrative Procedure
Act Provisions  
The Administrative Procedure Act
provisions at 5 U.S.C. 553 require
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the Federal Register. 
Final Rule 
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OMB Review Under
Executive Order 12866
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Independent agencies are exempt
from OMB review.
Congressional Review Act
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Regulatory Planning and Review (E.O. 12866) 
Would the rule have a $100 million annual impact, raise 
novel issues, and/or have other significant impacts? ! If yes Prepare economic impact analysis.
Regulatory Planning and
Review (E.O. 12866)
Rulemaking documents must comply
with the specified regulatory phi-
losophy and principles of regulation.
Drafting
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for Rulemaking
Documents
Unified Regulatory Agenda
The Unified Regulatory Agenda
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or review.
The Unified Regulatory Agenda is
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Specific Analyses for Steps Three and Seven
Agency Initiatives 
Agency initiatives for rulemaking
originate from such things as:
• Agency priorities and plans
• New scientific data
• New technologies
• Accidents
Initiating 
Events
Step One
Required Reviews
Statutory Mandates
Recommendations from
Other Agencies/External
Groups/States/Federal
Advisory Committees
Lawsuits
Petitions
OMB Prompt Letters
Optional Supplementary
Procedures to Help 
Prepare a Proposed Rule
Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking 
An advance notice of proposed
rulemaking requests information
needed for developing a 
proposed rule. 
Negotiated Rulemaking 
Negotiated rulemaking is a
mechanism under the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act (5 U.S.C. 561-570)
for bringing together representa-
tives of an agency and the various
interests to negotiate the text of a
proposed rule.
Administrative Procedure
Act Provisions  
Under the Administrative Procedure
Act provisions at 5 U.S.C. 553, rules
may be established only after
proposed rulemaking procedures
(steps three through six) have been
followed, unless an exemption
applies. The following are exempted: 
• Rules concerning military or
foreign affairs functions
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management or personnel
• Rules concerning public
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benefits, or contracts
• Interpretive rules
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under the Administrative Procedure
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Special Types of 
Final Rules 
Interim Final Rule 
An interim final rule adds, changes,
or deletes regulatory text and
contains a request for comments.
The subsequent final rule may make
changes to the text of the interim
final rule.   
Direct Final Rule 
A direct final rule adds, changes, 
or deletes regulatory text at a
specified future time, with a duty to
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the period specified by the agency. 
Administrative Procedure
Act Provisions  
Under the Administrative Procedure
Act provisions that are included as
part of the Freedom of Information
Act at 5 U.S.C. 552, agencies are
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im final rules, and direct final rules
in the Federal Register.
Federal Register Act 
(44 U.S.C. 1501-1511)
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Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501–3520)
Does the rule contain a “collection of information” 
(reporting, disclosure, or recordkeeping)? ! If yes Prepare information collection clearance
package for OMB review and approval, and
prepare request for public comments.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (2 U.S.C. Chs. 17A, 25)  
Does the rulemaking process include a proposed rule? ! If yes
Does the rule include any Federal mandate that may result
in the expenditure (direct costs minus direct savings) by State, 
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by 
the private sector, of $100 million in any one year ! and yes Prepare unfunded mandates analysis 
(adjusted annually)? (unless an exclusion applies).
Federalism (E.O. 13132)
Is the rule a discretionary rule that has federalism impli-
cations and imposes substantial unreimbursed direct 
compliance costs on State and local governments? ! If yes Prepare federalism summary impact statement.
Does the rule have federalism implications and 
preempt State law?  ! If yes Prepare federalism summary impact statement.
Indian Tribal Governments (E.O. 13175) 
Is the rule a discretionary rule that has tribal 
implications and imposes substantial unreimbursed 
direct compliance costs on Indian tribal governments? ! If yes Prepare tribal summary impact statement.
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preempt tribal law?  ! If yes Prepare tribal summary impact statement.
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (15 U.S.C. 272 note)
Does the rule contain provisions for which the use of 
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action that has takings implications (other than 
regulating private property for the protection of 
public health and safety)? ! If yes Prepare takings analysis. 
Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks (E.O. 13045) 
Is the rulemaking a “covered regulatory action”? ! If yes Prepare analysis of the environmental health
or safety effects on children.
Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect 
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use (E.O. 13211)
Is the rulemaking action a “significant energy action”? ! If yes Prepare statement of energy effects.
Federal Register
Publications 
Rulemaking documents must comply
with the Federal Register regulations
(1 CFR). Additional guidance and
requirements are contained in the
Federal Register’s Document Drafting
Handbook.
Presidential Memorandum
on Plain Language 
(63 FR 31885)
Rulemaking documents must
comply with plain language
principles.
Civil Justice Reform 
(E.O. 12988)
Rulemaking documents must be
written in clear language designed
to help reduce litigation. 
Regulatory Plan
The Regulatory Plan provides
information concerning the most
important significant regulatory
actions that the agency is planning
to take.
The Regulatory Plan is published in
the Unified Regulatory Agenda in
the fall of each year. 
Regulatory Flexibility
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The Regulatory Flexibility Agenda
provides information concerning
any rule that an agency expects to
prepare or promulgate that is likely
to have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
Agency regulatory flexibility agendas
are published as part of the Unified
Regulatory Agenda in the spring
and fall of each year.
National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321–4347)
Is the rule categorically excluded from review? ! If no
Does the rule constitute a major Federal action that 
could significantly affect the quality of the 
human environment? ! and yes Prepare environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement, as
appropriate.
Comments 
Under the Administrative Procedure
Act provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553, an
agency must provide the public the
opportunity to submit written 
comments for consideration by the
agency.
As required by Public Law No. 107-347,
agencies must provide for submission
of comments by electronic means and
must make available online the
comments and other materials
included in the rulemaking docket
under 5 U.S.C. 553 (c).
Executive Order 12866 established
60 days as the standard for the
comment period.
The holding of a public hearing is
discretionary unless required by
statute or agency policy.
Using The Reg Map
The Reg Map is based on general requirements.
In some cases, more stringent or less stringent
requirements are imposed by statutory provisions
that ar  agency specific or subject matter specific.
Als , in some cases more stringent requirements
are imposed by agency policy. 
In a typical case, a rulemaking action would
proceed from step one through step nine with a
proposed rule and a final rule. 
However, if a rulemaking action is exempt from
the proposed rulemaking procedures under the
Administrative Procedure Act provisions
(explained under step three) or under other
statutory authority, an agency may:
• promulgate a final rule omitting steps three
through six, or 
• promulgate an interim final rule omitting steps
three through six, but providing a comment
period and a final rule after step nine.
Also, if an agency determines that a rule likely
would not generate adverse comment, the
agency may promulgate a direct final rule,
omitting steps three through six, but with a
duty to withdraw the rule if the agency receives
adverse comments within the period specified
by the agency.
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601–612)
Is a notice of proposed rulemaking required by law?  ! If yes
Would the rule “have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities”? ! and yes Prepare regulatory flexibility analysis.
Note:  Under limited circumstances analyses also are required for certain interpretive rules 
involving internal revenue laws (5 U.S.C. 603, 604). 
Source: Adapted fro the Reg Map (http://www.r ginfo.gov/public/reginfo/Regmap/), a
cooperative effort of th U.S. Gen ral Services Administrati n nd ICF Consulting. See the
Reg Map for considerably mor d tail on what happens du ing each stage of the process, as
well as the legal requirements associated with e ch step.
local pharmacy. As such, they are a central way that policy change occur in the Amer ca
system.
Using notice-and-comment to bring a rule from the idea stage to the bin in policy
stage is an arduous process. Fig re 1.1 outlines the many phases of this byzantine proc ss.
Although the process includes many stages, it is anchored around two points: the issuance
of a proposed rule (Step 5) and, subsequently, a final rule (Step 9).
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The initial impetus for a rule (Step 1) can come from many sources.6 For instance,
Congress can include legislative language in a statute that directs an agency to write a rule
on a specific topic or the president can ask agency leaders to draft a proposal to accomplish
a key administration goal. Often, however, agencies draft proposed rules based on their
existing legal authority (usually granted in the agency’s organic statute) in order to address
problems that have arisen within the agency’s policy jurisdiction.7
Regardless of how the process is initiated, the act of drafting a proposed rule, while
slightly different for each agency, generally takes the following path. First, a small rule-
writing team is put together. This team usually includes staff from the program office,
but can also include representatives from other program offices, from the General Counsel’s
office, or even from political leadership (Interview with EPA official, May 2013; Interview
with FDA official, May 2013). This team may decide that additional research is needed,
which they will either do themselves or delegate to an outside group. The team may also
decide that additional consultation with stakeholders is necessary. If this is the case, the
agency may publish an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,8 which is simply a notice
in the Federal Register which invites comments from the public on the types of policies and
data the agency should consider in the proposed rule.9 Generally speaking, outreach during
these early stages tends to be “informal and idiosyncratic” (West, 2009).
6According to the Reg Map, initiating events include: agency initiatives (agency priorities and plans, new
scientific data, new technologies, accidents); required reviews; statutory mandates; recommendations from
other agencies, external groups, states, or federal advisory committees; lawsuits; petitions; and prompt
letters from OMB.
7In a study of 878 agency rules, West and Raso (2013, 504) find that 60% of the rules in their sample (and
53% of significant rules) were initiated based on the agency’s discretion, rather than a statutory mandate.
8This step is optional and is not pictured in Figure 1.1. As the name implies, it occurs prior to the publication
of a proposed rule.
9Or, the agency may take a less formal route of holding “listening meetings” in which select groups are
invited to come and present information to the agency.
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What should be clear from this is that the drafting of a proposed rule can be an
extremely time-intensive process, often taking years (West, 2009). Once the rule has passed
the agency’s internal clearance process, the agency submits the rule to the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review.10 OIRA, a component of OMB, is the White
House clearinghouse for agency rulemaking. OIRA’s review is intended to make sure that
the agency’s policy represents good governance principles (including cost-benefit analysis),
is consistent with administration priorities, and does not conflict with the other programs
managed by the federal government.
Once OIRA approves the rule and it is published, communication with outside parties
becomes taboo.11 In the case that outside contact occurs (usually for reasons outside of
the agency’s control), the agency is supposed to generate a record that a contact occurred,
explain the nature of the contact, and include it in the public (and court reviewable) docket.12
This restriction remains in effect until the final rule is published.
After the proposed rule is published, the public is given an opportunity to weigh in on
the agency’s proposal. At a minimum, this public consultation includes a public comment
period during which members of the public can submit written comments to the agency.
There is considerable variation in how many comments agencies receive on proposed rules
during the comment period. Often agencies will receive no comments or only a very small
number of comments. On the other end of the spectrum, agencies sometimes receive more
10With a handful of exceptions, OIRA’s purview is limited to executive branch agencies. For those agencies
within the Executive, OIRA has the power to select which rules it chooses to review, as OIRA staff
determine which rules fall under the definition of “significant.”
11This is often referred to as ex parte communication, meaning “off-the-record, private communications
between agency decision-makers and other persons concerning the substance of the agency’s proposed
rule” (Lubbers, 2006, 335).
12For instance, several of the interviews that the author conducted for this research covered ongoing agency
rules and were included in the agency’s public docket for those rules.
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comments than they know what to do with; in 2012 the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) received more than 2 million public comments on a controversial greenhouse proposed
rule. Finally, agencies may choose to do additional outreach, by holding hearings or public
forums.
The culmination of the rulemaking process is the final rule. After reviewing the
public’s feedback and deliberating, the agency decides whether or not to make any changes
to the policy it laid out in the proposed rule. The agency is not bound to make any changes
at the final rule stage, but it must explain in the preamble to the final rule the types of
comments it received and why it chose to adopt or not adopt the commenters’ suggestions.
After submitting the rule through internal clearance, the rule is then sent back to OIRA
for a second review. Subject to OIRA’s approval, the final rule is published in the Federal
Register. The rule then becomes legally binding for regulated parties after a waiting period,
usually 30 days.13
The legal framework underpinning this process was first established under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA, P.L. 79-404). The APA still remains the backbone for
the process today, although numerous procedural requirements have been layered on top by
Congress and the president. For instance, under Executive Order 12866 (EO 12866, 1993),
the key EO governing agency rulemaking, agencies are required to conduct formal cost-
benefit analyses for certain rules before submitting them to OIRA for review. In addition,
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (P.L. 104-121) requires agencies to
provide an assessment of whether each rule will have an adverse impact on small businesses.
13Current law requires that agencies have a minimum 30-day phase-in period before a rule takes effect
(Lubbers, 2006), although this can be waived in emergency circumstances. Often for major policy changes,
agencies will choose a period longer than 30 days to give regulated parties time to prepare.
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Other requirements are targeted at specific agencies or specific types of rules. For instance,
under the Higher Education Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-325), the Department of Education must
conduct regulatory negotiation with stakeholders for all substantive rules that are issued
under that law’s authority.14
The Policy Significance of Rules
As previously alluded, rules touch on almost all policy areas. For instance, many
important decisions emerging from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA,
P.L. 111-148) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act (“Dodd-Frank,” P.L. 111-203),
arguably two of the most important pieces of legislation passed in the last decade, are
currently being made through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Yet, not all rules produced
by agencies have major policy implications; like executive orders (Howell, 2003) and laws
(Mayhew, 2005), some rules issued by agencies do not have substantive policy import.
Considering the significance of a rule is one way to separate the wheat from the chaff.
According to EO 12866, a significant rule is defined as any rule that is likely to:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, com-
petition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal
governments or communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency;
14Negotiated rulemaking, or regneg, is a modification of notice-and-comment that requires the agency to
negotiate the proposed and final rules with a set of pre-selected stakeholders. While regneg was popular
in the 1990s, it has fallen out of vogue in more recent years, although some scholars still see promise in
this form of rulemaking (Kerwin and Furlong, 2011).
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(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or
loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues (EO 12866, 1993, §3(f)).
However, even when just significant rules are considered, it becomes clear that rule-
making has become a relatively routine activity for most federal agencies. For instance, in
2008, executive branch agencies proposed more than 276 “significant,” or policy-relevant,
rules and finalized more than 312 such rules.15 And as Figure 1.2 illustrates, this volume
has been a relatively constant feature of the regulatory state over the last two decades.
1.2 motivating literature
This project builds on two distinct and theoretically-rich literatures: political control
of the bureaucracy and administrative rulemaking. I now discuss each in turn.
Administrative Procedures and Dynamic Political Control
The act of delegating policymaking authority (i.e., the ability to issue legally binding
rules) from Congress and the president to a government agency is a consequential one. While
this form of delegation is an entrenched (and perhaps necessary) feature of the modern
administrative state, it gives rise to a classic principal-agent problem, one to which political
scientists have given considerable attention. The fundamental problem is that the principal
(in this case either the president or Congress) wants the agent (the agency) to produce rules
that align with her preferences. However, there is a key information problem; the principal
15This is compared with a total volume (significant and non-significant) of approximately 600 proposed rules
and 800 final rules issue by federal agencies during that same year, according to the Unified Agenda, a
semi-annual accounting of all rulemaking by federal agencies.
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Figure 1.2: Volume of “Significant” Proposed and Final Rules, 1993-2012
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as that is the year in which the new definition of “significant” under EO 12866 took effect.
can only observe outcomes (the rules the agency publishes) and not the facts on the ground
that led the agency to make that choice. More specifically, the principal cannot obtain this
information without a substantial investment (and may not even be able to acquire it at
all).16
To solve this “political control problem” scholars have identified a number of institu-
tional mechanisms that a principal can implement in order to incentivize the agent to adhere
to the principal’s preferences. The notice-and-comment process is one such mechanism that
16Put another way, the agency has acquired policy expertise that is not shared by Congress or the president.
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falls under a broader class of tools called administrative procedures (McCubbins, Noll and
Weingast, 1987, 1989), or processes that an agency must follow before reaching a policy
decision.17 By requiring notice-and-comment, the president and Congress are assured that
they will be given notice of an agency’s policy idea (and also the opportunity to stop the
rulemaking process), rather than being presented with a final policy as a fait accompli.
Tools of political control, including administrative procedures and notice-and-comment,
are generally deemed effective by scholars. For instance, in an early work McCubbins and
Schwartz (1984) characterize administrative procedures as a type of “fire alarm” oversight,
an analogy that draws on the point that this form of oversight relies on outside parties (usu-
ally interest groups) to pull a fire alarm and alert overseers to agency infractions. Compared
to more traditional forms of routinized oversight like oversight hearings (which they dub
“police patrols”), fire alarm oversight is less costly for overseers (and may even be more
effective at detecting infractions) (Aberbach, 1990; Horn, 1995). Scholars have established
a sense that political control is effective from an empirical perspective as well. Studies have
shown that when the preferences of political principals change, agencies increase or reduce
their outputs accordingly (Olson, 1996; Ringquist, 1995; Shipan, 2004; Weingast and Moran,
1983; Wood, 1988; Wood and Waterman, 1991). Yet while the finding that agencies are
responsive may be statistically significant, it does not give us a sense of levels. That is, if
an agency adjusts its output by 25% in response to a change to the political environment,
should we conclude that the agency is responsive? Or does the remaining 75% of output
17Other administrative procedures include advisory committees (Balla and Wright, 2001; Moffitt, 2010) and
reporting requirements. Of course, the president and Congress have other tools to control the bureaucracy
aside from administrative procedures. For instance, the president can staff the agency with presidential
appointees (Lewis, 2008) or centralize oversight of the agency into the Executive Office of the President
(Moe, 1985).
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that is unaffected better speak to the issue of responsiveness?
This disconnect highlights the inherent tension between arguments about political
control of the bureaucracy and arguments about the autonomy of bureaucratic actors. Given
the levels of discretion associated with rulemaking, autonomy is worth considering, since as
Croley (2003, 832) succinctly states, “substantial agency autonomy is a fact of regulatory
life.” Carpenter (2001) develops a theory of bureaucratic autonomy that is rooted in the
notion that autonomy is one of the core motivations for bureaucrats. Using a historical case
approach, he shows how autonomy is built, not given, based on the efforts of bureaucratic
leaders to enhance the agency’s reputation. Indeed, studies of bureaucratic organizations
often focus on the importance of agency culture and professional norms in affecting agency
decisionmaking (Kaufman, 1960; Milkis, 2005; Wilson, 1989), rather than purely political
factors. Yet it is not clear how bureaucratic autonomy factors into standard accounts of
political control over agencies.
Taken together these findings about limited responsiveness of agents, as well as bu-
reaucratic autonomy, suggest that political control may be a dynamic relationship between
principals and agents (Krause, 1999; Moe, 2006). That is, the typical approach to studying
political control has been top-down, treating the process as unidirectional. In the prototyp-
ical game, the principal institutes a control mechanism, such as notice-and-comment, the
agent responds by choosing a level of rulemaking or enforcement, and the game ends. How-
ever, agencies may be able to use their autonomy to adapt to the administrative procedures
that are in place. As I explain in the sections that follow, this is particularly true with re-
spect to notice-and-comment, where the APA, the key law governing the process, has been in
place for nearly 70 years, enabling bureaucrats to learn and adapt to the incentive structure
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created by notice-and-comment. In other words, there may be a bottom-up response that
influences the effectiveness of political control mechanisms.
“Kabuki Theater” and the Study of Rulemaking
In contrast to the top-down approach to notice-and-comment taken in the politi-
cal science literature, students of the rulemaking process take a much more agency-centric
approach. This work, which hails primarily from the public administration and legal tradi-
tions, focuses more on the normative implications of the process, often with rather gloomy
conclusions.
Scholars have noted that certain interest groups enjoy privileged access to agencies
before the proposed rule is put out for comment (Chubb, 1983; Furlong and Kerwin, 2005;
Golden, 1998; Yackee, 2006; Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Wagner, Barnes and Peters, 2011).
The advantages for insiders continue throughout the process, as several studies find that
industry tends to participate at a higher rate than public interest and other groups during
the public comment period (Golden, 1998; Yackee, 2006; Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Wagner,
Barnes and Peters, 2011).
At the final rule stage, there is less consensus among scholars about the effect of
comments submitted by groups during the public comment period. At this point in the
process, agencies choose whether or not to make changes to the proposed rule according to
groups’ requests (from written comments). While some scholars find that group comments
have no meaningful effect on the final policy released (Magat, Krupnick and Harrington,
1986; Nixon, Howard and DeWitt, 2002), others find that there is an effect, but that it holds
only in certain contexts (Golden, 1998; Yackee, 2006). Overall, however, there is no robust
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finding that agencies make changes based on public comments.
The sense that the deck is stacked in favor of monied interest groups and that the
process is generally closed to outsiders has persisted for decades and has led some scholars
have to cast aspersions on the process, dismissing notice-and-comment as fundamentally
undemocratic (Bernstein, 1955; Lowi, 1969; Wagner, Barnes and Peters, 2011). Elliott (1992)
famously described the process as “kabuki theater,” wherein all of the real action occurs
offstage and the drama on the stage is just windowdressing.
Yet, in spite of this substantial body of work and these grim pronouncements, there
is little understanding of why we might observe the outcomes that we do. That is, what
role do institutions play in allowing groups’ access to the process early on? Why might
agencies systematically ignore the public comments received on rules when these comments
are intended to improve the quality of the final policy? This is important because while
the literature on administrative procedures focuses on institutions (and overlooks agency
abilities), the literature on agency rulemaking ignores institutions completely.18 The theory
I develop in this project demonstrates how notice-and-comment is an institution in its own
right and, as such, agency bureaucrats respond to the incentives it creates. While this does
not alleviate any normative concerns about the process, it does help explain the underlying
mechanisms that produce the outcomes and points toward potential policy solutions (a point
to which I return in Chapter 7).
18However, a handful of studies have drawn out the effects of the political process on agency rulemaking
decisions (see e.g., O’Connell, 2008; Potter and Shipan, 2013; Yackee and Yackee, 2009).
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1.3 overview of the argument
In this dissertation, I make the case that political scientists have been overly opti-
mistic about the extent to which notice-and-comment rulemaking and other administrative
procedures facilitate political control. Taking cues from legal and public administration
scholars, I argue that notice-and-comment has an implicit bias towards the early stages of
the process, making it appear undemocratic. To establish this, I consider how administrative
procedures appear on the receiving end (to agencies).
The theory that I develop places the bureaucrat in the driver’s seat. From a bu-
reaucrat’s perspective, the administrative process is home turf. The APA has governed the
rulemaking process for nearly 70 years, and OIRA review has been a fixture of the process
for more than 30 years. While the individual players at the agencies have changed during
this time, agencies have accumulated institutional knowledge about the rulemaking process,
learning what works and what does not.
In other words, agencies have gained insight on how to game the administrative
process surrounding rulemaking. Instead of focusing on the advantage that agencies enjoy
because of their greater policy expertise, I emphasize the procedural prerogatives and greater
political acumen of agency actors. I argue that, armed with this knowledge, they can and do
strategically manipulate the rulemaking process to help ensure that it favors their preferred
outcomes. Note that I am not making the case that agencies have perfect information about
the preferences or future behavior of interest groups or political principals with respect to
rulemaking. Rather, the argument here is that agencies have better information about the
rulemaking process itself and that agency bureaucrats have an incentive to steer the process
in their preferred direction.
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This argument does not suggest that agency bureaucrats are malevolent in any way.
Instead, it is rooted in the observation that agency bureaucrats are not neutral implementers
of rulemaking policies. The people that write rules have preferences over policy that are
independent of the preferences of political principals, those in Congress and in the White
House. Further, the notice-and-comment rulemaking process creates an incentive structure
that forces agencies to express those preferences early on in the process, making the proposed
rule stage–and not the final rule stage—the critical moment in the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process.
In sum, a number of incentives converge to make the proposed rule the critical mo-
ment in the life of a rulemaking. As such, agencies view proposed rules as investments
and they write proposed rules that they want to see succeed.19 In order to make that hap-
pen, agencies act strategically in order to game the system. This dissertation unpacks that
strategic behavior with respect to the actual selection of the policy included in the proposed
rule (Chapters 3 and 4) and the administrative decisions surrounding the comment period
associated with the publication of the proposed rule (Chapter 5).
1.4 contributions
This projects makes several contributions to the study of bureaucratic politics and
public administration. First, from a bureaucratic politics perspective, I approach administra-
tive procedures from a bottom-up perspective, while still operating within the principal-agent
and political control frameworks that are often used to describe these problems. While the
19This does not necessarily mean that agencies propose rules that contain their ideal policies. As I explain
in Chapter 3, agencies propose rules in a constrained political environment. This means that the proposed
rules they write are their most favored policy, given the constraints they face.
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notion of political control over the bureaucracy is premised upon a power struggle between
agencies and their political overseers, the precise way that bureaucrats subvert the inten-
tions of principals is not made explicit. Many studies ignore the potential for agencies to
subvert principals’ intent altogether. Those that do are not explicit about how this subver-
sion occurs. This project makes a contribution by identifying specific mechanisms by which
bureaucrats can be subversive, and also shows how and when these mechanisms are strategi-
cally employed by agencies. This is important because it provides a micro-level foundation
for broader theories of principal-agent relations.
Second, from a public administration perspective, I deconstruct the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process and examine the nuances of this process from the agency’s implemen-
tation perspective. This is important because the literature on rulemaking, while being
notably sparse to begin with, also tends to dismiss the details of the administrative process
as technical points unworthy of further examination. Yet, agency bureaucrats are themselves
steeped in the details and nuances of this process, and use that insider knowledge to solidify
support for the rules they propose. Thus, I elevate the details of the process to a level that
satisfies the demands of a bottom-up theory. The result of this dual political science and
public administration approach is that this project provides a bridge between two fields that
often fail to speak to one another.
Finally, from an empirical perspective, the project offers many advances. To begin,
I collect and analyze new data on several aspects of agency rulemaking, including a new
dataset of regulatory vetoes by OIRA (Chapter 4) and micro processes with respect to the
public comment period (Chapter 5). My data span both executive and independent agencies
across a number of years. Additionally, I incorporate a variety of different cutting-edge
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measures of agency ideology into my empirical tests about agency rulemaking. The net
result is evidence that speaks to broad effects that exist outside of the narrow context of one
agency or a small sample of rules.
1.5 plan for the dissertation
In the remainder of this dissertation, I present an examination of rulemaking in a
political context. The purpose is to demonstrate how agencies behave strategically in the
rulemaking process and to explain why this behavior matters. The analysis proceeds as
follows.
The next chapter (Chapter 2) develops the argument about the importance of the
proposed rule and agency strategy in greater depth. I explain how bureaucrats’ preferences
over policy apply to the rulemaking process. I also explain that the project’s focus on
the early stages of the notice-and-comment process is based on the logic that agencies view
proposed rules as investments and that they work to protect those investments as the process
unfolds. Together, these arguments lay a theoretical foundation for the evidence I provide
in the ensuing chapters.
In Chapter 3, I argue that agencies have a potent agenda-setting power because they
are able to “move first” by setting a proposed rule. This chapter explores how agencies
harness this agenda-setting power by writing a proposed rule that they like or moderating
the rule so that is more palatable to political principals. The mechanism by which the
political principals are sometimes able to extract policy concessions at the proposed rule
stage is by a threat of a regulatory veto. To formalize this relationship, I develop a signaling
model of notice-and-comment, in which a Politician (generically, OIRA or Congress) and an
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Agency bargain over policy. In the game, the Agency has private information about interest
group disposition, which it uses to set a proposed rule and subsequently adjust a final rule.
The Politician must choose whether to “veto” the agency’s rulemaking proposal. The model
shows that ideological distance between the agency and its overseers, as well as the political
salience of the agency to the president, are key features in proposal selection.
Chapter 4 empirically tests the key predictions that emerge from the model in Chapter
3. Using a new dataset of regulatory “vetoes” by OIRA, I show that although such vetoes
are relatively rare events, they tend to occur more frequently in the context of increasing
ideological distance between the president and OIRA, as well as the political salience and
public support for a policy area. I conclude by considering how the model this applies
to congressional vetoes of rules (i.e., the inclusion of a regulatory limitation rider in an
appropriations bills).
In Chapter 5, I explore additional avenues for agency manipulation of the notice-and-
comment process, beyond setting the proposed and the final rule. I argue that strategic
agencies can employ “micro procedures” to help ensure the policies they propose survive to
the final stage. Focusing on the agency-Congress relationship, I show that when agencies
are ideologically distant from congressional overseers, they raise the costs for members of
Congress to intervene in their rulemakings by engaging more with external stakeholders to
build support coalitions and timing their actions to coincide with congressional recesses.
Evidence from a new dataset of more than 5,000 proposed rules from 24 agencies shows that
agencies indeed manipulate the length of the public comment period and the timing of the
publication of these rules.
Chapter 6 addresses strategic agency behavior in the context of a specific rulemaking
20
case: the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) menu labelling proposed rule. With this
rule, the FDA carried out a mandate in the Affordable Care Act requiring chain restaurants
to display calorie information on their menu boards. The purpose of this case study is to
illustrate how some of the assumptions from the broader argument work in practice. Using
evidence from agency rulemaking dockets and interviews with agency officials and interest
groups, I show how FDA officials gathered key information about the policy well in advance
of issuing a proposed rule and strategically set the proposed rules.
My dissertation concludes that bureaucrats are not purely faithful servants of their
political masters. They set proposed rules strategically, and use microprocedures such as
the length of the public comment period to ensure the adoption of their preferred policies.
Because these strategies so often succeed, the net result is that the rules that become law
represent the preferences of unelected bureaucrats, rather than their elected overseers in
Congress and the White House. In addition to contributing to the literature on bureaucratic
politics, these findings speak to when administrative discretion is too much of a good thing.
The concluding remarks in the final chapter contextualize the findings of the dissertation
and discuss the policy implications for the notice-and-comment process.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Foundations
In U.S. criminal law, prosecutors focus on establishing a suspect’s motive, means, and
opportunity to commit a crime. The idea is that to prove guilt one must first show that
the suspect had a reason to commit the crime (motive), the ability to do so (means), and
the chance to get it done (opportunity). These are necessary but not sufficient conditions to
convict a suspect of the crime, and most clever television crime shows often find novel ways
to further implicate the accused.1
In terms of notice-and-comment rulemaking, I argue that agency bureaucrats have
the motive, means, and opportunity to orchestrate the rulemaking process in ways that make
their preferred outcomes more likely. There is, of course, no crime, but rather the resulting
body of law is disproportionately influenced by unelected bureaucrats, and less so by elected
principals or members of the public.
In this chapter, I focus on bureaucrats’ motives with respect to rulemaking. I develop
a theory of how bureaucratic preferences combine with the incentive structure surrounding
notice-and-comment—specifically, the resource constraints, legal limitations, and psycholog-
1In making this claim, I draw on years of experience as a loyal viewer of Law & Order, Law & Order:
Criminal Intent, and Law & Order: Special Victims Unit.
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ical aspects of the process—to motivate the agency to attend carefully (and strategically)
to the proposed rule. In the chapters that follow, I then demonstrate the means by which
agencies strive to get their preferences enacted, namely the drafting of the proposed rule and
manipulation of the procedural components of the public comment period. And, because
the process is so stacked toward the early phases of rulemaking, I argue that each proposed
rule presents the agency with an opportunity to shape policy.
This analogy to a crime is admittedly crude; comparing agency rulemaking to criminal
behavior is, undoubtedly, an overly dramatic characterization of the situation. Yet, the
analogy serves well to illustrate several important points about the rulemaking process. This
chapter proceeds with an overview of the broader argument. I then explain how bureaucrats’
preferences function in practice and how they play into the incentive structure surrounding
notice-and-comment. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the theory for the
subsequent chapters.
2.1 overview of the argument
This dissertation presents a theory of bureaucratic behavior. Rather than focusing on
fire alarms or attempts to assert political control, I treat the bureaucrat as the central policy
actor. The foundation for this theory, which I build in this chapter, is that agencies write
proposed rules that they like and that they want to see succeed. In other words, I make
the case that bureaucrats have a motive to behave strategically in the notice-and-comment
process.
To establish this, I need to show two things. First, bureaucrats must have policy
preferences that are distinct from the preferences of political principals, and they must use
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the rulemaking process to express those preferences. To demonstrate this, I show that the
idea that bureaucrats’ preferences infiltrate their workproduct has deep roots in the study of
the bureaucracy and can also be linked to popular concerns about “bureaucracy run amok.”
Second, I must show that the proposed rule is the point in the process at when these
preferences manifest (i.e., that bureaucrats do not wait and inject their preferred policies at
the final rule stage). To demonstrate this, I show how, from the agency’s perspective, the
incentive structure of notice-and-comment leads the agency to treat the proposed rule as
an investment. So, instead of waiting and substantively deliberating over a proposed policy
after the public comment period, a confluence of resource, legal, and psychological factors
leads agencies to invest in a proposed policy earlier in the process.2.
Taken together, I argue that the preferences of bureaucrats and the incentive structure
of notice-and-comment combine to demonstrate that agencies have a motive to see their
proposed rules succeed. The implication is that, as the process progresses, agencies behave
strategically in order to protect their proposed rule investments, with the ultimate goal of
ensuring that the proposed rule becomes a final rule (i.e., binding law).
2Casting the proposed rule as an investment has important implications for our understanding of the rule-
making process. One consequence is that it means that the proposed rule is costly rather than “cheap
talk.” While a proposed rule can sometimes be used as a bargaining chip (as I explain in Chapter 3), it
is a costly enough gamble that is never treated as a “throw away” by the agency. Another implication
of this argument is that agencies should make few changes to the rules at the final rule stage, since the
important decisions will have been made earlier on the process and the agency will be entrenched in the
proposed policy. Although, I don’t explore this implication further in this project, it is supported in the
work of many rulemaking scholars who find that agencies are generally reluctant to make changes to final
rules (Fritschler, 1969; West, 2009)
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2.2 agency preferences in rulemaking
The case that bureaucrats’ preferences infiltrate their work is an easy one to make
as it has a long intellectual history.3 Indeed, it can be traced to Weber (1978), who high-
lighted the efficiency of modern bureaucracy, but also noted that this efficiency comes at
the expense of conceding considerable power to unelected experts. This same idea is, in
a sense, the motivating principle behind the canonical principal-agent model that is often
used to characterize the interactions between bureaucratic agencies and Congress and the
president (Miller, 2005). If the preferences of bureaucrats (the agents) did not matter for the
policy choices that they made, then principals would not need to concerns themselves with
overseeing bureaucratic outputs. Yet, oversight of the bureaucracy is a routine component of
modern government, and it is often accompanied by a healthy dose of skepticism about the
inclinations of unmonitored bureaucrats. For instance, Neustadt (1960) famously described
Cabinet agency heads as the president’s “natural enemies” and President Nixon extended
this distrust from presidential appointees to the thousands of civil servants working in the
agencies, stating “they’re bastards who are here to screw us” (Waterman, Rouse and Wright,
2004).4
The notion that bureaucrats have preferences and that those preferences permeate
into their professional doings lurks quietly behind the scenes in many studies (e.g., Bawn,
1995; Huber and Shipan, 2002; Huber, 2007). Indeed, policy motivations can be a more
proximate means to self-serving ends. That is, agencies do not just write rules, they also
3I make a general case about the role of preferences in agency policymaking here, but it applies equally well
to rulemaking since rules are important and binding policy choices made by bureaucrats.
4Additionally, fieldwork in public administration that demonstrates that bureaucrats care deeply about the
issues that they work on (see, e.g., Feldman, 1989; Golden, 2000; Meier and O’Toole, 2006).
25
enforce them. So, in order to develop and implement a successful policy—which ultimately
affects many aspects of a bureaucrat’s experience—the agency must select the right policy.
This suggests that policy preferences need not be ideological (although they certainly can
be), they can also be pragmatic and implementation-oriented.
Yet, pinning down the precise nature of bureaucrats’ preferences is difficult for both
theoretical and empirical reasons. First, it is not clear exactly what motivates bureaucrats
and how such motivations reduce to preferences. Scholars have identified a number of dif-
ferent sources of bureaucratic motivation, including budget maximization (Niskanen, 1971),
career advancement (Golden, 2000; Gailmard and Patty, 2007), enhanced autonomy for the
agency (Carpenter, 2001), and adherence to professional norms and organizational culture
(Wilson, 1989; Golden, 2000; Brehm and Gates, 1993). Fortunately, for the purposes of this
study it is not necessary to identify which of these mechanisms has greater explanatory power
(and as Golden (2000) argues it is likely the case that multiple causes are simultaneously
at work), as it suffices to say that bureaucratic preferences exist and that they matter for
policymaking.
Examining potential sources of motivation highlights the fact that these are individual-
level motives. Yet in order to speak to the theoretical issues addressed in this study (as well
as many other problems in political science), an understanding of preferences at the agency-
level is warranted. Aggregating the preferences of multiple actors into an aggregate choice
function is a fundamental problem confronting social scientists (Arrow, 1963). In the bu-
reaucratic case, the problem is exacerbated because agencies are composed of both political
appointees and career civil servants, and it is not clear how to weigh the preferences of agency
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leaders vis-a`-vis the rank-and-file (careerists).5
Finally, measurement is a persistent problem with respect to ideology; even after
parsing the theoretical and aggregation issues, developing reliable empirical measures of
agency ideology is difficult. (See the Appendix to this chapter for a detailed explanation of
extant measures of agency ideology and how I employ such measures in this dissertation.)
In spite of these issues, the preferences of agency bureaucrats are important in under-
standing the rulemaking process. Since solving these problems is beyond the scope of this
project, I simply posit that agency preferences exist and explore how they affect the different
phases of the process. While the empirical measures of agency ideology that I use to test the
hypotheses that flow from the theory are necessarily noisy, by employing multiple measures
I show that I am tapping into the deeper latent construct of agency preferences.
2.3 the incentive structure of notice-and-comment
In the previous section I argued that agency bureaucrats have preferences over policy
and use the rulemaking process to advance those preferences. Yet the argument in this
project is that agency bureaucrats write proposed rules that they like and that they want
to see succeed. To make this case, I must also establish that the proposed rule (and not the
final rule) is the point at which agencies stake their claim, a task to which I now turn.
I argue that the proposed rule is an “investment” (and thus the point at which agency
preferences manifest) due to the incentives created by a combination of resource, legal, and
5A number of weighting schemes are plausible. For instance, one could count only the preferences of agency
heads, only those employees with some level of formal policy authority, or, alternatively, every agency
employee could carry equal weight. Each of these aggregation schemes carries an implicit judgment about
the role of different personnel in making policy decisions and each might be appropriate depending on the
question at hand.
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psychological factors. As I explain in the paragraphs below, each of these factors leads to
the agency to want to invest in the process early on, rather than wait and deliberate after
receiving the public’s comments.
Resource Considerations
Resource deficits, both in terms of budget and personnel, are a continual struggle for
bureaucratic agencies (one might even daresay such deficits are a defining characteristic of
government bureaucracies). Getting a proposed rule from the idea stage to publication in
the Federal Register involves considerable resources and changes an agency’s calculations in
how they approach a proposed rule.
At the start of the process, agencies must dedicate resources to gathering research and
conducting policy analysis.6 Research, which is used to justify the agency’s policy decision,
can be conducted by the agency itself or an outside vendor who conducts the research on the
agency’s behalf, or gathered from existing academic, policy, or technical studies. In addition
to scrutiny over the scientific or technical rationale underlying their policy decisions, agencies
are subject to a variety of analytical requirements in preparing proposed rules, including cost-
benefit analysis, small business impact analysis, and other agency-specific analyses required
by statute. According to Vogel (2012, 260), analytical requirements “have required agencies
to invest considerable resources to developing extensive economic and scientific data sufficient
to withstand legal challenges to their rule-making... It is estimated that 90% of the scientific
factual data prepared by the EPA are to enable the agency’s decisions to withstand judicial
review.”
6This discussion presumes a rule with relatively important policy implications, as research is generally not
required for non-substantive rules (e.g., small administrative changes).
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In the process of preparing a draft of the proposed rule, the agency may (or may not)
consult with stakeholders outside of the agency to improve the draft policy. It is becoming
increasingly common for agencies to engage stakeholders at this early draft stage7 and this
again involves staff time and resources. After the analyses and consulting, the agency must
prepare a draft of the proposed rule, itself a considerable task. West (2009, 580) explains
that “important [proposed rules] are often accompanied by lengthy discussions (sometimes
in excess of 100 pages) that may examine alternative courses of action and that may cite
thousands of pages of supporting evidence.”
Once the draft policy is complete from the program office’s perspective, it goes
through the agency’s internal clearance process. This is often quite contentious, as dif-
ferent units within the same agency can have a stake in the policy and a very different take
on how the policy proposal should look (Interview with EPA official, May 2013). Things
that the program office decided on months ago can get reopened and redecided at this stage.
After the draft proposed rule receives internal clearance from the agency, it is sent
to OIRA for review. Although EO 12866 suggests that OIRA’s review should not exceed
90 days, reviews can be adversarial and often exceed the recommended time (see Bolton,
Potter and Thrower, 2014). Again, issues that the program office considered closed can be
reopened and relitigated during OIRA review. Following OIRA review, the agency sends the
rule to the Federal Register for publication.
The time it takes to complete all of these tasks is difficult to ascertain, since the
point at which the agency began accumulating data and having staff meetings about what
7A recent report by the Administrative Conference of the United States actually encourages agencies to
conduct outreach when drafting a proposed rule, so long as they are transparent and avoid perceptions of
favoritism or bias (ACUS, 2014).
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a particular rule might include is not a matter of public record. Nevertheless, West (2004)
finds that the average length of the proposal development period for 42 rules in his study
was more than 5 years. And, when considered in light of the fact that the time from the
publication of the proposed rule to the publication of the final rule is estimated to take
anywhere between 8 and 25 months (O’Connell, 2008), rulemaking is a very time- (and by
extension resource-) intensive undertaking indeed.
The point is that the preparation of a proposed rule soaks up substantial agency
resources. This should be thought of as an opportunity cost, since time the agency invests
in issuing one proposed rule comes at the direct expense of other rulemaking projects. This
is particularly acute, since almost all agencies face a backlog in rulemaking, with an ever-
increasing list of policy fixes and improvements on the regulatory to-do list (Kerwin and
Furlong, 2011). Because of the costliness of the resource investment in a proposed rule,
agencies cannot afford to treat a proposed rule as a “trial balloon.” Scrapping a proposed
rule and starting anew (or having to issue a second proposed rule on the same topic) is not
an efficient use of resources from the agency’s perspective.
Legal Considerations
From a legal perspective, agencies have an incentive to pin down the “right” policy
at the proposed rule stage. Although many political science models of agency policymaking
include strategic accommodation (where the agency proposes a policy that it does not prefer
in order to adjust it closer to its own ideal point later on), this is not an optimal strategy
in the case of notice-and-comment. Specifically, the principle of “logical outgrowth” states
that an agency may not introduce meaningful changes at the final rule stage if those changes
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were not adequately foreshadowed at the proposed rule stage (Kannan, 1996). If an agency
violates this principle, the rule can be challenged in the courts and overturned on the grounds
that it is arbitrary and capricious.
For instance, a recent court ruling overturned a final rule issued by the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) on the grounds that the agency changed the meaning
of a key part of the rule at the final rule stage. The rule pertained to the calculation
of the reimbursement rate for Medicare Part E (treatment of disproportionately low-income
patients). The proposed rule (2003) would have excluded certain patients from the numerator
of the formula, while the final rule (2004) took the exact opposite stance and included those
patients in the numerator. The change had considerable financial implications for regulated
parties. In overturning the final rule, the federal district court noted that this was not
a harmless error on the agency’s part: “we ask ourselves, would a reasonable member of
the regulated class— even a good lawyer—anticipate that such a volte-face with enormous
financial implications would follow the Secretary’s proposed rule. Indeed, such a lawyer
might well advise a hospital client not to comment opposing such a possible change for fear
of giving the Secretary the very idea...the Secretary’s final rule was not a logical outgrowth
of the proposed rule” (Allina Health Services v. Sebelius, D.C. Cir. 2014). In other words,
the court vacated the rule because commenters had not been given adequate notice and the
opportunity to comment on the new numerator.
Cases like this illustrate the point that, given the resources involved in the rulemaking
process, it makes sense for agency bureaucrats to propose a policy that they like at the
proposed rule stage, as they may not get a chance to change it later on (or if they do change
it, it may be subject to legal challenges).
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Logical outgrowth also highlights an important principle about rulemaking more gen-
erally; rules are more visible and receive greater scrutiny—from the public, the president,
Congress, the press, the courts—after the proposed rule is published and enters the public
consciousness. Further, everything from the publication of the proposed rule onward the
becomes the basis of a record that is subject to judicial review (Lubbers, 2006).8
Overall, then the legal components of the rulemaking process suggest that it is worth
an agency’s effort to try to pin down a policy that is legally viable—and that the agency
likes—early on in the process. If the agency waits until later on (i.e., the final rule stage),
their decision will be subject to greater public scrutiny and may raise issues related to logical
outgrowth.
Psychological Considerations
Even after investing resources in a proposed rule and carefully weighing the legal
consequences, some proposed rules would be better sent to the scrap heap than to the
Federal Register, because they face dismal prospects of being finalized or withstanding legal
challenges. Yet, I argue that psychological factors also incentivize agencies to protect their
investments in proposed rules even in the face of long odds. The phenomenon that I refer
to here is what psychologists describe as the “sunk cost effect,” or the idea that people have
“a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time
has been made” (Arkes and Blumer, 1985). The effect has been found to hold in numerous
organizational and personal contexts (see Brockner, 1992, for a review). In the context of
rulemaking, the sunk cost effect suggests that instead of withdrawing a proposed rule (or,
8This is a stylized fact. As Shipan (1997) points out, the evidence that is subject to judicial review varies
by agency and policy area, and is itself a political variable.
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alternatively, issuing a second proposed rule to supplant the first) agencies work to defend
the policy contained in the proposed rule.
In the context of rulemaking, the behavior may also stem from a psychological com-
mitment to the policy that was included in the proposed rule (West, 2009). That is, agency
rulewriters spend months (or, in some cases, years) developing the policy that is included
in the proposed rule. At the end of the process, they have convinced themselves that the
proposed policy is indeed the best policy given the circumstances at hand.
Finally, the desire to protect the proposed rule may also be rooted in the fact that
the longer a proposed rule (or draft proposed rule) hangs around, the more it begins to
seem like the status quo. And because human beings exhibit a status quo bias, they tend
to be more resistant to changes to the status quo (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In
other words, losing five dollars vexes us more than gaining five dollars gratifies us. In
the context of bureaucratic politics, Carpenter and Krause (2012, 29) describe this as an
agency’s tendency toward inertia, wherein agencies tend to treat things as immutable, when
they in fact still can be changed. Other scholars have noted this tendency with respect to
rulemaking, as agency proposals are “increasingly difficult to stop or alter as they progress
in their development” (West, 2009). In this case, status quo bias toward the proposed rule
may indicate an unwillingness to return to the actual status quo or to consider an alternate
policy proposal down the road.
In the context of the proposed rule, these psychological factors suggest that even
though there might be good reason for an agency to scrap a proposed rule and pursue
a different policy alternative—be that no policy or another policy contained in a second
proposed rule– psychological factors encourage agencies to stand pat with the proposed rule
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and protect their investment.
2.4 conclusion
Returning to the crime analogy drawn in the introduction to this chapter, I have
made a case for bureaucrats’ motives with respect to the notice-and-comment process. I
have argued that bureaucrats have preferences and that it is reasonable to expect that these
preferences find their way into the proposed rules that agencies draft. I have also shown
how resource, legal, and psychological factors cause the proposed rule to be perceived as an
investment by the agency. Taken together, this suggests that agencies write proposed rules
that they like and that they want to see succeed. The implication is that agencies have a
reason to defend their proposed rules.
In the chapters that follow, I draw out the means by which agencies defend their
proposed rules. There are many obstacles a proposed rule faces on the path to becoming
a final rule, and, I point to a number of tools that agencies can use to help proposed rules
surmount these obstacles. These tools are subtle, and rely on bureaucrats’ superior expertise
and familiarity with the details of the rulemaking process.
In the next chapter, I use a signaling model to show how, in the shadow of a regulatory
veto (one potential roadblock), agencies strategically select which policy to include in the
proposed rule. I show that these incentives mean that agencies sometimes, although not
often, propose rules that are closer to principals’ preferred policies than their own. In
Chapter 4, I test the implications of this model on a new dataset of OIRA vetoes. And in
Chapter 5, I show how this protectionist behavior extends to the public comment period.
The remaining challenge is to establish opportunity. I argue that each proposed rule
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represents an opportunity for an agency to engage in getting preferred policies enacted into
law. However, some of the strategies are more available or more necessary at some times than
others. For example, in the signaling model, I show that agencies are more likely to propose
their preferred policies when they are ideologically proximate to political principals. This
suggests less of a need to protect the proposed policy in the case of ideological proximity,
since it is less likely to come under attack. Further, as I show in the conclusion to this
dissertation (Chapter 7), some agencies appear to be much better at getting their proposed
rules past the finish line, suggesting that perhaps all opportunities are not created equal.
Finally, as referenced in the introduction, motive, means, and opportunity are nec-
essary, but not sufficient conditions to establish that the rulemaking process is dominated
by unelected bureaucrats. Showing that these strategies are successful in getting an agency
what it wants is a difficult—if not impossible—bar to clear, a point to which I return in my
concluding thoughts (Chapter 7). My hope is that the evidence I present in this dissertation
serves to convince the reader (beyond a reasonable doubt) that agencies behave strategically
in the rulemaking process.
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2.5 appendix: measuring agency ideology
The ideology of political actors is one of the primary explanatory factors for polit-
ical outcomes in the American context. Given its theoretical importance, along with the
quantitative nature of the discipline, it is unsurprising that political scientists have devel-
oped numerical estimates of the ideology of political actors on a left-right continuum. Most
prominently, scholars have used congressional roll-call data to create measures of latent ide-
ology for members of Congress.9 Outside of the legislative context, scholars have harnessed
other data sources including newspaper editorials describing the ideology of Supreme Court
nominees (Segal and Cover, 1989) and individuals’ campaign contributions to elected officials
(Bonica, 2013) to create measures of the ideology of political actors.
Extending such estimates of ideology to the bureaucracy has been tricky, since bureau-
crats rarely take public positions on policy issues, and when they do it is not in a systematic
and reliable manner. While early scholars relied on the president’s ideology as a crude proxy
for the agency (e.g., Cohen, 1986; Shipan, 2004) or whether the agency was created by a
Democratic or Republican congress (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006), in recent years scholars have
begun to develop more sophisticated measures of agency ideology (e.g., Bertelli and Grose,
2009; Nixon, 2004; Snyder and Weingast, 2000).
Because ideology plays a critically important role in this project, in the empirical
chapters I use a mix of three cutting-edge measures of agency ideology.10 I focus on these
9The most influential scores, of course, being Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) NOMINATE scores.
10Of course, the three measures I use are not the only measures of agency ideology in existence. For instance,
Krause and O’Connell (2014) are currently working to develop separate measures of appointee competence
and loyalty. And Clinton et al. (2012) survey both careerists and appointees, asking them to “vote” on
a number of bills pending in Congress. From there, they scale agencies and congressional actors on the
same dimension. While their measures have considerable face validity, they are only available for the 109th
Congress (2005-2006), and are not suitable for time series studies.
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three measures, shown in Table 2.1, because they rely on published work and cover the
greatest number of agencies.
The earliest measures that I use come from Clinton and Lewis (2008). Their estimates
are based on a survey of bureaucracy experts, who were asked to evaluate the ideology of
82 agencies. Clinton and Lewis aggregate the experts’ responses using a multirater item
response model to create an estimate of each agency’s ideology. The estimates cover both
independent and executive branch agencies. Because experts were asked about the overall
ideology of the agency (and not the ideology of the agency at a specific point in time) these
estimates can be thought of as covering the ideology of the agency’s mission (e.g., whether
the Department of Labor is more liberal than the Department of State). There are two
drawbacks to these data. First, they are not time-varying; each agency has one ideology
estimate that does not change. Second, the scores are not scaled on the same dimension
as other political actors, so while it is possible to compare agencies to each other, it is not
possible to evaluate the ideological distance between the agency and, say, the president or
the filibuster pivot at any point in time.
Bertelli and Grose (2011) create agency ideology measures that are time-varying.
They scour the written congressional testimony of agency heads and identify positions that
these leaders take on pending bills during their testimony. From there, the authors use a
Bayesian scaling algorithm to place agency heads on the same scale as congressional actors
and the president, relying on agency testimony, congressional roll-call votes and presidential
statements on these bills. The resulting scores cover most Cabinet-level agencies from 1991-
2004. Because these scores are focused only on the agency head (usually the Department
Secretary), they assume a considerable role for agency leaders, and do not capture the
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Table 2.1: Summary of Agency Ideology Measures
Authors Method #
Agen-
cies
Years Focus
Bertelli and Grose
(2011)
Data on Cabinet agency heads’ pub-
lic positions on bills, as coded in
agency heads’ written congressional
testimony. Positions are then scaled
to congressional actors and the pres-
ident using a bridging technique.
16 1991-
2004
Agency head
only
Chen and Johnson
(2014)
Data on agency bureaucrats’ cam-
paign contributions to sitting mem-
bers of Congress. They map these
donors to the members’ Common
Space NOMINATE score. The
contributions then become weights,
which are then used to create an ag-
gregate agency score.
79 1994-
2012
Political ap-
pointees and
careerists
Clinton and Lewis
(2008)
Survey of 37 bureaucracy experts,
where experts rated the ideology of
agencies. Experts’ scores are then
aggregated using a multirater item
response model
82 1988-
200511
Agency mission
ideology of other actors within that agency (e.g., career civil servants and lower-ranked
political appointees).
Finally, in even more recent work Chen and Johnson (2014) create a measure that
uses campaign contributions from agency employees to sitting members of Congress. They
identify any campaign contribution by an agency employee of $200 or more and match
the dollar amount to the member’s Common Space NOMINATE score. The aggregate
contributions come to form weights, and the agency’s ideology score is then a weighted
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average of the campaign finance-weighted Common Space NOMINATE scores. The resulting
scores implicitly weigh the preferences of high-level careerists and political appointees more
than the rank-and-file (since executive leaders have higher salaries and tend to donate more
to congressional candidates), but still speak to agency ideology at the broad agency level since
they incorporate the preferences of career civil servants.12 These scores vary by presidential
campaign cycle (i.e., every four years), and are available from the Clinton administration to
present.
Empirical Approach to Using Agency Ideology Estimates
Each of the estimates of agency ideology relies on a different data source and a different
population of interest (that is, Bertelli and Grose (2011) focus on political appointees, while
Chen and Johnson (2014) focus on both appointees and careerists, and Clinton and Lewis
(2008) focus on agency mission). Additionally, as shown in Table 2.2 each measure covers a
slightly different set of agencies and a slightly different time period.
Because of these distinctions, each of the measures taps into a different underlying
dimension of agency ideology: Clinton and Lewis (2008) address agency mission, Bertelli and
Grose (2011) address agency leadership, and Chen and Johnson (2014) capture a broader
portrait of agency personnel. Indeed, this is evidenced by the relatively low correlation
among the measures; for instance, the Bertelli and Grose (2011) and the Chen and Johnson
(2014) scores only share a correlation of ρ = .45.
In order to take advantage of the measures, but also be cognizant of their differences,
I employ them in different ways in different chapters. In Chapter 4, I rely primarily on
Bertelli and Grose’s (2011) measure since it focuses on agency leaders and I argue that the
12Indeed, Chen and Johnson (2014) use the data to test theories about the unionization of agency employees.
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Table 2.2: Agencies Included in the Data
Agency Name Clinton &
Lewis
Bertelli &
Grose
Chen &
Johnson
Commodity Futures Trading Comm + X
Dept of Agriculture + X
Dept of Commerce X X X
Dept of Defense X X
Dept of Education X X X
Dept of Energy X X X
Dept of Health & Human Services X X X
Dept of Homeland Security X X X
Dept of Housing & Urban Development X X X
Dept of the Interior X X X
Dept of Justice X X X
Dept of Labor X X X
Dept of State + X
Dept of Transportation X X X
Dept of the Treasury X X X
Dept of Veterans Affairs X X X
Envt’l Protection Agency X X
Fed Deposit Insurance Corp + X
Fed Emergency Mgmt Agency X
General Services Admin X
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin + X
Nat’l Credit Union Admin + X
Nuclear Regulatory Comm + X
Office of Personnel Mgmt X X
Securities and Exchange Comm + X
Small Business Admin X X
Social Security Admin X X
a) + indicates agencies included in Chapter 5, but not Chapter 4. Chapter 4 includes fewer agencies,
because it was not possible to match all agencies to an appropriate Policy Agendas topic area.
b) The Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002 and is included in the data from the
year 2003 onward.
c) The Federal Emergency Management Agency was subsumed into DHS at the time of its creation
and is included in the data from 1981-2002 only.
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key policy decisions pertaining to regulatory vetoes (the focus of that chapter) are made at
that high level. In Chapter 5, however, I use Chen and Johnson’s (2014) data, since the
agency decisions in question (regarding the length of the comment period and the timing of
the proposed rule’s publication) are much more routine and are made at a lower level within
the agency.13 In the latter chapter, I also use Clinton and Lewis’s (2008) expert measures
as a robustness check, since they capture a more general sense of the agency’s mission (but
lack the time-series dimension).
13This was confirmed in interviews with EPA and FDA officials, who indicated that for most rules, the
program office did not partake in these decisions. Both indicated that, occasionally, the Administrator or
Secretary’s office would get involved for very high-profile rules.
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Chapter 3
Dodging the Regulatory Veto: A Formal Model
Balancing the public health concerns of smoking with the commercial interests of the
tobacco industry is a perennial struggle for regulators (Croley, 2009). The recent growth
of electronic cigarettes (“e-cigarettes”) has presented regulators with a particularly acute
challenge, as it is not immediately clear how such devices fit into the extant regulatory
framework. These electronic devices simulate the experience of smoking a cigarette—users
puff on a reusable metal tube which releases a nicotine vapor—but do not emit smoke and
do not contain carcinogenic tars. While research on the health effects of e-cigarettes remains
inconclusive, some states and localities have begun enacting prohibitions on the use of these
devices in public spaces.1
In the fall of 2013, faced with mounting public pressure for federal action, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began drafting a proposed rule to address e-cigarettes.
Observers speculated whether the FDA would classify this new technology as an “alternative
nicotine product” (following seven states), a “vapor product” (North Carolina’s definition),
or under the current federal definition of “tobacco product” (Wilson, October 29, 2013). Each
1For instance, three states (New Jersey, North Dakota, and Utah) and Washington, D.C. have banned the
use of e-cigarettes wherever smoking is prohibited.
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potential classification would carry different consequences. Defining electronic cigarettes as
a “tobacco product” would bring the most significant impositions for the industry, including
requiring the makers of e-cigarettes to disclose health concerns on packaging and subjecting
the product to the federal cigarette sales tax. On the other hand, the creation of a new
“vapor product” category at the federal level, the alternative preferred by the electronic
cigarette industry, would likely result in a laxer standard since it would not automatically
invoke the existing (and strict) regime. The “alternative nicotine product” category would
fall somewhere in between.
As this e-cigarette example illustrates, there are many ways to accomplish a policy
objective, and when writing new regulatory proposals, federal agencies are faced with multi-
ple routes to achieving their goals. The policy that the FDA ultimately selects for inclusion
in the e-cigarette proposed rule is important, as it will serve as the starting point for future
policy discussions on e-cigarettes.2 In other words, the issuance of a proposed rule serves as
a critical agenda-setting tool (Kingdon, 2002; Cox and McCubbins, 2005) for agencies.
Yet, the agency is not necessarily free to pick the policy that it most prefers, because
the preferences of other actors in the political system matter as well. Most notably, in
order to have a proposed rule reach the final rule stage and become law, it must not be
blocked by political overseers. While such “regulatory vetoes” (as I refer to them here) are
rare events, they do occur and, as I show empirically in the next chapter, may occur with
greater frequency than we often think. These vetoes may be issued by either Congress or
the president, and, just as veto power has been shown to have strong anticipatory effects
in other contexts (Cameron, 2000; Ferejohn and Shipan, 1990; Tsebelis, 2002), they have
2As of this writing the FDA has yet to release a proposed rule on e-cigarettes.
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the power to critically shape agency behavior when writing proposed rules even if they are
relatively infrequent.
In this chapter, I show how agencies strategically write proposed rules, selecting
policies with an eye toward avoiding a veto while also remaining as faithful as possible to the
agency’s own policy preferences. This strategic action is necessary in order to protect the
agency’s investment in the proposed rule. To show how the second face of anticipatory power
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) works in this context I develop a game theoretic signaling model
that shows when an agency writes a unconstrained (i.e., preferable) version of a proposal,
and when the agency scales back to a more constrained (i.e., less preferable) version of
the proposal in order to dodge the regulatory veto. The model also generates predictions
about when Congress and the president are more (less) likely to veto an agency’s rule. The
advantage of formally modeling the interaction between an agency and its political principals
is that the predictions that emerge are more nuanced than a simple verbal model; I am
able to derive specific predictions about how the actors make tradeoffs between political
and policy benefits. The key takeaway is that, more often than not, agencies issue their
preferred policies, rather than tempering their proposals to placate political principals. In
addition, regulatory vetoes, while rare, tend to occur more for unconstrained proposals than
for proposals that are moderated due to political considerations.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in several sections. I begin by briefly de-
scribing how regulatory vetoes work in practice and demonstrating that, for an agency, it is
critical to write a proposed rule in a way that dodges these vetoes. I then introduce a sig-
naling model and explain how this type of model helps to clarify the logic underlying agency
behavior when drafting a proposed rule. Next I present the fundamentals of the model, in-
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cluding the key assumptions and the players, preferences, and sequencing of the game. The
subsequent sections analyze the model and derive a series of hypotheses. The final section
discusses these hypotheses in the context of the empirical tests offered in Chapter 4.
3.1 regulatory vetoes and proposal selection
As detailed in Chapter 2, drafting a proposed rule is a significant investment for an
agency. As a result, having a proposed rule vetoed by Congress or the president is a highly
unfavorable outcome since it essentially squanders the agency’s investment. Nou (2013)
explains,
Reversals are costly. They can upend months, usually years, of work spent gath-
ering data, reaching out to stakeholders, and considering and responding to pub-
lic comments. This is to say nothing of the efforts required to draft regulatory
text, analyses, and preambles with the sustained coordination of policy experts,
economists, scientists, and lawyers through multiple stages of the rulemaking
process. Moreover, reversals create more work for agencies by sending them back
to the drawing board in settings where resources are already constrained and
budgets consistently threatened. Reversals also thwart the policy preferences of
the agency.
Nou’s argument relates specifically to presidential oversight of agency rulemaking
through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). As the centralized clear-
inghouse for rulemaking, OIRA has the authority to formally review any rule written by
an agency within the executive branch.3 OIRA review serves as an important check on the
agencies. As Senator Coburn (R-OK) recently noted, OIRA is the “last line of defense.
When a bad, or unnecessary regulation is coming, OIRA is the last place where someone
3This is a generalization. OIRA reviews agency rules under the authority of Executive Order 12866, which
exempts certain classes of rules from review. In addition, OIRA has purview over the rules produced by a
handful of “independent” agencies, like the Social Security Administration.
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can say ‘No.’ And if you don’t say no when you should, these situations end in court, waste
time and money and cause unnecessary heartache.”4
As this quote suggests, in the course of reviewing a rule, OIRA has the power to
“veto” a rule, returning it to the agency for further consideration. In effect, the rule is dead.
The agency may try to tweak the rule and resubmit it to OIRA at some future time, but all
of the effort that went into crafting the current proposed rule has been wasted. Furthermore,
the policy window has closed (Kingdon, 2002) and there is no guarantee that it will open
again in the future.
However, an agency drafting a new proposed rule doesn’t just contend with presi-
dential review; it must also consider the possibility of a congressional veto. Congressional
vetoes can transpire in one of three ways. First, and most directly, at any point Congress can
simply write a new law that overwrites the agency’s rule. Because laws passed by Congress
supersede agency rules, the rule then becomes moot. A second and related congressional veto
power exists under the Congressional Review Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-121). This law states
that after issuing a “major” proposed or final rule (i.e., a rule with important financial or
policy consequences)5 Congress has a period of 60 days to consider—and possibly annul—the
rule. In order to execute the nullification, both chambers must pass a joint resolution and
the president must sign it. Finally, the third path to a congressional veto involves a member
4Statement of Senator Tom Coburn, confirmation hearing of Howard Shelanski, nominee for OIRA
Administrator, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, June 12, 2013,
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/nomination-of-howard-a-shelanski.
5According to the Government Accountability Office, a “major” rule is any rule that meets at least one
of the following criteria: “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; (2) a major increase
in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, federal, state, or local government agencies, or
geographic regions; or (3) significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity,
or innovation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises
in domestic and export markets (5 U.S.C. §804(2)).
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of Congress attaching a limitation rider to an appropriations bill prohibiting the finalization
of a proposed rule or forbidding agency funds from being spent on the implementation of a
final rule (MacDonald, 2010). Again, these riders prevent the agency from making a binding
policy in that particular policy area.
In the next chapter, I explore the nuances and empirical regularities associated with
these veto outlets, but at present, suffice it to say that vetoes of agency rules—by both
Congress and the president—are possible and, indeed, occur with some frequency. Of course,
the myriad paths for either a congressional or presidential veto of an agency’s rule are not
secret; agencies are well aware of the potential for vetoes and can craft policies to avoid
them. That is, agencies can scale back or enhance the ambitiousness of a policy proposal to
make that proposal more palatable to a political overseer and deter him or her from issuing
a veto. Implicit in this framework is the notion that there are many ways to accomplish
a policy goal and the agency can select among different levels or policy alternatives when
drafting a new proposed rule. This approach to understanding policy formulation is common
in studies of public policy and, indeed, is explicitly required under EO 12866. That order
directs agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis not only for the policy they are offering in
the proposed rule, but also for “reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned regulation.”
However, more often than not such analysis is either not conducted, or is not done in a
meaningful way (Carrigan and Shapiro, 2013).
In practice, the act of weighing alternatives is conducted when the agency is in the
planning and drafting stages of writing a new proposal, well before the proposed rule is
published in the Federal Register and well outside of public scrutiny. The policy that is then
offered in the proposed rule is the result of careful planning and evaluation and should not
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necessarily be thought of as the agency’s ideal policy proposal.6 While the policy proposed
may be altered should it make it to the final rule stage, as explained in Chapter 2 there
are resource, legal, and psychological factors that make it more difficult to make substantive
policy changes at that late stage. This suggests that agencies have an incentive to propose
policies that are as close to their ideal policy as possible at the proposed rule stage. That is,
agencies are incentivized to treat the selection of a proposed rule as though it will ultimately
be the binding policy issued in the final rule. As a result, agencies have to make a strategic
calculation early on regarding how much of their “ideal” policy they will be able to achieve
without being vetoed or whether they will need to make policy concessions in their proposal.
Other scholars have recognized that agencies select from a menu of alternatives when
drafting new rules. Wiseman (2009) formalizes a model that shows that agencies strategically
propose policies prior to submitting to OIRA in order to minimize the potential negative
consequences that flow from OIRA review. His results suggest that agencies “pad” their
rules (i.e., include some “fat” that can be “trimmed” during the course of review), an idea
supported by Shapiro (2007) in a case study of a rulemaking at the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA). While these studies confirm the notion that agencies
propose policies other than their ideal policies, they do not give a sense of when and how
often this padding (or concessionary proposing) occurs. It is to this task that we now turn.
3.2 why a signaling model?
To fashion a more sophisticated understanding of how agencies draft proposed rules
in order to dodge the regulatory veto, I develop a signaling model. The key advantage of
6Rather, it can be thought of as a constrained policy preference.
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the model over a simple verbal description is that its predictions are nuanced, and allow us
to get at the tradeoff that the actors make between policy and political benefits while also
accounting for the role of beliefs. The intuition behind the model is that, from the agency’s
perspective, getting past the proposed rule stage is essential. After all, in order for a rule
to take on the full force and effect of law, it must reach the final rule stage. In other words,
surpassing the proposed rule stage is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to achieving
the agency’s desired policy outcome.
A signaling model allows us to disentangle the nuances of this behavior in a systematic
way. Broadly speaking, signaling models are helpful in cases where two conditions are met:
1) there is an information asymmetry between the actors; and 2) the receiver recognizes that
the signal sent by the sender may be inaccurate or incomplete (Cameron, Segal and Songer,
2000).
In this model, the information asymmetry between the agency and its political over-
seers is based on the idea that the agency has superior intelligence regarding interest group
support for (or opposition to) the proposed rule (an assumption that I discuss in greater
detail in the next section).7 Both the agency and its overseers (i.e., Congress and the presi-
dent) care about the level of interest group support for the rule, but only the agency knows
the actual level of support. The political overseer must then attempt to infer the level of
interest group support from the type of policy that the agency proposes. This is a departure
from the standard signaling model setup in that instead of having private information about
its own type, the agency has private information about the interest group environment.
7This is an extension of the assumption, common to models of bureaucratic policymaking, that agencies
have greater policy expertise. Indeed, I allow for agencies to have greater policy expertise, but also assume
that they may have better political information.
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The model also represents an advance over existing models in that it begins with
the agency as first mover, rather than Congress or the president. That is, most models
begin with some sort of elected official delegating policymaking authority to an agency (e.g.,
Bawn, 1995; Wiseman, 2009) or selecting a political appointee to lead an agency (e.g., Lupia
and McCubbins, 1994; McCarty, 2004). After this initial move by the political principal,
the agency moves second. While these models have the ability to speak to a great number
of theoretically interesting questions, they are not well-suited to the study of rulemaking.
Agencies issue hundreds of rules each year and it is hard to imagine any politician (no
matter how omniscient) able to anticipate and delegate in response to the net effect of such
rules. Rather, agencies issue rules based on new laws that are passed, but also based on
the authority that was granted to them in their enabling legislation (which in most cases
was issued decades ago) (West and Raso, 2013).8 This makes it plain that agency rules
are not issued based solely on explicit grants of authority or delegation from some political
overseers, but are based on existing legal authority. This suggests that having the agency as
the first-mover is an appropriate way to model the rulemaking process.
3.3 modeling assumptions
The model is rooted in several assumptions about political behavior during the rule-
making process. I now introduce each of these assumptions in turn.
8For instance, the FDA issues hundreds of rules each year. While the menu labeling case covered in Chapter
6 is currently being promulgated based on an explicit grant of authority under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010, this is more the exception than the rule. The majority of rules issued by the
FDA stem from the agency’s organic statute, the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 (P.L. 59-384), or other
long-standing statutes such as the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (P.L. 82-215).
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Assumption 1. Agencies Have an Informational Advantage
A key feature of the canonical principal-agent model is that the agent possesses in-
formation that is not known by the principal. In the context of bureaucratic politics, this
frequently translates into the agency (or bureaucrat) having greater expertise about the pol-
icy area than the principal and using that information to its strategic advantage (Miller,
2005). In this model I make a similar, albeit slightly different assumption about the infor-
mation asymmetry between the agency and its political overseers. I assume that agencies
know the disposition of interest groups vis-a`-vis the specific policy contained in the proposed
rule and that political principals do not.
Rather than supposing that this knowledge comes from a general expertise possessed
by bureaucrats, I instead assume that agencies gather critical policy-relevant intelligence
from stakeholders in advance of the publication of the proposed rule. Indeed, a growing
amount of evidence suggests that agencies engage in significant amounts of ex parte (off the
record) information gathering with interest groups while in the early stages of drafting a
proposed rule. For instance, Chubb (1983) draws on a series of case studies of energy-related
bureaucracies and interest groups and finds that most interest group influence comes infor-
mally, before a proposed rule is put forward for public comment. He interviews more than
70 officials related with energy policy in the late 1970s and reports that agencies developed
cozy relationships with industry groups, and came to rely on the expertise they provided.
This, in turn, led to frequent consultation before a proposed rule went out for comment.
He summarizes his interviews as follows: “with two exceptions, every group with sufficient
experience to comment explained that petroleum regulation was influenced in the early, for-
mative stages, and that once proposed regulations reached the Federal Register they could
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not be changed. At that point, as several oil company representatives put it ‘regulations are
cast in cement’ ” (142).
Similarly, in a survey of interest groups conducted by Furlong and Kerwin (2005)
in 2002, 86% of respondents that had engaged in the notice-and-comment process reported
having informal contact with the agency before the proposed rule was published in the Federal
Register. Of those respondents, 90% reported that the method was effective at getting the
agency to make changes to the draft rule.9
And, in a more recent study, Yackee (2012) uses content analysis and a survey of
interest groups for a set of 19 rules from the Department of Transportation to uncover the
extent of group influence on rulemaking before the proposed rule. In the survey, interest
groups respondents who participated before the proposed rule was published were “52%
more likely to share data and scientific studies with rule writers than other participants,
and 62% more likely to provide rule language” (387). Furthermore, these respondents who
did engage informally early on reported that their actions were influential with respect to
the proposed rule that was later published. Although the study’s design does not speak to
the frequency of informal pre-proposal parte contact (just that it occurs), Yackee concludes
that it is nonetheless an important source of agenda-setting and information-gathering in
the rulemaking process.10
9Both of these figures represent an increase from a similar survey the authors conducted ten years prior;
in 1992, 73% of respondents reported having engaged in informal pre-proposal contact, and of those re-
spondents 85% rated it an effective lobbying technique. Effectiveness figures indicate the percentage of
respondents who gave the method a “3” or higher (on a 5-point scale).
10See also West (2009) and Wagner, Barnes and Peters (2011). Broadly, these conclusions about early
consultation may explain findings from the legal and public administration fields that suggest agencies
rarely learn (Elliott, 1992) or incorporate information (Mendelson, 2011; Yackee and Yackee, 2006) that
is provided formally during the public comment period. Pre-conferral may provide agencies with requisite
information earlier in the process, meaning that the comment period may serve some other end, such as
inducing groups to publicly reveal their information (see Gailmard and Patty, 2013).
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Taken together, this suggests that agencies do their homework, consulting with key
interest groups in advance and getting a good sense of the lay of the land, and are significantly
advantaged in this regard vis-a`-vis political principals. In Chapter 6, I use a case study
approach to show how the FDA engaged with stakeholders extensively prior to publishing
an important proposed rule on menu labeling. In the 13 months that it took the FDA to
draft its proposed rule, it met with key stakeholder groups (formally and informally) and also
solicited written feedback from hundreds of groups. The case demonstrates the plausibility
of this assumption in practice; by the time the proposed rule was published in the Federal
Register, the agency had a well-developed sense of how different interests lined up with
respect to the proposed policy.
A key aspect of this assumption is that political principals—in this case congressional
overseers and OIRA—do not share the knowledge about interest group disposition that the
agency has accumulated. Recall that agency rules tend to deal with very specific policy
topics, ranging from how to best disclose nutrition information on restaurant menu boards
to how to restructure aspects of the federal student loan program to guard against fraud
and abuse. While political principals certainly have some sense of where specific constituen-
cies might line up with respect to, say, environmental policy, rules deal with very specific
policy topics and the mapping between general preferences over the environment to specific
environmental rules may not always be clear. Thus, agencies have an information advantage
with respect to the specific policy areas addressed in each individual rule.
Further, agencies issue thousands of rules each year and the very nature of delega-
tion ensures that political principals cannot be equally informed on every policy area. To
put it in concrete terms, OIRA reviews about 620 rules per year and maintains a staff of
53
approximately 50 desk officers. Meanwhile, the agencies that work to write those rules have
dozens of employees working on each rule. It would be impossible for OIRA desk officers
(or, alternatively, members of Congress) to share the detailed knowledge of group support
for each rule that those agency rule-writers possess.
Assumption 2. Interest Group Preferences Matter
In addition to having their own policy preferences (see Chapter 2), I assume that both
the agency and its political overseers care about interest group preferences with respect to
the policy. In this context, I use the term “group support” rather loosely to refer to the issue
public or constituency that is affected by (and possibly mobilized in response to) the policy
area that the proposed rule will affect, not to refer to the broad level of support for a policy
that exists in the general public. The model incorporates a level of group support for the
policy and payoffs accrue when the “right” policy is enacted and, in the political principal’s
case, also when the “wrong” policy is vetoed.
The notion that the political overseers like Congress and the president care about
choosing policy that is consistent with the preferences of affected publics should not be con-
troversial. Members of Congress face a reelection constraint, while the president is concerned
with the public perception of his management of the executive branch, his approval ratings,
and his legacy. Taken together, this suggests that those groups that are attentive enough to
have preferences over rulemaking proposals have the ability to threaten reelection prospects
and are taken seriously by political principals.11
11In the model I separate out the Politician’s (i.e., the principal) policy preferences from their electoral
preferences. On the one hand, this raises an issue since the policy preferences of elected officials are often
thought to incorporate the preferences of electoral constituents. On the other hand, separating these two
ideas out is not problematic once we consider that a Politician might have their own policy preferences
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Yet, the idea that agencies are rewarded for selecting policies that are supported
by interest groups and other constituents is less intuitive. After all, bureaucratic agencies
are often characterized as the least democratic institutions in the American system and
bureaucrats do not face the same electoral incentives as other political actors. Nonetheless,
there are reasons that bureaucrats may want to attend to the preferences of their constituents.
Carpenter (2001) points to the critical importance of an agency’s reputation in helping to
build agency autonomy. Interest groups and other affected constituents play a key role in
enhancing—or diminishing—an agency’s reputation, and therefore agencies pay heed to the
concerns of these groups. And Bradley (2014) points out that interest groups can be powerful
allies for agencies, as agencies can enlist them to lobby the legislature on their behalf. Other
scholars highlight the role of interest groups in helping agencies to bring attention to policy
areas (Rourke, 1984), secure budgets (Berry, 1989), and influence public opinion (Hrebenar,
1997).12 Further, group support lends democratic legitimacy to agency decisions, a critical
ingredient for creating rules that are durable and to which regulated parties comply. In
the model, I refer to the agency’s payoff for making policy that its constituents prefer as a
“reputation bump.”
This assumption about the rewards accrued from heeding group support on a pro-
posed rule plays a critical role in the model. Namely, allowing the actors to have both policy
preferences and electoral and reputation preferences (respectively) creates situations where
vetoes of rules are observed in equilibrium. This is important, because as empirically demon-
that are distinct (and according to Mayhew (1974), secondary, to electoral concerns) from that of their
constituents. These policy preferences might stem from personal beliefs or from the desire to accomplish
other political goals (e.g., to use later in log-rolling negotiations).
12Of course, agencies also have an indirect interest in attending to interest group preferences, since political
principals care them and, to a certain point, agencies want to curry favor with political principals.
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strated in the previous section, vetoes occur with some frequency and should be considered
“on-the-path” equilibrium behavior.
Other Assumptions in the Model
In addition to these two global assumptions, I also make two more mundane assump-
tions. First, I assume that agencies must issue a proposed rule. In other words, there is no
“exit option,” where the agency can choose not to issue any proposed rule at all. This mir-
rors an important facet of reality in that agencies are frequently required to issue proposed
rules, through a legislative mandate, by the courts, or as the result of some crisis. While not
all rules are compulsory, this is a necessary assumption if we wish to understand the rules
that are actually issued by agencies (or vetoed by principals).13 Second, I adopt a common
knowledge assumption that players’ prior beliefs are symmetric and that other players’ pref-
erences are known. In other words, the Politician knows the type of rule preferred by the
Agency and the payoffs that the agency will receive for each type of rule. Conversely, the
Agency knows the type of rule preferred by the Politician and the payoffs that accrue to the
Politician from each policy action.
3.4 elements of the model
Every model is comprised of five basic components: players, preferences, a sequence
of play, information, and strategies. Below, I identify and explain each of these elements for
13Another way of stating this is that both the agency and political principals are in general agreement that
policy should be moved away from the status quo. The traction in the model comes from disagreement
over how far policy should be moved from the status quo. See Potter and Shipan (2013) for a discussion
of how agencies can adjust the volume and timing of the releases they release as political circumstances
change.
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this signaling model.
Players and Preferences
There are two players: an Agency (A) and a Politician (P).14 The Politician is generic
and can represent either Congress or OIRA. The basic setup of the game is that the Agency
can propose either a constrained or an unconstrained proposed rule and the Politician must
decide whether to veto or not veto the proposed rule.15
Without loss of generality, I assume that the Politician prefers a constrained policy
and the Agency prefers an unconstrained policy.16 The terms “constrained” and “uncon-
strained” are used here to connote the degree to which the Agency’s policy choice accords
with his own policy preferences. A proposed rule that is constrained is one that is more
palatable to the Politician, but less so to the Agency; in essence the Agency modifies the
policy proposal to meet with the preferences of his political principal. If the Agency is feel-
ing less encumbered, he chooses his more preferred alternative of an unconstrained policy.
Further, I assume that the Politician prefers no rule (i.e., a veto) to accepting the agency’s
unconstrained proposal.17
14In the remainder of this chapter, I use masculine pronouns to refer to the Agency and feminine pronouns
to refer to the Politician.
15This model is very loosely based on Clark’s (2009) model of congressional court-curbing. I borrow the
terms “constrained” and “unconstrained” from that model. However, where he uses the terms to refer to
the decision made by a judicial actor (the receiver), I use the terms to refer to the decision made by the
Politician (the sender).
16This implies that the Politician and the Agency do not share preferences (i.e., P 6= A).
17This last assumption is necessary in order to make an interesting case to study, yet it has a theoretical
foundation. Rules are durable policy; not only are they cumbersome to overturn after they are finalized
(Potter and Shipan, 2013), but agencies also treat them as if they are irreversible (Carpenter and Krause,
2012). As a result, it is reasonable to assume the Politician would prefer to have her preferred policy
implemented—or no policy—than have an undesirable policy implemented by the Agency. See Section 3.8
for a more detailed discussion of the role of the status quo in this model.
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Before choosing to offer a constrained or unconstrained proposed rule, the Agency
observes the level of group support for making a policy change in that particular policy
area, Ω ∈ {L,¬L}. This is private information not shared by the Politician. Group support
can be either liberal or conservative. I assume that the Politician is more conservative than
the Agency and so liberal-leaning group support (Ω = L) favors the unconstrained rule.
Conversely, when group support is conservative (Ω = ¬L), a constrained policy accords with
the preferences of these groups. This is a normalization made to simplify the analysis; exact
analogues exist for the case where the Politician is more liberal than the Agency.
Players receive a policy benefit from the proposal enacted (or lack thereof) and a
political benefit if they take action to make policy accord with the state of the world (i.e.,
interest group preferences). The Agency receives a policy benefit bu if he proposes an un-
constrained policy and it is accepted, and bc if he proposes a constrained policy and it is
accepted. Because the Agency prefers the unconstrained policy to the constrained one and
payoffs are positive, this implies that bu > bc > 0. If the Agency proposes either policy and
it is vetoed, he gets 0. If the Agency proposes a policy that aligns with the signal he receives
about interest group disposition (Ω = L and x = u, or Ω = ¬L and x = c), he receives δ.
This represents the reputation bump the Agency receives from setting policy that falls in
line with their interest group constituency.
To simplify the model, I standardize the Politician’s payoffs according to her prefer-
ence ordering such that she receives a payoff of 1 for approving (i.e., not vetoing) a constrained
proposal, a payoff of 0 for vetoing any proposal, and a payoff of −1 for approving an uncon-
strained proposed rule. However, even though the Politician does not know the true level of
interest group support, if she vetoes a proposed rule that does not align with interest group
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preferences (e.g., she rejects a constrained proposed rule when group support for the policy
is liberal), she receives an additional payoff of γ. Similarly, if she approves a proposed rule
that aligns with group support she also receives an electoral bonus of γ. As discussed above,
this represents the electoral credit that the Politician can claim for overseeing an agency that
selects the “right” policy or from stopping an agency that proposes the “wrong” policy.18
Finally, I make the assumption that γ ≥ 1. Practically speaking, this assumption
serves to narrow the range of equilibria in the model. From a theoretical standpoint, this
presumes that electoral payoffs always precede policy ones, an assumption rooted in May-
hew’s (1974) observation that politicians are “single-minded seekers of reelection.” Put
another way, this assumption simply makes the case that politicians only have the luxury of
attending to policy concerns after they have dealt with the more immediate political concern
of getting reelected.
A summary description of the variables included in the model is provided in Table
3.1.
Sequence of Play
The game follows a standard signaling model setup, proceeding in three stages. To
begin, Nature selects the level of group support for making a policy change, which can be
either liberal or conservative such that Ω ∈ {L,¬L}, with Pr(Ω = L) = pi. A observes Ω
and selects a constrained or unconstrained proposed rule x ∈ {c, u}. Finally, P observes x
and decides whether to veto or not veto A’s proposal. Players receive their attendant payoffs
and the game ends.
18In cases where the Politician is indifferent between the payoffs, I assume that she prefers to clear a proposed
rule, rather than veto it.
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Table 3.1: Model Variables and Description
Symbol Brief Description
α Conditional probability with which the Politician mixes
and chooses to veto the proposed rule
bi ∈ {bc, bu} Policy benefit to the agency from a constrained or un-
constrained proposed rule, such that bu > bc and bc > 0
δ Reputational payoff to the Agency from proposing a rule
that accords with interest group position, s.t. δ > 0
d ∈ {v,¬v} Decision made by the Politician to either veto or not
veto (approve) the proposal made by the Agency
γ Electoral payoff to the Politician for rejecting a proposal
that is out of step with the level of interest group sup-
port or approving a proposal that is in line with group
support, such that γ ≥ 1
Ω = {L,¬L} State of the world such that group support for making
a policy change in a particular policy area is liberal (L)
or not liberal (¬L, conservative)
pi = Pr(Ω = L) Probability that interest group support for moving the
policy is liberal
q Conditional probability with which the Agency mixes
and chooses an unconstrained policy
x ∈ {c, u} Policy proposal selected/ message sent by the Agency
(constrained or unconstrained)
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Figure 3.1: Extensive Form of the Signaling Model
The extensive form of the game is shown in Figure 3.1. Given this setup, A’s choice
of a constrained or unconstrained proposed rule functions as a signal about its private infor-
mation about the state of the world.
Beliefs
The Politician’s belief about the true state of the world is defined such that pi =
Pr(Ω = L), where pi ∈ [0, 1] and Ω ∈ {L,¬L}. Upon observing the Agency’s signal about
the state of the world, the Politician updates her beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule.
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Strategies
A complete strategy set for each player is defined by a strategy for each node of play
in the game, even those off-the-equilibrium path. A strategy for the Agency is a mapping
from the state space into a message, x : Ω→ {c, u}. A strategy for the Politician involves a
mapping from her prior belief about the state of the world and the signal she receives into
a decision, d : [0, 1]× {c, u} → {v,¬v}.
3.5 analysis of the model
This signaling model addresses how agencies leverage their asymmetric information
to strategically set policy in the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. I rely on Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept.
Three kinds of equilibria are possible: separating, where the Agency chooses a different
type of proposal depending on the message he receives about group sentiment, pooling where
the Agency selects the same type of rule regardless of the message he receives, and semi-
pooling, where the Agency may randomize his strategy contingent on receiving a certain type
of message. I now consider each in turn.
Separating Equilibria
In a separating equilibrium each type of the “sender” (i.e., an Agency faced with
either liberal or conservative group support) chooses a different action, so that upon ob-
serving the sender’s action (i.e., the selection of an unconstrained or constrained proposed
rule), the “receiver” (i.e., the Politician) knows with certainty the true state of the world.
In this model, there is a separating equilibrium where the Agency engages in “truth-telling”
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behavior such that he always selects a proposed rule that accurately represents the true level
of constituent support for the rule. The first proposition states this in the language of the
model; see the Appendix to this chapter for proofs of this and other propositions.
Proposition . If δ ≥ bu − bc, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where
the Agency plays the strategy:
sA =
{
u, if Ω = L.
c, if Ω = ¬L.
The Politician responds with the strategy:
sP =
{
¬v, if x = u.
¬v, if x = c.
according to the belief that Pr(Ω = L|x = u) = 1 and Pr(Ω = ¬L|x = c) = 1.
Notably, in this equilibrium the game results in the Politician accepting any rule
that the Agency proposes; no vetoes occur. The constraint δ ≥ bu − bc indicates that this
truth-telling behavior holds when the difference between the Agency’s policy payoffs from
an unconstrained and a constrained rule are low. This suggests that the Agency will be
truthful and rulemaking can occur with few upsets when these two actors are ideologically
proximate. This follows from a near universal axiom for signaling models that states that
information transmission is more precise the closer the preferences of the sender and receiver
(Bailey and Maltzman, 2011).
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What we learn here, then, is that when the Politician and the Agency have similar
ideological preferences (i.e., bu−bc is small) or when the reputational payoff for the agency is
high (i.e., sufficiently large δ) the Politician will accept rules proposed by the Agency. This
occurs because the Agency is willing to truthfully convey the state of the world through the
rule he proposes. The former result is unsurprising since if the Politician and the Agency are
like-minded it is intuitive that the agency will be truthful. In the latter case, the reputational
reward that the agency will receive for doing the right thing outweighs the policy benefit of
always getting its preferred unconstrained policy enacted.
These dual mechanisms have very different implications. The first offers strong sup-
port for the ally principle—if Politicians select agencies that are ideologically close to them,
they can achieve policy outcomes that match well with the political environment. The second
points to an entirely different source of power—interest groups that can provide compelling
returns to the agency can get their preferred policy enacted. This is a perhaps a story of
“agency capture,” wherein groups that can bestow desirable rewards to bureaucrats (like
revolving door jobs) can dictate the policymaking process. In each case, the Agency is a
rainmaker, deciding who wins and loses in the policymaking process.
Pooling Equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium, the Agency selects the same type of proposal regardless of
the state of the world and, as a result, the Politician learns nothing about group support for
the rule when she observes the proposed rule. In this model, there exists a unique pooling
equilibrium, where the Agency always proposes an unconstrained rule, and it is not vetoed
by the Politician.
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Proposition 2. If δ < bu−bc, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where
the Agency plays the strategy:
sA =
{
u, if Ω = L.
u, if Ω = ¬L.
The Politician responds with the strategy:
sP =
{
¬v, if x = u.
¬v, if x = c.
according to the belief that pi > γ+1
2γ
.
This is the “bureaucracy gone amok” equilibrium, as it reveals a situation where the
Agency will always offer his preferred unconstrained policy (regardless of the true state of
the world) and the Agency’s preferred policy actually succeeds in getting past the proposed
rule stage. This somewhat surprising maneuver is possible when the Politician believes that
group support is liberal-leaning and that groups actually prefer the Agency’s unconstrained
policy. In contrast to the solution from the separating equilibrium, the ideological preferences
of the two actors need not be proximate in order for the Agency to stave off a veto.
This equilibrium reveals that when the agency’s preferred policy is very likely to be
favored by interest groups, the Politician cannot credibly veto it. Because the Politician’s
beliefs must be correct in equilibrium, this outcome is sustained if pi is sufficiently high,
relative to γ. As with the separating equilibrium, this pooling equilibrium predicts that the
Politician will not veto the rules that the Agency proposes.
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Semi-Pooling Equilibrium
The final class of hybrid equilibria is in many ways the most interesting since it
allows the Agency to randomize in his selection of a constrained or unconstrained proposal.
In turn, the Politician can mix her response, probabilistically choosing whether to clear or
veto a proposed rule. In fact, the hybrid case is the only scenario in which we observe the
Politician actually vetoing proposed rules in equilibrium.
Here, the Agency always offers an unconstrained rule when issue support is liberal
and, when facing a belief that group support for a policy change leans conservative, mixes
his selection of a constrained or unconstrained proposed rule, according to the following
strategies and beliefs:
Proposition 3. If δ < bu−bc, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where
the Agency plays the strategy:
sA =
{
u, if Ω = L.
q∗ = γpi−pi
γ−γpi−pi+1 , if Ω = ¬L.
where q is defined as the Pr(x = u|Ω = ¬L) = q. The Politician responds with
the strategy:
sP =
{
¬v, if x = c.
α∗ = bu−bc−δ
bu
, if x = u.
where α is defined as Pr(d = v|x = u) = α and P’s prior belief is that pi < γ+1
2γ
.
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In this equilibrium, the Agency only moderates his behavior by proposing a con-
strained rule randomly when group support is conservative (Ω = ¬L). Otherwise, he pro-
poses his more-preferred unconstrained rule if group support is liberal or randomly when
Nature reveals a conservative level of group support.
Overall, this equilibrium is interesting for several reasons. First, it is the only equi-
librium that supports on-the-path vetoes by the Politician. Second, it presents a portrait
where the Agency is occasionally constrained by political oversight, but not always. This
suggests that oversight is only sometimes meaningful in checking the Agency’s behavior.
Finally, these outcomes are sustained when the Politician’s prior belief is that group support
is conservative. I discuss each of these points in more detail in the sections that follow.
3.6 model interpretation and hypotheses
The equilibria presented above indicate how both the Agency and Politician will
behave under specific sets of conditions. Looking across these different cases, we can draw
implications about behavior across (and despite) these conditions. Some of these observations
have empirical implications, which I highlight when appropriate. In the next chapter, I
empirically test many of these hypotheses to provide support for the theory laid out here.19
Veto Decisions
The model provides insight into the Politician’s behavior, indicating when she vetoes
rules and when she accepts them. In the model, the Politician observes either a constrained
19The emphasis in Chapter 4 is on testing the predictions relating to when regulatory vetoes occur (i.e,
those pertaining to the Politician’s behavior), rather than the predictions about the type of rules the
Agency proposes. This emphasis is necessary as I was unable to identify a valid and reliable measure of
the ideological orientation of proposed rules (i.e., whether they are constrained or unconstrained).
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or an unconstrained proposed rule and must decide whether to accept or veto the rule—
without knowing whether group support is liberal or conservative. This decision is based on
several factors: her prior belief about the level of group support for a policy change (i.e.,
whether pi leans conservative or liberal), the Agency’s political payoffs (δ), and the policy
payoffs from a constrained (bc) or unconstrained (bu) policy.
Overall, in equilibrium, vetoes occur infrequently, arising probabilistically in Propo-
sition 3 (and only for unconstrained proposals) and not at all in Propositions 1 and 2. This
result provides some face validity for the model, as empirically speaking regulatory vetoes
are rare events. The predicted dearth of vetoes suggests that the Agency operates relatively
unchecked—in many of the cases, the Politician accepts the Agency’s rule even if it is not
the “right” policy according to interest group support or it is not the Politician’s preferred
constrained policy.
Understanding the empirical regularities associated with regulatory vetoes requires a
careful examination of the hybrid case in Proposition 3, since this is the only situation where
the Politician issues vetoes. To begin, note that vetoes are predicted only when the Agency
offers an unconstrained rule. If the Agency offers a constrained rule in this equilibrium, the
Politician will not veto it. This suggests the first veto hypothesis:
Veto Hypothesis 1. Regulatory vetoes of unconstrained rules will be more frequent
than vetoes of constrained rules.
Of course, the model suggests that vetoes of constrained rules never occur, while
this hypothesis implies that vetoes will transpire with reduced frequency for these types of
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rules. While stylized, this modification recognizes that because vetoes are rare, they are not
perfectly predicted by any model and also that off-the-equilibrium path vetoes will occur.
As a result, the veto predictions I offer here speak to reductions in volume rather than to
the complete absence of vetoes.
Next, a nuanced understanding of vetoes in Proposition 3 invites scrutiny of α∗, the
probability with which the Politician vetoes an unconstrained rule. Figure 3.2 depicts this
probability graphically, as a function of political payoffs and the ideological distance between
the Politician and the Agency. To simplify the interpretation, I assume that the Politician
and the Agency share the same payoffs (i.e., δ = γ). This essentially reduces to the idea
that the Politician and the Agency share the same constituencies.20 This assumption does
not meaningfully change the model’s results.
The figure shows the how political payoffs and policy benefits associated for the
Politician and the Agency affect the probability with which the Politician vetoes rules (α∗).
From this, we see that as the ideological distance between the Politician and the Agency
increases, so does the veto probability. This is a straightforward result suggesting that when
the Politician has strong policy preferences for her own policy, she is more likely to ac-
cept it (and not veto it). Meanwhile, as the political payoffs to the Politician increase, the
probability of a veto decreases. The next two hypotheses restate these observations formally:
Veto Hypothesis 2. Regulatory vetoes will increase as the ideological distance be-
tween the Agency and the Politician increases.21
20This is a reasonable assumption given that many of the groups that get involved in rulemaking also tend
to lobby Congress and also OIRA (Kerwin and Furlong, 2011). Additionally, Golden (2000) and Yackee
and Yackee (2006) find that business and industry participate at higher rates than public interest groups
and individual citizens, a finding mirrored in much of the literature on lobbying Congress.
21Notably, I use the term “ideological distance,” as a shorthand for the difference in the policy benefits that
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Figure 3.2: Political Vetoes of Unconstrained Rules under Proposition 3
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Note: This figure depicts the parameter space for α∗ in Proposition 3. The shaded area
shows the probability that the Politician will veto an unconstrained rule. The y-axis shows
the ideological distance between the Politician and the Agency (bu − bc), while the x-axis
displays the political payoffs to the Politician (γ).
Veto Hypothesis 3. Regulatory vetoes will decrease when the Politician’s electoral
payoffs are high.
In addition, the model speaks to the interactive effect of political payoffs and ideolog-
ical distance in producing a change in the probability of the Politician issuing a veto. The
probability of a veto is highest when distance is high and electoral payoffs are low. This
leads to three related hypotheses about how politics and ideology interact to produce vetoes.
accrue from an unconstrained an constrained policy (bu − bc). Its application stems from the observation
that a constrained policy will be close to the Politician’s ideal point and an unconstrained policy will be
located near the Agency’s ideal point. Thus, the ideological distance between these two actors serves as
proxy for the difference in policy benefits from the two proposals. Additionally, ideological distance is a
more useful referent from an empirical perspective.
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First, we note that the probability of a veto is highest in the upper left quadrant of the
figure (when ideological distance is high) and decreases as political payoffs increase. Next,
we note that when actors are ideologically proximate (i.e., distance is low), the probability
of a veto is at or near zero. The third hypothesis results from the observation that there
is an appreciable gap in the probability of a veto between low and high levels of distance
on the lefthand side of the graph (low political payoffs) and that this gap fades as political
payoffs increase. Each of these observations, which follow directly from Figure 3.2, is stated
formally below:
Veto Hypothesis 4a. When ideological distance is high, vetoes will decrease as
political payoffs increase.
Veto Hypothesis 4b. When ideological distance is low, vetoes will have no rela-
tionship with political payoffs.
Veto Hypothesis 4c. At low levels of political payoffs, high ideological distance
will have a greater probability of veto than low ideological distance.
Finally, we turn to an examination of the role of the Politician’s prior beliefs play
in issuing veto decisions. Notably, we see that Propositions 2 and 3 set a threshold value
of pi = γ+1
2γ
. Below this threshold, the semi-pooling equilibrium obtains and vetoes should
increase as pi increases, and above it, the pooling equilibrium obtains and no vetoes occur.
This suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship, as stated in the last hypothesis:
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Veto Hypothesis 5. Regulatory vetoes will increase and then decrease as the Politi-
cian’s prior belief that group support is liberal increases.
This is an imprecise prediction. Technically speaking, the hybrid equilibrium suggests
that the probability of a veto increases up until the threshold point (since q∗ is an increasing
function of pi, given γ ≥ 1), after which the probability of a veto is zero under the pooling
equilibrium. The inverted U-shaped function roughly approximates this distribution, but
does not account for the steep drop off at the cut point. Although less accurate from
a theoretical standpoint, this approximation is appropriate from the empirical perspective
adopted in the next chapter, since few things in the real world have such a Manichean cutoff.
Overall, these empirical implications regarding the Politician’s actions mesh well with
reality. The Politician only vetoes unconstrained rules, which are less desirable for her in the
first place. This may reflect the fact that regulatory vetoes are costly in terms of political
capital and resources. However, looking across the propositions we see that the Politician
accepts both constrained rules and unconstrained rules. This suggests a world where the
Agency sometimes get what he wants (an unconstrained policy) and sometimes the Politician
gets what she wants (a constrained policy), and that political payoffs and the ideological
distance between the two actors plays an important role in determining these outcomes.
Agency Proposal Decisions
The model also speaks to the Agency’s decision about what type of policy to propose.
After observing the draw from Nature (i.e., liberal or conservative group support), the Agency
is faced with a decision: propose a more desirable unconstrained rule or a less desirable
constrained rule. Overall, the model presents a portrait where more often than not, the
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Agency proposes an unconstrained policy (and it is subsequently accepted). In other words,
the Agency anticipates the regulatory veto and is able to shape its proposal behavior (if
necessary) so that, in equilibrium, unconstrained policies are frequently the outcome that
we observe.
In the separating equilibria, truth-telling occurs; the Agency always heeds group pref-
erences and the Politician accepts it. The unifying constraint here is that this outcome holds
when the Politician and the Agency are ideologically proximate and δ ≥ bu−bc, as suggested
in the first hypothesis:
Proposal Hypothesis 1. When the Agency’s reputational reward is greater than
the ideological distance between itself and the Politician, the Agency will propose
policies that accord with group support.
This first hypothesis focuses on the relative value of reputational benefits compared to
ideological distance. If groups can provide enough of a reward to the Agency and the Agency
and the Politician aren’t too far apart, groups can get their way. Yet, when reputational
rewards are low compared to the ideological distance between the two actors, the Agency is
more likely to do more of what he wants, as elaborated in the next hypothesis.
Comparing the Agency’s responses after a liberal draw of group support (Ω = L)
in the pooling equilibrium (Proposition 2) and the semi-pooling equilibrium (Proposition
3) reveals that in these situations the Agency always goes against the group’s wishes and
proposes an unconstrained policy. However, this behavior is not observed in the separat-
ing equilibrium (Proposition 1), where the Agency always tells the truth and proposes a
constrained policy when group support is liberal. The key difference between these cases is
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that in Propositions 2 and 3, reputation benefits must be low compared to the difference
in the policy payoffs between the Politician and the Agency (i.e., δ < bu − bc), whereas in
Proposition 1, the opposite case holds (i.e., δ ≥ bu − bc). This observation is summarized in
the next hypothesis:
Proposal Hypothesis 2. When group support is liberal, the agency will disregard
group beliefs and propose an unconstrained rule whenever reputation benefits are
low compared to ideological distance.
Next, looking at the pooling equilibrium (Proposition 2) yields interesting insight
since in this case the Agency always offers its preferred unconstrained policy. The third
hypothesis lays out this expectation:
Proposal Hypothesis 3. When the Politician’s prior belief that public support is
liberal is sufficiently high and reputation benefits are low compared to ideological
distance, the Agency will always propose an unconstrained policy.
In this case, the Agency is free to do what it wants because interest groups can’t
provide enough of an incentive to offer a constrained policy when public support is liberal.
Additionally, the Politician is convinced that group support is liberal, and so it cannot
credibly veto an unconstrained policy. The Agency takes advantage of this belief and always
proposes its preferred policy.
Finally, in the hybrid equilibrium (Proposition 3), we also gain an understanding of
when the Agency will propose an unconstrained rule, given a conservative level of group
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Figure 3.3: Unconstrained Agency Proposals under Proposition 3
Note: This figure depicts the parameter space for q∗ in Proposition 3. The shaded area
shows the probability that the Agency proposes its preferred unconstrained rule, given that
group support is conservative (Ω = ¬L).
support. Here, the Agency will have to sometimes give the Politician her more preferred
constrained rule in order to convince the Politician to sometimes accept unconstrained rules
in this circumstance.
Figure 3.3 presents the Agency’s mixing probability q∗ graphically. This figure reveals
that the Agency is more likely to propose an unconstrained rule as the Politician’s prior belief
that group support is liberal (subject to the constraint that pi < γ+1
2γ
) and the Politician’s
electoral rewards increase. This leads to the next hypothesis, which holds when reputation
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benefits are low compared to ideological distance:
Proposal Hypothesis 4. When group support is conservative, the Agency will offer
both constrained and unconstrained rules.
In sum, in equilibrium the Agency proposes both constrained and unconstrained rules;
however unconstrained rules figure prominently in Propositions 2 and 3. In the pooling
equilibrium (Proposition 2) the Agency only proposes unconstrained rules, while in the
hybrid equilibrium (Proposition 3) unconstrained rules are offered in both pure and mixing
strategies. Taken together, this suggests that agencies offer their preferred policies quite
often, an expectation that contrasts with the notion that agencies advance rules that do not
represent their preferred policies (Shapiro, 2007; Wiseman, 2009). What this model shows
is that agencies do propose policies that represent their best case policy, and occasionally
offer policies that include concessions to satisfy political principals.
3.7 conclusion
This signaling model shows that agencies offer their preferred (unconstrained) policies
with some frequency, and that political principals only rarely veto these rules. This suggests
that with respect to rule proposals, agencies may operate with a relatively free hand. Re-
turning to the e-cigarettes case referred to in the introduction, the implication is that there
is a very good chance that the FDA will be able to select whichever category—vapor prod-
uct, alternative nicotine product, or tobacco product—that agency officials prefer in terms
of implementation and policy concerns.
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From the perspective of the larger dissertation, this model establishes a key point; it
shows how agencies act strategically when selecting which policies to offer when they propose
a rule in order to avoid a regulatory veto. Sometimes they offer their first-best unconstrained
policy and at other points in time they will offer a second-best constrained policy to appease
political principals. (And when they do propose a constrained policy, they have virtual
certainty that it will not succumb to a political veto.) In sum, the model shows that more
often not, proposed rules represent the agencies desired policy, but that agency’s are savvy
enough not to always show their hand.
Of course, the signaling model presented in this chapter is a simplification of reality.
In the real world, agencies choose among a multitude of policy alternatives—not merely
two—and rarely, if ever, do they have perfect information about how interest groups are
disposed to a policy change. Further, the rewards to the Politician of approving or vetoing
a policy proposal are more often than not highly nuanced and specific to particular policy
areas, rather than the simple payoffs presented here.
However, not all of the critiques that can be lobbed at the model are equally valid.
For instance, one criticism of the model is that it is a “one-shot” game, presuming that the
Agency-Politician interaction is a one-time event rather than an exchange that occurs with
some regularity. Yet, the analysis of the political parameters δ and γ dissipates some of the
concern on this point. The notion that both agencies and political overseers think about how
constituencies will perceive their policy choices suggests that there are longer-term costs to
the game. These are exactly the types of effects that matter most in repeated play.
In addition, while the model is highly stylized, it has introduced analytical rigor by
explicitly stipulating the assumptions underlying the theory and yielded a series of testable
77
hypotheses. In addition, the framework allows us to understand how agencies select proposed
rules from available alternatives. This is at its core an unobservable decision; we can never
empirically observe the counterfactual of what an agency would have proposed under different
political circumstances. While this complicates the empirical testing in the next chapter, it
alters our understanding of rulemaking as a fundamentally political activity.
78
3.8 appendix: a note on the status quo
The signaling model presented in this chapter is not a spatial model and, as a result,
many features of traditional spatial models of delegation and accommodation are not rele-
vant(e.g., Bendor, Glazer and Hammond, 2001; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and
Shipan, 2002; Volden, 2002). Although I have taken an agnostic approach to the status quo,
some of the assumptions that I make have implications about its location. In this section, I
unpack these assumptions in order to provide more intuition about the model.
To begin, the Politician’s preferences over policy outcomes are set up such that she
prefers a constrained policy to no policy, and no policy to an unconstrained one. Here
“no policy” means that the Politician vetoes the policy proposed by the Agency and policy
remains at the status quo. Specifically, she receives a payoff of 1, 0, and −1 for each of these
respective outcomes. In a traditional spatial model, this payoff structure would imply that
A < SQ < P . This presumes that the Politician would rather have no rule put forward than
have the Agency lock in a rule with which she disagrees.
As indicated in Footnote 17 there is an empirical basis for setting up the Politician’s
payoffs in this way; rules are durable policy instruments and are costly for political overseers
to undo once they are finalized. An alternate case is possible where the Politician’s payoff
structure is set up so as to imply that SQ < A < P , but it is easy to see that this case would
predict no regulatory vetoes, and would therefore be uninteresting.
Meanwhile, the Agency’s payoffs are set up such that he receives 0 for a vetoed rule,
bc for a constrained rule, and bu for an unconstrained rule (where bc < bu). This implies
that SQ < P < A. In this case, the Agency would rather make incremental policy than do
nothing. This accords with the basic notion that agencies seek out tasks to accrue autonomy
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(Carpenter, 2001, 2010). An alternate case is possible where the Agency prefers the status
quo to the constrained policy (P < SQ < A), yet this case implies that agencies might
actively seek out a veto (presuming that they have to issue a rule), or choose not to issue
the rule altogether. While this is an interesting case, it is one I leave for future research to
unpack.
The contradictory implications about the spatial location of the actors in the model
presented here would not be possible in a traditional one-dimensional spatial model. Yet,
here they are not problematic because the policy benefits associated with rulemaking are nec-
essarily multidimensional.22 For instance, agency bureaucrats likely trade off over pure policy
preferences (i.e., those policies they prefer from a personal perspective) and implementation
preferences (i.e., those policies that their agency can effectively implement). Meanwhile,
OIRA desk officers (for example), trade off over pure policy preferences, goals of the current
presidential administration, and reaching an agreement with the agency that does not cause
them to extend their review time past the allotted 90 days (see Bolton, Potter and Thrower,
2014).
22In one sense, I have segregated one dimension of the policy that I consider especially important – the
political benefit – into a separate parameter for each actor (δ and γ). The other dimensions are lumped
together into a catchall policy benefit parameter.
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3.9 appendix: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that A plays a separating strategy, s.t. SA = {u|Ω =
L; c|Ω = ¬L}. P’s posterior beliefs are given by Pr(Ω = L|x = u) = 1 and Pr(Ω = ¬L|x =
c) = 1. P’s expected utility from playing d = ¬v upon observing x = c is [Pr(Ω = ¬L|x =
c) · (γ + 1)] + [(1− Pr(Ω = ¬L|x = c) · 1)] = γ + 1, while her expected utility from playing
d = v in this case is [Pr(Ω = ¬L|x = c) ·0]+ [(1−Pr(Ω = ¬L|x = c) ·γ)] = 0. So, P strictly
prefers to play ¬v when x = c.
Upon observing x = u, P’s expected utility from playing d = ¬v is [Pr(Ω = L|x =
u) · (1γ− 1)] + [(1−Pr(Ω = L|x = u) · −1)] = γ− 1, while her expected utility from playing
d = v in this case is [Pr(Ω = L|x = u) · 0] + [(1− Pr(Ω = L|x = u) · γ)] = 0. So, P strictly
prefers to play ¬v when x = u.
Now consider whether A would unilaterally deviate from this separating strategy. If
Ω = L, P will play ¬v and A will receive bu + δ for selecting an unconstrained rule. If A
instead plays x = c following Ω = L, he receives bc. Therefore A has no incentive to deviate,
since bu + δ is strictly greater than bc by construction. If Ω = ¬L, P will play ¬v and A will
receive bc + δ for selecting a constrained rule. If A instead plays x = u following Ω = ¬L,
she receives bu. It follows then that if δ > bu − bc, A will have no incentive to deviate and
this is a PBE. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that pi > γ+1
2γ
. Let A play a pooling strategy s.t. sA = u.
P’s expected utility of playing ¬v is EUP (¬v) = (γ − 1)(pi) + (−1)(1 − pi) = γpi − 1, while
her expected utility of vetoing is EUP (v) = (0)(pi) + γ(1− pi) = γ− γpi. It follows that since
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pi > γ+1
2γ
, P prefers not to veto A’s unconstrained proposal (d = ¬v).
To see that A will not deviate and offer a constrained rule, consider the case where
Ω = ¬L. Here, A receives bu from an unconstrained rule, and would receive bc + δ from
switching and offering a constrained rule. However, if we assume that bu − bc > δ this be-
comes a suboptimal move for A and so he does not make it. In the case where Ω = L, A
receives bu + δ from an unconstrained rule and bc from a constrained rule. By construction
bu > bc and δ > 0, so A does not deviate and offer a constrained rule in this situation. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let A play a semi-pooling strategy where he offers an uncon-
strained policy whenever support is liberal and mixes between a constrained and uncon-
strained rule whenever support is conservative, SA = {x = u|Ω = L;x = q|Ω = ¬L}. Let q
be his mixing strategy s.t. q = Pr(x = u|Ω = ¬L).
Following Bayes’ rule, we see P’s posterior beliefs are given by Pr(Ω = L|x = u) =
pi
pi+q−qpi . Using this quantity, we can compare P’s expected utility of not vetoing a rule to
her expected utility of vetoing a rule.
EUP (¬v|u) = pi
pi + q − qpi (γ − 1) + (1−
pi
pi + q = qpi
)(−1)
=
γpi
pi + q − qpi − 1
EUP (v|u) = pi
pi + q − qpi (0) + (1−
pi
pi + q − qpi )(γ)
= γ − γpi
pi + q − qpi
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Setting these quantities equal, we see that after observing an unconstrained proposal,
P will mix between v and ¬v with probability q∗:
EUP (¬v|u) = EUP (v|u)
γpi
pi + q − qpi − 1 = γ −
γpi
pi + q − qpi
q∗ =
γpi − pi
γ − γpi − pi + 1
This implies that pi > 0. Now I show that A mixes with positive probability α =
Pr(d = v|x = u) when he observes a conservative level of group support (Ω = ¬L).
EUA,conservative(u) = α(0) + (1− α)(bu)
= bu − αbu
Observe that if A offers a constrained rule, P will always play ¬v since he knows with
certainty that the level of support is conservative (i.e., Pr(Ω = ¬L|x = c) = 1), suggesting
that EUA,conservative(c) = bc + δ.
EUA,conservative(u) = EUA,conservative(c)
bu − αbu = bc + δ
α∗ =
bu − bc − δ
bu
This implies that bu−bc ≥ δ. To confirm that this is an equilibrium, it is necessary to
show that when group support is liberal A will not deviate and propose a constrained rule.
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In this case the expected utility from staying (and proposing an unconstrained rule) must
be greater than the expected utility from deviating (and proposing a constrained rule).
EUA,liberal(u) > EUA,liberal(c)
αδ + (1− α)(bu + δ) > bc
bu − bu − bc − δ
bu
(bu) + δ > bc
δ > 0
But, δ > 0 is true by construction, showing that this is indeed a PBE. To see why
pi < γ+1
2γ
, note that the constraint δ < bu − bc from this equilibrium is also shared by the
pooling equilibrium. When that constraint binds and pi > γ+1
2γ
, the pooling equilibrium
holds. So it must be the case that when δ < bu− bc binds and pi < γ+12γ , this semi-separating
equilibrium obtains. 
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Chapter 4
Demystifying the Regulatory Veto: Empirical Tests of the Model
Federal agencies issue hundreds of proposed rules each year. Like bills introduced in
Congress, however, many rules never reach the final rule stage. While this attenuation can
be attributed to many causes (e.g., a proposed rule may become less of a priority if a new
administration takes office), regulatory vetoes account for a non-negligible portion of the fall
off. Vetoes from the president and Congress come in different guises, as I explain in this
chapter.
The central argument in this dissertation is that because agencies invest so much
in their proposed rules, they behave strategically in order to help them succeed. The first
and second chapters laid out a theoretical framework for thinking about how agencies do
this and why it matters. The third chapter developed that argument by way of a signaling
model that highlighted how agencies select which types of rules to propose. In this chapter,
I empirically test the regulatory veto implications that flow from that model.
This chapter proceeds in several parts. I begin by summarizing and restating the
theoretical expectations from Chapter 3 with regard to regulatory vetoes. I then describe
the nature of regulatory vetoes by the president and test the expectations on a new dataset of
vetoes by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The next section explains
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how congressional regulatory vetoes function in practice, and explores how the model might
be tested in that context. The final section concludes with a discussion of the implications
of the results for the broader argument advanced in the dissertation.
4.1 theoretical expectations
The signaling model offers two types of empirical predictions: 1) predictions about
the type of rule the agency will propose (a less desirable constrained rule or a more desirable
unconstrained rule); and 2) predictions about when political principals will issue regulatory
vetoes. In this chapter, I test the second class of hypotheses about regulatory vetoes. Reg-
ulatory vetoes have a clear empirical application, as it is possible to observe rules that are
successfully promulgated and those that are vetoed by political principals.
Below I restate the veto hypotheses from Chapter 3 for the reader’s convenience.
Notably, I reframe the hypotheses in terms of the veto rate, since that is the basis of the
empirical tests that follow.
Veto Hypothesis 2. The veto rate will increase as the ideological distance between
the Agency and the Politician increases.
Veto Hypothesis 3. The veto rate will decrease when the Politician’s electoral
payoffs are high.
Veto Hypothesis 4a. When ideological distance is high, the veto rate will decrease
as political payoffs increase.
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Veto Hypothesis 4b. When ideological distance is low, the veto rate will have no
relationship with political payoffs.
Veto Hypothesis 4c. At low levels of political payoffs, high distance will have a
greater veto rate than low distance.
Veto Hypothesis 5. The veto rate will increase and then decrease as the Politi-
cian’s prior belief that group support is liberal increases.
The keen reader has no doubt observed that this list omits Veto Hypothesis 1, which
relates to the relative incidence of vetoes for unconstrained and constrained rules. I exclude
this hypothesis from the tests in this chapter, because it is not possible to observe the degree
of extremity of a policy proposal (i.e., whether it is constrained or unconstrained). The
policy alternatives that agencies consider when drafting a new proposed rule are rarely, if
ever, made explicit. Even in the e-cigarettes example from Chapter 3, where we know that
the FDA at least nominally considered categorizing e-cigarettes as a “vapor product,” an
“alternative nicotine product,” or a “tobacco product,” it is entirely possible that the FDA
will select a fourth policy alternative that differs from these defined alternatives. Put differ-
ently, the implicit nature of policy alternatives means that they are essentially unobserved
counterfactuals, meaning that we do not know exactly what the agency would have proposed
had they not proposed the policy that they did propose.
This limitation also prevents me from testing the agency proposal hypotheses from
Chapter 3. This is unfortunate because, in terms of developing the theoretical argument
for this project, that set of hypotheses is substantively quite interesting; it is indicative
of how an agency strategically selects which rule to propose, which, in turn, informs our
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understanding of proposed rule investments. While the model still provides value from a
theoretical standpoint with respect to this set of hypotheses, in practice empirical tests are
limited since one cannot gather data and make inferences about policy alternatives that
never materialized and are fundamentally unobservable. Testing all of the implications of
any formal model is, in a sense, a quixotic pursuit as most models have implications far
beyond what the original research envisioned (Morton, 1999, 282). In this case, while the
evaluation of only one set of implications from the model is not dispositive, showing that
the model’s implications have empirical support serves to enhance the overall validity of the
model.
In the sections that follow, I apply the veto hypotheses to a new dataset of regulatory
vetoes by the president (via OIRA), and discuss how the hypotheses might be tested in the
context of regulatory vetoes issued by Congress.
4.2 white house vetoes of agency rules
OIRA’s review process ultimately concludes with a decision: approve (or, in the
lingo of OIRA desk officers, “clear” the rule) or veto the rule. Rejections can come in two
forms. Most directly, OIRA can return the rule to the agency for further consideration (a
euphemism for rejecting the rule). Although this veto power has existed since OIRA was first
created in 1981, the tool took on a more public role at the start of the Bush administration.
At that point, OIRA, under the leadership of Administrator John Graham, began posting
“return letters” to its website. These letters, which recount in some detail the reason(s) that
OIRA found the rule to be deficient, serve as a public shaming to the agency and their high
visibility virtually ensures that they are rare events; since 2001, only 27 returns letters have
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been issued.1
However, return letters are not the only avenue for a presidential veto of an agency’s
proposed rule. In cases where OIRA credibly threatens to return a proposed rule to the
agency, the agency can voluntarily “withdraw” the rule from consideration before OIRA
officially returns the rule. Indeed, according to former OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein
(2013a, 1847), “because many rules are withdrawn and many change as a result of OIRA
review, it is misleading to focus on the number of return letters as a measure of OIRA’s
impact.”
Withdrawals essentially function as a quiet veto of the agency’s proposal; OIRA
stops the rulemaking process from proceeding, and the agency does not have to endure
the humiliation of a return letter. While this strategy is less conspicuous than a return,
withdrawals have not gone without notice. For instance, one observer recently suggested
that under President Obama OIRA has encouraged agencies to withdraw rules in order to
“unceremoniously dispose of long-overdue OIRA reviews involving important safeguards that
are vigorously opposed by industry” (Goodwin, 2013).
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, when OIRA vetoes are calculated to include both with-
drawals and formal returns (solid black line), vetoes are actually a relatively common occur-
rence. Based on the number of rules reviewed by OIRA each year, considering vetoes in this
manner results in an average annual veto rate of 7.4% for proposed rules (compared to an
average annual veto rate of about 1.4% for proposed rules when withdrawals are excluded).2
1Return letters are available on OIRA’s website: http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoReturnLetters.
2Although this chapter focuses on vetoes of proposed rules, vetoes of agency rules can also occur at the final
rule stage. Empirically speaking, vetoes at this late stage are much rarer, with a veto rate of approximately
4.9% (including withdrawals) and 0.7% (excluding withdrawals). This may be explained that by the fact
that most final rules were already reviewed and approved by OIRA at the proposed rule stage (so if OIRA
was going to veto the rule, it would have already done so). Also, it may be more politically costly for OIRA
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Figure 4.1: OIRA Vetoes of Agency Rules, 1981–2012
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Note: Data compiled by the author from OIRA records (available at www.reginfo.gov). The
drop in vetoes from 1994 onward can likely be attributed to the signing of E.O. 12866 in
September of 1993. That order precipitated a number of changes to the regulatory review
process, including a significant reduction in the volume of rules that OIRA reviews each year.
Further, Figure 4.1 shows that withdrawals and returns generally follow the same
patterns, peaking during the administration of President George H. W. Bush and again at
the start of George W. Bush’s administration. This implies that withdrawals and returns
are both influenced by the same political factors, perhaps even serving as a continuum,
with agencies withdrawing rules when OIRA review is consonant, and OIRA returning rules
when review is more contentious. Sunstein (2013a, 1847) suggests as much, stating that
to intervene and overturn a rule at the final rule stage than at the proposed rule stage.
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return letters are only issued when there is consensus within the Executive Office of the
President that the rule is not viable (politically or practically). However, he also notes
that withdrawals can occur for many reasons (including the agency’s unprompted request
to withdraw), and OIRA pressure is just one of these reasons. This means that including
withdrawals in calculations of OIRA’s veto rate overcounts the number of vetoes, while
focusing solely on official returns undercounts the number of vetoes. This essentially reduces
to a tradeoff between making Type I and Type II errors in a statistical analysis of OIRA
vetoes. In light of this, I include consideration of vetoes with and without withdrawals in
the regression analyses in this chapter.
OIRA Veto Data
To translate the model to data, I first determine the rate at which OIRA vetoes agency
rules. To calculate the veto rate, for each agency I identified all rules that OIRA reviewed
in a given year.3 This figure serves as the veto rate denominator. I offer three versions of
the numerator. The first version Return Rate includes only rules that OIRA returned to the
agency for reconsideration. Withdraw Rate, the second version, includes only rules that the
agency withdrew from consideration. The third version, Total Rate, pools both returns and
withdrawals to create the most comprehensive portrait of vetoes.
The dependent variables, Return Rate, Withdraw Rate, and Total Rate, are thus
agency-year proportions, with values closer to one indicating a higher rate of vetoes by
OIRA. The dataset includes 19 agencies4 and span from 1981 to 2012. The level of analysis
3These data come from the official government website for OIRA review data, www.reginfo.gov. I exclude
from the analysis any rule that did not undergo a meaningful review; these are rules that are marked by
OIRA as either “improperly submitted” or “exempt from review under the Executive Order.”
4See Table 2.2 in the Appendix to Chapter 2 for a list of the agencies included in the analysis.
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is the agency-year.
Testing the model’s hypotheses requires the operationalization of several parameters.
First, to capture the ideological distance between the agency and OIRA (bu − bc), I rely
on estimates of agency ideology developed by Bertelli and Grose (2011).5 These scores are
based on statements about legislation made by agency heads during congressional testimony.
Bertelli and Grose code these statements and then use a scaling technique to place these
agency heads on the same dimension as presidents and legislators. As detailed in Section
2.5 of Chapter 2, Bertelli and Grose’s estimates capture agency ideology at the highest level
and are appropriate to address political decisions, like writing an extreme rule (or vetoing
it). Their estimates are scaled from -1 to 1, with negative (positive) values indicating a more
liberal (conservative) agency. To get the distance between the actors, I take the absolute
value of the ideological distance between the agency and the president using these scores.
As stated in Veto Hypothesis 2, Ideological Distance should have a positive relationship with
the veto rate, indicating that the veto rate increases when the president and the agency are
ideologically discordant.
Next, I create a measure of the political payoffs for OIRA (γ). This parameter
captures the idea that OIRA (or the president) receives political rewards for getting certain
policies right (i.e., setting policy that accords with the true level of public support). To
operationalize this, I consider whether the policy area that the agency oversees is an area of
particular importance to the president. Those areas that are high on the president’s agenda
should provide greater political rewards for setting policy accurately. To measure this, I use
data from presidential State of the Union (SOTU) addresses, coded by the Policy Agendas
5See the Appendix to Chapter 2 for further discussion of how these estimates were created, and how they
compare to other estimates of agency ideology.
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Project (“Policy Agendas”).6 These addresses are coded by sentence and categorized into a
set of predefined topic areas. I then match these topic areas to the agencies in the dataset
according to the crosswalk provided in Table 4.1. The variable SOTU Mentions is a count of
the number of times the agency’s policy area was mentioned by the president in that year’s
SOTU address. Consistent with Veto Hypothesis 3, I expect SOTU Mentions to have a
negative relationship with veto rates.
The variable Policy Mood approximates OIRA’s prior belief about the level of public
support for a policy change. To create a measure of public opinion by policy area I draw
from policy-specific mood measures of public opinion from the Policy Agendas Project. The
idea of a policy mood, first developed by Stimson (1991), involves amassing hundreds of
survey data responses to create aggregate measures of the “liberalness” of the population at
a given point in time. Following Stimson’s methodology, Atkinson et al. (2011) extend policy
moods to specific policy areas, such as transportation and education, by first categorizing
survey questions according to their policy area and then creating aggregate mood measures.
This generates longitudinal measures of the liberalness of public opinion in specific policy
domains on an annual basis. From there, I match Policy Mood with agencies according to
their Policy Agendas policy area (see Table 4.1). Higher values of Policy Mood indicate a
more liberal mood towards a policy area. In order to approximate the inverted U-shape
indicated in Veto Hypothesis 5, I square this variable and multiply it by −1. I expect this
transformation of Policy Mood to have a positive relationship with each dependent variable.
The next variable, Divided, is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 0 if both
chambers of Congress and the White House are controlled by the same party, and 1 otherwise.
6These data are available at http://www.policyagendas.org/.
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Table 4.1: Agency-Policy Agendas (PA) Crosswalk
Agency Name Policy Agendas Topic
Dept of Commerce Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce (15)
Dept of Defense Defense (16)
Dept of Education Education (6)
Dept of Energy Energy (8)
Dept of Health & Human Services Health (3)
Dept of Homeland Security Defense (16)
Dept of Housing & Urban Development Community Development & Housing Issues (14)
Dept of Justice Law, Crime, and Family Issues (12)
Dept of Labor Labor, Employment, & Immigration (5)
Dept of Transportation Transportation (10)
Dept of Veterans Affairs Defense (16)
Dept of the Interior Public Lands & Water Management (21)
Dept of the Treasury Macroeconomics (1)
Environmental Protection Agency Environment (7)
Fed Emergency Mgmt Agency Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce (15)
General Services Administration Government Operations (20)
Office of Personnel Management Government Operations (20)
Small Business Administration Banking, Finance, & Domestic Commerce (15)
Social Security Administration Social Welfare (13)
Note: This table lists the agencies included in the analysis and the corresponding policy
topic in the Policy Agendas (PA) codebook. The mapping from agencies to topics was
done by the author based on the correspondence between the policy areas addressed by the
agency and the substance of the PA topic area. In almost all cases, the agency name is
listed in the PA codebook.
I include this variable to account for the possibility that OIRA may view a congressional
veto as a substitute for its own veto. So during periods of unified government, OIRA has
a “fall back”—if it does not veto the agency’s rule, Congress may do so instead. During
periods of divided government, I expect the veto rate to increase, as the president cannot
rely on Congress to share in the workload of checking agency rules. This suggests a positive
sign for this variable in the regression analyses that follow.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for OIRA Veto Data
Variable name mean s.d. min max
Return Rate 0.50 2.06 0 16.00
Withdraw Rate 7.44 11.34 0 58.82
Total Rate 7.94 11.72 0 58.82
Ideological Distance 0.50 0.17 0.13 0.89
SOTU Mentions 18.03 20.06 0 106
Policy Mood -0.41 0.19 -0.82 -0.08
Divided 0.59 0.49 0 1
Total Review 16.84 21.94 0 184
Finally, I include a control variable Total Review that is a count of the number of
rules that the agency submitted to OIRA for review in that year (i.e., the denominator for
Return Rate, Withdraw Rate and Total Rate). This variable addresses the possibility that
veto rates may be artificially higher (lower) for agencies that submit very few (many) rules
for review each year. See Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
analysis.
Results
Table 4.3 presents the results of OLS models that test the theoretical implications
of the signaling model using the OIRA veto data described above. OLS provides the most
straightforward way to analyze these data, although I use an alternative estimation technique
later as a robustness check. To ease the interpretation of the coefficients, I multiply each of
the dependent variables by 100, so that the values are bounded on the [0,100] interval, rather
than the [0,1] interval. The models include fixed effects for each presidential administration,
with George W. Bush as the omitted case. Robust standard errors clustered on the agency
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are in parentheses.
The results provide support for the hypotheses that follow from the signaling model.
To begin, Veto Hypothesis 2 indicates that Ideological Distance should have a positive re-
lationship with the veto rate. To test this hypothesis, I examine the effect of this variable
with all other variables (including the interaction term) held constant at their means. I
find statistically significant support for the hypothesis. Moving from the minimum to the
maximum value of Ideological Distance results in an increase of 1.42 vetoes for Return Rate,
which is approximately double the mean value of these veto rates. For Withdraw Rate and
Total Rate the effect is positive, but not significant at conventional levels.
Turning to the role of electoral rewards in veto decisions, the models do not provide
statistically significant support for the political payoff hypotheses. Specifically, Veto Hy-
pothesis 3 predicts that as political rewards increase, the veto rate will diminish. While the
models do not support this hypothesis, there is support for the interactive effect of SOTU
Mentions, at least with respect to Return Rate.7 Figure 4.2 presents a graphical depiction of
the results of the interaction that tests Veto Hypotheses 4a-4c for Return Rate. Consistent
with H4a, for high values of distance (dark gray line), vetoes decrease as SOTU Mentions
increase. While the regression line for low values of distance (light gray) is slightly increasing,
the lower confidence interval never exceeds zero, suggesting that, as predicted in H4b, SOTU
Mentions is not meaningfully modified by ideological distance. In addition, at low values of
SOTU Mentions, there is a statistically significant difference between high and low values of
distance, with high distance values having a higher veto rate. Again, this is consistent with
7Notably, although not statistically significant at conventional levels, the sign for the interaction coefficients
for Withdraw Rate and Total Rate are in the expected direction and the empirical pattern shown in Figure
4.2 holds for these models as well.
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Table 4.3: OIRA Veto Rate Models, 1991-2004
(1) (2) (3)
Return Rate Withdraw Rate Total Rate
β/se β/se β/se
Ideological Distance 2.046*** 12.761 14.806
(0.627) (10.773) (10.784)
SOTU Mentions 0.027*** -0.045 -0.018
(0.009) (0.179) (0.183)
Id Dist x SOTU -0.068*** -0.195 -0.263
(0.019) (0.377) (0.383)
Policy Mood -0.802 14.029* 13.228
(1.316) (7.592) (7.543)
Total Review 0.004 0.080** 0.084**
(0.005) (0.037) (0.038)
Divided 0.237 3.130* 3.366*
(0.231) (1.554) (1.642)
Bush I 4.178** -15.620*** -11.442**
(1.633) (3.230) (3.976)
Clinton -0.880 -3.121 -4.001
(0.744) (2.781) (2.899)
Constant -0.555 8.631 8.076
(0.349) (6.500) (6.661)
R-squared 0.208 0.089 0.092
N 116 116 116
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < .01
Note: OLS models with robust standard errors clustered on the
agency in parentheses. Return Rate excludes rule withdrawals,
while Total Rate includes both rule returns and withdrawals. Ide-
ology scores are from Bertelli and Grose (2011).
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Figure 4.2: Marginal Effect of Ideological Distance x SOTU Mentions
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Note: Graph shows predicted values for high and low values of Ideological Distance across the
range of values for SOTU Mentions for Return Rate. Shaded areas represent 90% confidence
intervals. Low values of distance calculated at the 10th percentile of Ideological Distance,
while high values are calculated at the 90th percentile.
the prediction in H4c.
The data provide some support for Veto Hypothesis 5, which predicts that Policy
Mood will have a positive relationship with the veto rate. This relationship holds at a
statistically significant level for Withdraw Rate (Model 2), and approaches a statistically
significant threshold in Model 3 (Total Rate). Because this variable is specified in a concave
manner, its interpretation is nuanced; moving the mean Policy Mood value to a one-standard
deviation increase results in a 4% increase in the veto rate, which is considerable in light of
the fact that the mean withdraw rate is about 7.4%.
Turning to the control variables, Total Review is positive and statistically significant in
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Models 2 and 3, suggesting that agencies that issue more rules (generally speaking, regulatory
agencies) are more likely to incur a veto. This is not surprising since many of the most
contentious rules come from regulatory agencies for whom regulation is the primary vehicle
to drive policy change. As expected Divided Government is positive and significant for
the Withdraw Rate and Total Rate models. This indicates that under divided government,
agencies are more likely to withdraw or have their rules vetoed. The coefficients for Bush
I are negative for Models 2 and 3, but positive for Model 1. This suggests that, compared
with the George W. Bush administration, the first Bush administration was less likely to
issue withdrawals and more likely to use formal returns instead.
Overall, we observe different patterns for Return Rate and Withdraw Rate. Model 1
(Return Rate) provides support for Veto Hypotheses 2 and 4a-c, while Model 2 (Withdraw
Rate) provides support for Veto Hypothesis 5. Ideally, one model would provide conclusive
empirical support for all of the veto hypotheses, yet this is a high bar for any model of real
world phenomena.
Robustness
One potential issue with the estimation of these models is that, because the dependent
variable is bounded between 1 and 100, OLS yields impossible predictions that lie outside of
this interval. As a robustness check, I transform the dependent variables into a proportion
(i.e., divide them by 100 so that they are bounded on [0,1]) and reestimate the models using a
fractional logit technique (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Kieschnick and McCullough, 2003).
This quasi-maximum likelihood approach is a modification of the traditional logit model
that allows the dependent variable to be a (bounded) fraction, rather than binary. Table
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4.4 presents the results of these models. Notably, the results from the main models do not
meaningfully change when this alternate specification is used: the signs are unaffected and
the effect sizes are approximately the same as those from the OLS models.
Finally, because the model’s observations are agency-year, autocorrelation is a poten-
tial issue. To address this concern, I reestimated the models using year fixed effects (rather
than presidential administration fixed effects) and also using a polynomial time trend (i.e.,
time and time squared). The results from both of these estimation strategies (not shown)
are substantively unchanged from those presented in Table 4.3.
4.3 discussion and conclusion
The regulatory veto is no great secret to agencies. The fact that OIRA can—and
does—veto agency rules is well-known to executive agencies that are subject to regulatory
oversight by that office. Unsurprisingly, then, vetoes are rare events because agencies antic-
ipate them and respond accordingly. When vetoes do occur, the signaling model suggests
that they happen because the agency has been ambitious (i.e., proposed an unconstrained
rule) and the political payoffs for political overseers and the agency trump policy concerns.
The regression analyses presented in this chapter provide some empirical corrobora-
tion for the veto conditions outlined in the signaling model. As predicted, vetoes increase
in the ideological distance between the president and the agency, but decrease when a pol-
icy area is more frequently mentioned in the SOTU or when the public’s mood about that
policy area becomes more liberal. Further, as expected, when the agency and OIRA are
ideologically distant, the veto rate decreases the more that a policy area is mentioned in
the SOTU. Overall, this patterns holds for Return Rate, and the results are suggestive for
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Table 4.4: Fractional Logit Models of OIRA Veto Rate, 1991-2004
(4) (5) (6)
Return Rate With Rate Total Rate
β/se β/se β/se
Ideological Distance 11.183* 1.261 1.409
(5.940) (1.101) (1.107)
SOTU Mentions 0.177 -0.038 -0.036
(0.148) (0.032) (0.033)
Id Dist x SOTU -0.539* 0.002 -0.004
(0.312) (0.064) (0.066)
Policy Mood -4.009 2.423** 2.249**
(4.436) (1.022) (0.997)
Total Review 0.012 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.019) (0.004) (0.004)
Divided 0.253 0.447** 0.454**
(0.511) (0.217) (0.212)
Bush I 3.236* -3.255*** -1.567***
(1.948) (0.648) (0.395)
Clinton -4.799 -0.316 -0.409
(3.161) (0.374) (0.374)
Constant -12.938** -1.894** -1.939**
(5.261) (0.846) (0.857)
N 116 116 116
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < .01
Note: Fractional logit models with robust standard errors
clustered on the agency in parentheses. Ideological distance
estimates come from Bertelli and Grose’s (2011) data.
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Withdraw Rate.
These results are suggestive. The signaling model lays out a plausible theory of how
agencies and political overseers approach rule-writing and the veto process. The data lend
support to this theory, suggesting that the theory actually applies in the real world. While,
as explained earlier, this empirical analysis is not dispositive (meaning that it does not allow
us to conclude that the model is “right”), the data indicate that the signaling model speaks
meaningfully to the empirical reality surrounding agency proposals and regulatory vetoes.
Of course, OIRA’s regulatory veto is only one part of the story. In addition to the
empirical findings presented in this chapter, the model naturally extends to congressional use
of the regulatory veto (recall that the Politician from Chapter 3 was generically defined as
either the President or Congress) and extending the analysis to cover Congress would serve
as additional support for the theory advanced by the signaling model.8 Congress can take
one of three actions to veto an agency’s rule: pass a new law that overwrites or otherwise
prohibits the agency’s rule, nullify the rule through powers enumerated in the Congressional
Review Act (CRA), or attach a limitation rider barring the rule to another bill at the final
passage stage. Each of these paths achieves the same end (a veto), yet each path presents
different challenges for members of Congress and has different implications for agencies on
the receiving end.
With respect to regulatory vetoes issued through new legislation, there is very little
by way of empirical data that addresses the frequency with which this occurs. Anecdotally,
it appears that Members of Congress (MCs) frequently introduce bills aimed at stopping
8I do not explicitly test the model on congressional vetoes here, given some of the complications associated
with that data (discussed below). In future work, I hope to explore congressional vetoes and “agency-
curbing” in more detail.
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agencies from completing certain rules.9 Yet, it is unclear how many of these bills actually
become law or whether their introduction is merely a form of constituency work (Fiorina,
1989) or credit-claiming (Mayhew, 1974) for MCs. For instance, at least four bills that
would thwart the FDA’s menu-labeling proposed rule (see Chapter 6) were introduced in
the 112th and 113th Congresses. All of those bills died at the committee stage. Given the
collective action problems associated with passage of any law (Cox and McCubbins, 1993), it
would seem that the majority of rule-curbing bills serve some other purpose, like posturing
or warning the agency, rather than directly impeding the agency’s action.
The second congressional veto outlet, the CRA, is very similar to the power to annul
a rule through passage of a new law. To use the CRA, both chambers must pass a joint
resolution which then must be signed by the president. As a result, the CRA path is still
subject to all of the same collective action and coordination problems previously cited. It is
unsurprising then the CRA has been successfully deployed exactly once; in 2001 Congress
overturned a final rule from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that
enacted broad ergonomics standards for workplaces. The rule was issued at the tail end of the
Clinton administration and overturned by a Republican Congress at the commencement of
the Bush administration. The rule itself was extremely controversial and is considered to be
an atypical rulemaking case (Rosenberg, 2008; Shapiro, 2007).10 However, as Copeland and
Beth (2008) point out, if Congress can overcome its collective action problem and actually
9This is similar to Clark’s (2009) argument about “court curbing” bills introduced by MCs to keep the court
in line. Clark argues that such bills can be an informative signal to the courts about public opinion on a
particular issue. “Agency curbing” bills may serve a similar function in that they inform agencies about
public opinion and the political salience of particular rules.
10However, Rosenberg (2008) reports that from 1996 to 2008, 47 resolutions of disapproval relating to 35
rules were introduced under the CRA. Although only one passed, three were approved by one chamber
and not the other.
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Figure 4.3: Regulatory Limitation Riders, Fiscal Year (FY) 1989-2009
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Note: The line indicates the number of congressional regulatory vetoes issued via limitation
riders from FY1989 - 2009. The data pool riders issued for proposed rules, final rules, and
“preemptive” vetoes for rules that do not yet exist. Data are from MacDonald (2010).
deploy the CRA, it comes with an additional punch: it prevents the agency from issuing the
rule (or a “substantially similar” version of the rule) at any point in the future.11
Finally, regulatory limitation riders may be the most accessible way for MCs to veto
an agency’s rule. As MacDonald (2010) explains, these riders are attached to appropriations
bills and bar agencies from spending money to issue or implement specific regulations. Be-
cause appropriations bills are considered “must pass” legislation,12 from an MC’s perspective
this is close to a unilateral veto power. Figure 4.3 shows the annual incidence of regulatory
limitation riders using MacDonald’s (2010) dataset.
11Copeland and Beth (2008) also note that the CRA is a useful tool for a new congress because it grants
them the opportunity to overturn last-minute rules issued during the waning days of the previous congress
(or administration).
12That is, outside of the recent political context where annual appropriations laws have been few and far
between.
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The figure demonstrates that limitation riders are used to veto agency rules with
some regularity (although they occur less frequently than OIRA vetoes). However, plotting
limitation riders in the same way as OIRA vetoes (see Figure 4.1) masks a key nuance of
these data. Importantly, limitation riders are often used preemptively to prevent agencies
from issuing rules in new areas. For example, of the 512 riders in MacDonald’s dataset, 22
(4.3%) were issued to prevent agencies from writing rules to implement the Kyoto Protocol.
These vetoes occurred even though no agency had started working on a rule to implement
the treaty. While other riders address specific proposed or final rules, preemptive vetoes
such as these are very different from the theoretical argument about vetoes offered in this
dissertation. This raises an important point about congressional use of the regulatory veto,
as the preemptive veto is also likely to be included in the type of regulatory vetoes contained
in bills and legislation previously discussed.
This suggests that, while an empirical study of congressional regulatory vetoes is
promising, careful attention should be paid to the details associated with these vetoes, as they
may be symbolic, preemptive, or even may address different substantive issues than those
raised here. So, while the argument advanced here is likely applicable to these data, empirical
and theoretical modifications may be necessary. In addition, to get a comprehensive sense
of how these vetoes work, it appears necessary to consider all three veto paths in tandem,
as MCs may treat them as substitutes and studying one path would paint an incomplete
portrait.13
To conclude, regulatory vetoes—issued by both OIRA and by Congress—critically
shape how agencies write rules. In the next chapter, I take this observation to the next
13Of course, as discussed earlier, OIRA vetoes and congressional vetoes may also serve as substitutes partic-
ularly under unified government.
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stage and examine how agency strategy continues once an agency has effectively dodged a
regulatory veto for a proposed rule.
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Chapter 5
Commandeering the Public Comment Period
The model of agency behavior put forth in this dissertation is one of strategic bu-
reaucrats responding to the incentives created by the notice-and-comment process. I argue
that this incentive structure leads bureaucrats to become entrenched in a policy early in the
process and then work to defend it as the process unfolds. In the preceding chapters, I devel-
oped a formal model to show how an agency strategically selects the type of rule to propose
in order to avoid a regulatory veto, and then tested the empirical implications of that model
on a new dataset of regulatory vetoes. In this chapter, I continue on to the next step of the
process and examine agency behavior after the proposed rule is drafted. Specifically, I ask
how do agencies strategically approach the public comment period in order to protect their
investment in the proposed rule?
The public comment period is a critical stage of the notice-and-comment process.
During this mandatory part of the process,1 the agency takes the proposed rule to the public
1The public comment period is not technically mandatory, as there are procedural options, such as issuing
an interim final rule, that allow the agency to bypass this step. Additionally, most rules themselves are
discretionary and not issued as the result of a specific mandate (West and Raso, 2013). So if an agency
really wanted to avoid a public comment period, it could not write a rule in the first place. That said,
federal agencies promulgate hundreds of rules each year, the majority of which follow the traditional notice-
and-comment route and include a public comment period.
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and allows stakeholders to weigh in on the policy. If stakeholders sound the “fire alarm”
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984), they can activate political overseers who can then put
the kibosh on the proposed rule. The agency’s investment in that proposed rule is then
squandered. To guard against this outcome, I argue that agencies can manipulate the public
comment period in strategic ways.
In this chapter, I situate this behavior in the context of congressional oversight of
rulemaking. I focus on Congress for two reasons. First, from the broader perspective of
the project, the argument I make is about the strategic behavior of agencies in response to
political oversight from both Congress and the president. In the previous chapter (Chapter
4) I focused on regulatory vetoes by OIRA (i.e., presidential vetoes), so it is only fitting to
balance the argument by focusing on Congress here. Second, from a practical perspective,
it is difficult to observe agency manipulation of the public comment period with respect to
OIRA, since much of this happens under the shroud of OIRA review and out of the public
eye.2
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in several sections. I begin by identifying the
discretion that agencies have with respect to the development of proposed rules and offer
a theory of how agencies use these tools to fend off (anticipated) congressional interven-
tions. The third section tests the hypotheses I develop about strategic preemption on a new
dataset of agency rulemaking activity. After presenting the empirical results, the chapter
concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for a broader understanding
of administrative rulemaking and this project.
2OIRA reviews draft proposed rules before they are sent to the Federal Register for publication. Thus, the
agency’s strategic behavior with respect to public comment periods and OIRA is likely different than the
case I make in this chapter since OIRA can privately negotiate the details of the public comment period
with an agency.
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5.1 procedural discretion and congressional oversight
For any particular rule, the agency issuing the rule has considerable discretion when it
comes to the procedural decisions that govern how the notice-and-comment process actually
unfolds. For instance, agency bureaucrats decide how long to set the public comment period
and when to publish the proposed rule. They also choose whether to publish a pre-rule
(formally known as an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking or ANPRM), to host
public hearings during the public comment period, to extend the initial public comment
period or reopen the rule for a secondary comment period, and to restrict the format of
comments accepted into a rule’s docket,3 amongst myriad other decisions.
Although this procedural discretion is rarely (if ever) recognized by scholars, it has an
important implication. Theoretically speaking, it means that administrative procedures are
not self-executing. This is important because scholars have long argued that by instituting
administrative procedures political principals assert control over an agency’s choices (Bawn,
1995; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987, 1989). While scholars have noted that agencies
still have discretion in the context of administrative procedures (Epstein and O’Halloran,
1999; Potoski, 1999), this discretion is always defined in terms of policy discretion, rather
than procedural discretion.4 Yet, when it comes to notice-and-comment, the administrative
procedures themselves are implemented by the very agency bureaucrats whose behavior they
are designed to constrain. This suggests that agencies may be able to use procedures to
3Agencies must specifically identify the formats (mail, e-mail, web, etc.) in which they will accept comments
for a particular rule. Although advances in e-government are rapidly making this less of an issue, in one
infamous 2008 midnight rule, the Department of Interior declined to accept comments submitted via email,
resulting in numerous comments criticizing the agency.
4The distinction between policy and procedural discretion is important, since the latter may magnify the
former.
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subvert the oversight that the process was intended to provide. This potential becomes
more plausible when one considers that agencies churn out dozens of rules each year, enabling
bureaucrats to familiarize themselves with the nuances of these procedural decisions and how
they tend to play out for their agency.
In this chapter, I examine how bureaucrats leverage this insider knowledge, along
with their administrative discretion, to steer the notice-and-comment rulemaking process in
their preferred direction. Specifically, I argue that agency bureaucrats manipulate the ad-
ministrative process in ways that make it more difficult for members of Congress to interfere
with a rulemaking. As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, the regulatory veto gives agencies
good reason to be leery of Congress when engaging in the rulemaking process. The repercus-
sions for promulgating an unfavorable rule do not stop there though. Several studies have
shown that as preferences between Congress and the agency diverge, Congress is more likely
to punish the agency in other ways, including reducing the agency’s discretion by writing
more specific statutes, strengthening administrative procedures, or increasing the level of
monitoring (see, e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002; McCubbins,
Noll and Weingast, 1987). Thus, as a starting point, we might suspect that agencies are
more likely to be cautious when they are ideologically distant from the controlling powers in
Congress (and therefore more susceptible to congressional sanctions).
Theories of a responsive bureaucracy (e.g., Weingast and Moran, 1983; Wood, 1988;
Wood and Anderson, 1993; Wood and Waterman, 1991) would suggest that agencies should
alter the content of their proposed rules or issue fewer proposals under such circumstances.
However, this is not the only possible strategy for an agency. After all, the negative conse-
quences that flow from congressional intervention in an agency’s rulemaking are not auto-
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matic. Instead, they are conditioned on two factors. First, the relevant parties in Congress
must be made aware of the agency’s infraction (i.e., the rule in question). Members of
Congress are busy and, as a matter of course, do not routinely follow the rulemaking ac-
tivities of agencies. Therefore, some aggrieved party must inform the powers that be of the
agency’s rule. Second, upon learning of the infraction, Congress must be willing to intervene
in the rulemaking process. That is, the benefits of weighing in against an agency’s rule must
outweigh the costs of doing so.
Crucial to the argument that I make here is the observation that agencies are the
first movers in the notice-and-comment process. That is, they propose a policy (i.e., a
proposed rule) and only then does Congress get a chance to respond. While agencies could
propose fewer policies or policies that congressional interests are more likely to agree with,
if we believe that bureaucrats have their own policy preferences this may be a suboptimal
result. Another route would be to propose a policy that more closely aligns with their own
preferences and then employ strategies that reduce the likelihood that members of Congress
will hear about the infraction or find it worthwhile to punish the agency. The argument in this
chapter is that the procedural decisions that accompany notice-and-comment afford agency
bureaucrats exactly this opportunity. And agencies use these procedures strategically to
lower the profile of their insubordination and raise the costs of intervening in the rulemaking
process for members of Congress. In other words, they preempt the possibility that members
of Congress will embroil themselves in the agency’s regulatory policymaking, rather than
respond to congressional preferences.
In the sections that follow, I outline how agencies use their procedural discretion in
the public comment period to stave off congressional incursion. First, I show how agencies
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use stakeholder engagement to build coalitions. This strategy builds support for an agency’s
proposed rule and makes intervention more costly since members of Congress will be less
likely to intervene when doing so requires them to confront entrenched stakeholders who
support the policy. Second, agencies can time the public comment periods associated with
their proposed rules to make it less likely that members of Congress learn about the proposal
and also make it more costly for them to respond when they do. Although these strategies
are divergent, they are flip sides of the same coin, both serving to preempt congressional
incursions into agency rulemaking.
Engaging External Stakeholders Through the Public Comment Period
Broadly speaking, many of the procedural decisions surrounding the notice-and-
comment process structure how (and how much) the agency interacts with external stake-
holders on any particular rulemaking. From the agency’s perspective, engaging with external
stakeholders involves a tradeoff between the benefits of coalition-building and the costs in-
volved with stakeholder management.
There are myriad substantive benefits to engaging with groups outside the agency.
For instance, Carpenter (2001) uses an historical approach to show how agencies build sup-
port coalitions with key interest group allies. By building a reputation with these groups
for reliability and efficacy, agencies create an environment in which they can operate with
(relatively) greater autonomy. In more recent work Moffitt (2010) shows how the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) strategically consults with advisory committees in order to pub-
licly demonstrate the risk and uncertainty associated with particular drugs. By engaging
externally and having outsiders acknowledge a drug’s inherent risks, the FDA “can demon-
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strate that any failure associated with the policy is inherent to the policy itself and not
attributable to (lack of) agency expertise.” She argues that this external consultation serves
as a reputation-enhancing tool for the FDA. Other scholars have argued that by consulting
with external stakeholders, agencies can co-opt potential opponents (Selznick, 1949), gather
information (Kaufman, 1981; Sunstein, 2013b), and facilitate policy implementation (Meier
and O’Toole, 2006).
By inviting many groups to participate on a proposed rule, the agency can tap into
a group of allies that supports the policy (see Nou, 2013). It is then more costly for con-
gressional overseers to swoop in after the coalition is in place and thwart the agency’s efforts
without raising the ire of the invested stakeholders. The power of the coalition-building strat-
egy is evident when agencies are forced to defend their proposed rules. For example, one
EPA deputy administrator pointed to the agency’s support coalition when called to testify
before the House during 112th Congress, stating: “There is tremendous public support for
moving forward with these rules. For instance, since March, we have received over 800,000
comments from across the country in support of regulatory mercury emission controls from
power plants” (Perciasepe, July 26, 2011).
Yet, greater external engagement is not costless. There can be negative consequences
when an agency turns outward. First, although it may seem an obvious point, stakeholder
engagement takes time. The more time spent formally interacting with stakeholders at
the proposed rule stage, the longer it will take the agency to move on to the final rule
stage.5 Delay in rulemaking is a serious consideration; the average time to bring a proposed
5For instance, longer comment periods enable interest groups to organize mass mailing campaigns, wherein
an interest group mobilizes hundreds or thousands of its members to submit near-identical comments in
support of or in opposition to a proposed rule. Such campaigns are not likely to add substance to an
agency’s deliberations (FR Advisor, April 15, 2013), but managing the response to these campaigns does
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rule to the final rule stage already takes between 8 and 25 months (O’Connell, 2008). In
addition, stakeholder management consumes resources, and agency rulemaking resources are
scarce (West, 2009). Most agencies have a significant backlog in the rules that they plan to
complete. As a result, time spent dealing with each additional comment or group comes at
the direct expense of other projects.
Turning outward also invites more risk vis-a`-vis the courts. For instance, the longer a
rule is open for comment, the greater the opportunity for groups to submit a comment. Not
all groups that enter the fold will be pleased with the agency’s decision and, now empowered
with stakeholder status, these groups may seek recourse with the courts. While the agency is
under no obligation to accommodate group demands in the final rule, submitting a comment
or testifying at a hearing can be part of a broader group strategy. Groups may not even
expect that agencies will make the changes they request in the final rule, but instead may
be laying the groundwork for future litigation (Schmidt, 2002). Engaging externally opens
this pathway to groups.6
When do agencies invest resources in engaging externally on their proposed rules?
I argue that agencies are more likely to do this when their rules are at the greatest risk
of congressional overturn or congressional intervention - in other words, when the agency
and Congress are ideologically distant. When the agency and Congress are ideologically
predisposed to agree on policy (i.e., they are proximate on the ideological spectrum), the
agency can expect less oversight and scrutiny of its actions. Further, when agencies and
soak up agency resources.
6This view is consistent with recent work by Woods (2009) who finds, in a survey of bureaucrats responsible
for rulemaking in state agencies, that increasing the opportunities for public involvement (e.g., through a
longer comment period) in a rulemaking is associated with greater perceived influence of the courts in the
rulemaking process.
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their political overseers are ideologically concordant, outside groups are of little utility as
the information they provide only serves to highlight disagreements between the groups and
policymakers (Gailmard and Patty, 2013). As a result, agencies will work to protect their
polices more as this distance increases, as laid out in the first hypothesis:
External Engagement Hypothesis. As the ideological distance between the agency
and Congress increases, agencies will increase the level of engagement with ex-
ternal stakeholders by holding longer public comment periods.
Judiciously Timing the Public Comment Period
The take-all-comers nature of notice-and-comment means that when an agency mobi-
lizes stakeholders outside of the agency it may activate those groups that agree with it, but
also those that disagree with it. In other words, agencies must be careful about what the
groups mobilized by external engagement strategies actually do. These disaffected groups
represent a potential threat to the agency because they can pull fire alarms and provide
ammunition to inimical interests in Congress (Hall and Miler, 2008).
Yet external engagement is not the only way that agencies can preempt congressional
action. That is, although agencies cannot eliminate the possibility that an alarm will be
pulled, they do have some administrative discretion that affects the likelihood that members
of Congress respond to the alarm. Specifically, they can manipulate the timing of the release
of the proposed rule (i.e., when the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register) - and,
importantly, when the comment period occurs - to coincide with periods when Congress is
less likely to respond. In other words, the agency can make sure the comment period, the
time when interest groups are empowered to pull fire alarms, comes at an inopportune time
115
for Congress.
Others have established the judicious use of timing by agencies in a variety of con-
texts. For instance, Muehlenbachs, Sinha and Sinha (2011) show how the EPA is strategic
when making announcements to the press. They find that the agency tends to announce en-
vironmental awards earlier in the week, whereas enforcement actions and regulatory changes
tend to be announced on Fridays and before holidays. They argue that this is part of an
implicit strategy on the part of the agency to bury adverse news in the weekend and holiday
news cycles, when the items are less likely to receive public attention and scrutiny. In a
similar vein, Gersen and O’Connell (2009) consider the timing of the publication of agency
final rules. They find significant effects for the publication of significant final rules during
congressional recesses, but less so for Friday publication of rules.
Agencies have considerable leeway with respect to the timing of the publication of
proposed rules and, if they are leery of potential fire alarms, may seek to enfeeble the
congressional response to those alarms. Publishing the proposed rule so that the comment
period overlaps with a congressional recess may provide just such an opportunity. During
recesses, members of Congress focus on activities in their home districts and are less attuned
to issues in Washington (Fenno, 1978). From a member’s perspective, Washington business
(including responding to agency rules) has essentially been “put on hold” until the session
resumes. This means that it may be more difficult for a member of Congress to learn about
a rule or to respond to the rule when they do.
While some staff members remain available to attend to group complaints, many
staffers schedule their vacations around recess periods (Beam, August 26, 2009). Thus,
while publishing during a recess period does not mean that the fire alarm will not be heard,
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it may decrease the likelihood that it will engender a substantial response. Gersen and
O’Connell (2009, 1183) summarize this strategy in the following way: “if Congress is out
of session, all else equal, the costs of mobilizing a political response to an unpopular policy
should rise.”
Since members of Congress are ill-disposed to agency proposals when they are ideo-
logically distant, agencies may seek to avoid scrutiny by publishing proposed rules during
recesses in these cases. Thus, as the distance between the two actors increases, we can expect
agencies to publish more covertly, as laid out in the second hypothesis:
Strategic Publication Hypothesis. As the ideological distance between the agency
and Congress increases, agencies are more likely to publish proposed rules so that
the comment period overlaps with a congressional recess.
5.2 testing the external engagement hypothesis
Turning to the analysis, I begin with an examination of the external engagement hy-
pothesis. Agencies engage with the public in numerous ways in the process of creating a new
rule, yet not all of these decisions are suitable for testing this hypothesis. Public hearings, for
example, provide an opportunity for individuals to come before the agency and testify about
a proposed policy. While hearings are a common way for agencies to receive feedback from
stakeholders on the policy impacts of a proposed rule, their implementation varies consid-
erably (and somewhat systematically) across agencies. For instance, some agencies like the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), a component of the Department
of Labor, routinely schedule hearings at the same time that they publish a proposed rule.
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Other agencies offer to host hearings only if commenters specifically request a hearing to
be held. Others are required to hold hearings when issuing rules under certain statutory
authorities. Finally, a few agencies rarely, if ever, hold hearings. The net result of this
variation is that, across agencies, it is difficult to systematically study and infer meaning
from the presence or absence of a public hearing.
The length of the public comment period is notably different, as it is a decision that all
agencies must make with respect to each proposed rule. The APA does not specify how long
the public comment period on a proposed rule need be, leaving this decision to the agency’s
discretion.7 In 1993, the Clinton administration clarified that agencies should provide a
meaningful opportunity to comment on any proposed regulation, which in most cases should
include a comment period of not less than 60 days (E.O. 12866). In practice, however, the 60-
day standard established in Clinton’s executive order is not closely followed. Figure 5.2 shows
that while 60 days is the modal number of comment days, there is considerable variation
in the length of comment periods across the agencies in this study. For instance, variance
at the Department of Homeland Security is considerably larger than at the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, which issued nearly one and a half times as many rules.
7As Lubbers (2006) notes, “A common misconception is that the APA prescribes a 30-day minimum comment
period, a belief that may derive from the APA’s requirement that final rules be published 30 days prior to
their effective date” (278).
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The dependent variable, Comment Days, is the number of days that a proposed rule
was open for public comment.8 As previously noted, longer comment periods are associated
with a greater volume of comments from a more diverse set of interests, because “it takes
time to assemble the essential information needed to evaluate and then respond to what
can be highly technical and complex rules. In the contemporary political environment, time
allows people to get organized, to build coalitions, and to orchestrate a response to the
agency’s proposals” (Kerwin and Furlong, 2011, p. 67). This is, of course, precisely the sort
of coalition-building that agencies can use to bolster their position vis-a`-vis congressional
overseers. Moreover, submission of a comment during the formal comment period matters
because the comments received constitute a docket that is the basis of the legal record that
reviewing courts rely on. Agencies are only required to respond to those comments that are
in the docket.
In order to empirically test the first hypothesis, I collected data on the number of
comment days for 5,090 proposed rules from 24 executive branch and independent agencies
(see Table 2.2 in the Appendix to Chapter 2 for a list of the agencies) from 2000 - 2010. This
constitutes the universe of rules that were proposed during this time period according to the
Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Action (“Unified Agenda”), a semi-annual
accounting of agency rulemaking activity.9
In the analyses, I focus on two sets of rules: all proposed rules and proposed rules that
8This analysis focuses on the length of the comment period as specified in the agency’s proposed rule.
Occasionally, agencies will extend a comment period (or reopen it if it has already closed). I do not include
these additional days in the counts of comment days for two reasons. First, extensions of the comment
period occur only at the explicit request of commenters (and subsequent consent of the agency). Thus,
including extension days in the analysis introduces a selection problem. Second, the original choice of
comment days represents a strategic, anticipatory choice by the agency, whereas the observed number of
days does not.
9See the Appendix to this chapter (Section 5.5) for a description of how the dataset was constructed.
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are deemed to be significant. Agencies issue thousands of rules each year, but only a fraction
of them have meaningful policy importance. While previous studies have relied on agency
self-reports of a rules significance (as listed in the Unified Agenda), agencies may have an
incentive to underreport the significance of their rules (see Potter and Shipan, 2013) and,
further, the standard for significance may vary across agencies. Instead, I count a proposed
rule as significant if it was reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA), the White House arm responsible for centralized review of agency rules. Under the
authority of Executive Order 12,866 (September 30, 1993), OIRA can review any rule that
has novel legal or policy implications or an annual impact on the economy of $100 million or
more. This external review essentially serves to separate the significant rules from the less
important ones in a way that is consistent across agencies.10 Approximately 37% (1,884) of
the proposed rules in the dataset are significant; to the extent that there is any strategic
behavior occurring with respect to the comment period, I expect to see it magnified in this
subset of rules.
My key explanatory variable is the ideological distance between the agency and
Congress. In recent years, a veritable cottage industry has emerged with the explicit goal
of measuring agency ideology (Bertelli and Grose, 2009, 2011; Bonica, Chen and Johnson,
2012; Chen, 2010; Clinton and Lewis, 2008; Clinton et al., 2012; Nixon, 2004).11 I begin the
analysis with ideological scores developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and modified by
Chen (2010) and Chen and Johnson (2014), but use an alternate measure of ideology as a
robustness check.
10One limitation of using OIRA review as a marker of significance is that, with the exception of the Social
Security Administration, OIRA’s purview excludes the independent agencies in the dataset.
11See the Appendix to Chapter 2 of this dissertation for a discussion of the role of ideology and its measure-
ment in this project.
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These scores, called Common Space DW-NOMINATE (“Common Space”), use roll
call votes to uncover legislators’ underlying ideological predispositions on a left-right con-
tinuum. Scores closer to -1 indicate a more liberal legislator (e.g., Senator Barbara Boxer)
and those closer to 1 indicate a more conservative legislator (e.g., Senator Tom Coburn).
Chen (2010) develops an innovative method of extending Common Space scores to agen-
cies by relying on bureaucrats’ (both careerists and appointees) campaign contributions to
legislators. The key assumption here is that individuals give money to those legislators
that best represent their true preferences (Bonica, 2013). To develop an aggregate estimate
of an agency’s Common Space score, Chen (2010) and Chen and Johnson (2014) use the
mean score among those legislators that received contributions from the agency’s employees,
weighted by the dollar amount of contributions. This weighting scheme places more empha-
sis on larger contributions, which tend to come from higher-earning employees (i.e., political
appointees).
When it comes to measuring the distance between the agency and Congress using
these scores, there are a number of feasible options. For instance, one could measure the
distance between the agency and its oversight committee, the distance between the agency
and the congressional median, or the distance between the agency and the median of one
chamber of Congress (e.g., the chamber that is ideologically closest or farthest from the
agency). Each of these options suggests a different model of congressional oversight. Using
the agency’s congressional oversight committee implies that agencies are concerned with the
types of oversight that such committees can provide (increasing the number of hearings,
budget cuts, etc.). However, not only is the identification of the agency’s primary oversight
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committee a tricky task empirically,12 it also suggests that rule-specific oversight operates
only through oversight committees. Instead I argue that members of Congress will respond
to issues as they learn of them, whether that be from committee-related tasks or from
constituents. This suggests the need for a more general model of congressional oversight.
Thus, for the variable Ideological Distance, I employ the congressional floor median as the
key representative, which offers a general sense of the broader disposition of Congress. (In
the next chapter, I discuss the appropriateness of this assumption in greater depth.) Figure
5.2 plots the Common Space distance measures for each agency and each congress.
12Agencies have not one, but many, oversight committees and it is not obvious which committees provide
oversight at which times. In a survey of agency careerists and appointees, Clinton, Lewis and Selin (2014)
find that most respondents identified 3 - 4 oversight committees for their agency. However, there was
significant variation among agencies. For instance, the reported average for the Department of Homeland
Security was 4.70, compared to 2.40 for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. While this study is helpful
in illuminating the nature of committee oversight of agencies, it covers a small sample of agencies in
one congress and does not vary over time. This makes it difficult to use for identification of oversight
committees for the time period and agencies included in this study.
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While the focus of this chapter is the politics surrounding the use of the public
comment period, this period ostensibly serves the more practical function of information
exchange between the agency and regulated parties. In other words, politics aside, agencies
may need longer comment periods for more complex rules. Scholars are increasingly skeptical
that agencies use the public comment period for this purpose (see, e.g., Elliott, 1992, likening
the process to Japanese kabuki theater), with many suggesting that agencies gather the
relevant information in advance (Yackee, 2012). Nonetheless, to control for this possibility,
I count the (logged) number of words (in hundreds) that the agency proposed to add to the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), the regulatory equivalent of the U.S. code.13 Here I
argue that the longer a rule’s text, the greater its complexity. That is, a longer rule tackles
more issues and gives more specific instructions on how the regulated community should
comply with the agency’s wishes. I expect the variable Log CFR words to have a positive
relationship with the length of the public comment period.
Next, I include two dichotomous variables that relate to the legal status of the pro-
posed rule.14 The first, Statutory Deadline, takes on a value of “1” if the proposed rule has an
associated deadline in a statute, and “0” otherwise. Similarly, the second variable, Judicial
Deadline, represents whether the court has imposed a deadline for the rule or not. Although
judicial deadlines are more infrequent that statutory ones (Gersen and O’Connell, 2008),
both tools are used to compel agencies to quicken the pace with respect to the completion
of a particular rule. As such, I expect that the imposition of either type of deadline will be
13The CFR text in a proposed rule is the “meat” of the rule; it is the text that binds regulated parties. This
operationalization is similar to Huber and Shipan’s (2002) use of the number of words in a statute as a
proxy measure for legislative constraint on an agency. There, the authors count the number of words in
Medicaid statutes across the 50 states and find that “longer statutes are longer because they provide more
details about the policy to be implemented” (75).
14Data for both of these attributes originate from the Unified Agenda.
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associated with a shorter comment period, as agencies hasten to accommodate these polit-
ical demands (Gersen and O’Connell, 2008; Kerwin and Furlong, 2011; Yackee and Yackee,
2010).
Next, I include a dummy variable Midnight that takes on a value of “1” if the proposed
rule was published during the last quarter of a presidential administration and “0” other-
wise.15 Although the tactic has been heavily criticized for normative reasons, midnight rules
are rules that an outgoing administration issues on its way out the door (O’Connell, 2008).
These rules often contain controversial policies that a lame-duck administration pushes
quickly through the rulemaking process. Discussions of midnight rules tend to (rightly)
focus on the publication of the final rule (since this entrenches the policy in the CFR), but
since midnight final rules must (generally) first be proposed rules, they are relevant to this
study. I expect that Midnight will have a negative relationship with the number of comment
days, as agencies shorten the comment period in an attempt to finalize these last-minutes
rules posthaste.
Finally, I include Bush and Obama, dummies for presidential administration in order
to control for the possibility that agencies behave differently under different administra-
tions.16 Descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis are provided in Table 5.1.
15Technically, this variable is coded “1” if the proposed rule was published between October 1st and December
31st of 2000, 2004 or 2008, and “0” otherwise. I focus on this timeframe since it is the period in which
a proposed rule must be published in order to secure the possibility of finalizing the rule before the new
administration takes control in January of the following year (Gersen and O’Connell, 2009).
16Clinton is the omitted category.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Models
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Comment Days 58.01 23.091 6 211
Recess Publication 0.441 0.232 0 1
Ideological Distance 0.172 0.143 0.001 0.569
Log CFR words 2.787 1.448 0.039 7.565
Statutory Deadline 0.096 0.296 0 1
Judicial Deadline 0.059 0.236 0 1
Midnight 0.074 0.262 0 1
Bush 0.534 0.499 0 1
Obama 0.102 0.302 0 1
Analysis & Results
The results from the statistical models testing the external engagement hypothesis
are presented in Table 5.2. Because the dependent variable Comment Days is a count and
exhibits evidence of overdispersion, I rely on negative binomial models. Accordingly, the
coefficients presented in the table are maximum likelihood estimates. I also include agency
fixed effects to account for unmodeled agency specific factors.
The models support the hypothesis that as the distance between Congress and the
agency grows, agencies increase the length of the comment periods on their proposed rules.
Substantively, moving from the minimum observed value to the maximum observed value
results in an increase of 3.2 comment days (a 5.7% increase) for all proposed rules, and an
additional 5.2 comment days for significant rules (a 9.0% increase).17 Figure 5.3 provides
a graphical representation of the substantive findings related to the external engagement
hypothesis. This figure shows the changes in predicted values of comment days as the
17All changes in predicted values are reported as the change between the minimum and maximum observed
values (for continuous variables) with all other variables held at their means. Binary variables are based
on change in values moving from 0 to 1, with all other variables held at their means.
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Table 5.2: Negative Binomial Models of Comment Days for Proposed Rules, 2000-2010
(1) (2)
All Rules Significant Rules
β/se β/se
Ideological Distance 0.097** 0.151***
(0.044) (0.058)
Log CFR Words 0.039*** 0.037***
(0.012) (0.013)
Statutory Deadline -0.125*** -0.131***
(0.043) (0.027)
Judicial Deadline 0.095*** -0.012
(0.033) (0.036)
Midnight -0.058*** -0.081**
(0.017) (0.032)
Bush -0.096*** -0.076***
(0.035) (0.026)
Obama -0.102*** -0.113***
(0.023) (0.042)
Constant 3.971*** 4.033***
(0.050) (0.036)
Ln α -2.258*** -2.418***
(0.111) (0.136)
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 5090 1884
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < .01
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood coefficients (standard er-
rors clustered on the agency are in parentheses). The proposed rule is
the unit of analysis.
distance between the agency and Congress increases, for all rules (see 5.3a) and for significant
rules (see 5.3b). Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals. While the effect sizes are
not large in absolute terms, it is surprising to find any effect whatsoever for an activity
so routine as the number of days that a rule is open for public comment. Indeed it is
128
Figure 5.3: Change in Predicted Values for Comment Days
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particularly noteworthy since agencies must exercise caution in manipulating the number of
days lest they call attention to their strategic behavior. As a result, this strategy is likely
exercised judiciously in combination with other procedural tactics.
Crucially, these findings indicate that even with the political use of comment days,
there is strong support for the information-gathering function of rulemaking. As the logged
number of CFR words in a proposed rule increases, agencies increase the length of the
comment period; moving from the minimum to the maximum of this variable results in an
average increase of 18 days for all rules and 17 days for significant rules.
In addition, the models also reveal interesting patterns with respect to the deadline
control variables. Notably, the sign for the judicial deadline variable is unexpectedly positive
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and significant for all proposed rules, suggesting that when rules have a judicial deadline
agencies increase, rather than decrease, the length of a proposed rule’s comment period (5.8
more days for all rules). This contrasts with the negative and statistically significant sign
for the statutory deadlines variable, indicating a decrease in the number of comment days
associated with the instance of a statutory deadline (6.9 fewer days for all rules and 7.4 fewer
days for significant rules). These findings may speak to the substantive difference between
statutory and judicial deadlines. Congress is concerned with having the agency complete the
rule quickly, whereas courts are much more concerned with procedural fairness and equity
(suggesting a longer comment period so all groups have the opportunity to participate).
The Midnight variable performs as expected. Agencies set shorter comment periods
at the end of an outgoing president’s administration: 3.3 fewer days for all rules and 4.6 fewer
days for significant rules. Finally, it appears that the number of comment days decreased
under more recent presidential administrations, as compared to the Clinton administration.
The difference between the Bush and Obama administrations, however, is insignificant.
Robustness Checks for Comment Days Models
As a robustness check, I reestimate the models in Table 5.2 under a variety of different
empirical specifications and operationalizations. First, I run the models using two different
estimation techniques in order to demonstrate that the findings are not contingent upon
any one distributional assumption. Models 3 and 4 (Table 5.3) replicate the results using
OLS. Models 5 and 6 provide the same replication using an ordered probit model. This
specification breaks the Comment Days variable into rough 15-day increments (1 = 22 days
or less; 2 = 23 – 37 days; 3 = 38 – 52 days; 4 = 53 – 67 days; 5 = 68 – 82 days; 6 = 83 days
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or more). This estimation technique puts less emphasis on deviations between individual
days (e.g., the difference between, say, 34 comment days and 35 comment days), and more
emphasis on the general category (or bucket) that the rule’s comment period falls into. The
results from these analyses are substantively unchanged from those presented in Table 5.2.
Specifically, as the distance between the agency and Congress increases, agencies increase
the length of the public comment period associated with a proposed rule.
Next, I employ alternate estimates of agency ideology to evaluate the level of dis-
agreement between the agency and Congress in order to show that these findings do not rest
upon any unique aspect of the Common Space ideological measures. Models 7 and 8 (Table
5.4) present the results using Clinton and Lewis’s (2008) measures of agency ideology, which
are based on surveys where experts were asked to rate the ideological position. The scores
are time-invariant making a temporal measure (like the one I create here) admittedly crude.
Specifically, I create a dummy variable that is coded “1” if the agency is liberal (conservative)
and both chambers of Congress are controlled by the Republican (Democratic) party and “0”
otherwise. Following O’Connell (2011) I consider an agency to be liberal if its Clinton-Lewis
score is negative, conservative if its score is positive, and moderate if the 95% confidence
interval includes zero. Because the theory speaks to strong ideological divergences, I exclude
moderate agencies from the analysis, which limits the size of the sample. Because moderate
agencies do not have clear partisan affiliations in this construction of the measure (and would
result in panels of all zeroes), excluding these agencies was also necessary for identification in
a model that included fixed effects. In spite of the roughness of this measure, we still observe
a positive and statistically significant finding for the distance measure: agencies increase the
length of the comment period when they are ideologically distant.
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Table 5.3: OLS and Ordered Probit Estimates of Comment Days for Proposed Rules
(3) (4) (5) (6)
All Rules Significant Rules All Rules Significant Rules
β/se β/se β/se β/se
Ideological Distance 5.233** 8.583** 0.251* 0.453**
(2.486) (3.483) (0.145) (0.225)
Log CFR Words 2.223*** 2.286*** 0.126*** 0.137***
(0.647) (0.791) (0.032) (0.041)
Statutory Deadline -7.594** -8.041*** -0.414*** -0.401***
(2.714) (1.644) (0.151) (0.105)
Judicial Deadline 4.920*** -1.231 0.281*** -0.031
(1.547) (2.041) (0.077) (0.117)
Midnight -3.443*** -4.812** -0.212*** -0.298**
(0.968) (1.889) (0.072) (0.122)
Bush -6.171** -4.794** -0.303** -0.212**
(2.424) (1.701) (0.146) (0.085)
Obama -6.530*** -6.991** -0.326*** -0.359***
(1.622) (2.492) (0.094) (0.134)
Constant 53.821*** 56.595***
(2.966) (2.123)
Cut 1 -1.991*** -2.299***
(0.169) (0.201)
Cut 2 -0.513*** -0.736***
(0.160) (0.143)
Cut 3 -0.251 -0.494***
(0.168) (0.163)
Cut 4 1.303*** 1.375***
(0.219) (0.125)
Cut 5 1.430*** 1.457***
(0.232) (0.118)
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5090 1884 5090 1884
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < .01
Note: Table entries are OLS (Models 3 and 4) and maximum likelihood coefficients
(Models 5 and 6). Standard errors clustered on the agency are in parentheses. The
proposed rule is the unit of analysis.
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Table 5.4: Negative Binomial Models of Comment Days using Alternate Ideology Measures
(7) (8) (9) (10)
All Rules Significant Rules All Rules Significant Rules
β/se β/se β/se β/se
Clinton-Lewis Id Dist 0.042*** 0.040*
(0.011) (0.016)
Agency-House Distance 0.102* 0.168**
(0.047) (0.056)
Log CFR Words 0.033** 0.037* 0.039*** 0.037**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
Statutory Deadline -0.117* -0.129*** -0.125** -0.130***
(0.052) (0.036) (0.043) (0.027)
Judicial Deadline 0.107** -0.005 0.095** -0.012
(0.036) (0.040) (0.033) (0.036)
Midnight -0.077*** -0.091* -0.058*** -0.080*
(0.023) (0.040) (0.017) (0.032)
Bush -0.089 -0.035 -0.097** -0.077**
(0.050) (0.026) (0.035) (0.026)
Obama -0.107** -0.094 -0.101*** -0.111**
(0.033) (0.053) (0.023) (0.042)
Constant 4.031*** 3.983*** 3.971*** 4.032***
(0.066) (0.042) (0.050) (0.036)
Ln α -2.232*** -2.350*** -2.258*** -2.418***
(0.143) (0.175) (0.111) (0.136)
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3789 1290 5090 1884
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < .01
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood coefficients (standard errors clustered
on the agency are in parentheses). The proposed rule is the unit of analysis.
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Finally, Models 9 and 10 in Table 5.4 show the same results using the distance between
the agency and the House chamber median (rather than the congressional floor median), in
response to the popular notion that the House provides more careful scrutiny of agency
activities (including rulemaking), while the Senate dedicates itself to the “bigger picture”
issues. The substantive findings remain unaffected. This suggests that there is something
deeper about the distance between the agency and those that oversee it that drives choices
about external engagement.
5.3 testing the strategic publication hypothesis
To test the strategic publication hypothesis, I create the dependent variable Recess
Publication. This variable is the number of comment days that were in a congressional recess
divided by the total number of comments days.18 In the analysis I include the variables from
the previous models with two exceptions. First, I exclude the variables for deadlines and
midnight publication, as the former are not theoretically relevant to recess publication and
the latter is entirely predictive.19 Second, I add the variable Comment Days to the model,
to account for the possibility that proposed rules with longer comment periods may have
greater overlap with congressional recesses by virtue of their increased duration. Put another
way, this variable controls for the possibility that a rule with a 120-day comment period has
a greater opportunity to overlap with a congressional recess by chance than a rule with a
30-day comment period.
18Following Gersen and O’Connell (2009), I focus on House recess dates in this analysis.
19Given the nature of the election cycle, rules that are published during the midnight period are published
at the end of the calendar year. Congressional recesses also occur at the end of the calendar year with
some regularity. Thus, these variables are systematically linked in a way that is unrelated to my theory.
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Table 5.5 below presents the results. Models 11 and 12 present coefficients estimated
using OLS. I provide OLS results since they are intuitive and easy to interpret. However,
because the dependent variable is a proportion and bounded between zero and one, OLS
does not yield predicted values that are guaranteed to fall within this interval. Therefore,
following the approach from Chapter 4, Models 13 and 14 estimate the models using a
fractional logit technique (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Kieschnick and McCullough, 2003).
This quasi-maximum likelihood approach is a modification of the traditional logit model that
allows the dependent variable to be a (bounded) fraction, rather than binary. All models
include agency fixed effects to account for agency-level variation. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
These results provide support for the expectation that agencies tend to publish rules
during congressional recesses when they are ideologically distant from Congress. Substan-
tively, moving from the minimum to the maximum observed distance of Ideological Distance
results in a 9.54% increase in the proportion of days in the congressional recess for all
proposed rules, and a 10.84% increase for significant rules. Figure 5.4 shows these effects
graphically.
The variable Log CFR words is positive and statistically significant in the third model,
reflecting that as rule complexity increases, agencies are more likely to publish rules to
coincide with congressional recesses. However, this variable does not achieve statistical
significance in the fourth model of significant rules. Finally, the Comment Days variable
is not statistically significant in either model. This suggests that the length of the public
comment period does not have a meaningful effect on the dependent variable.
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Table 5.5: OLS and Fractional Logit Models of Recess Publication of Proposed Rules
(11) (12) (13) (14)
All Rules Significant Rules All Rules Significant Rules
β/se β/se β/se β/se
Ideological Distance 0.168*** 0.192*** 0.683*** 0.780***
(0.029) (0.042) (0.116) (0.168)
Log CFR Words 0.006** 0.005 0.026** 0.020
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.016)
Comment Days -0.000* -0.000 -0.001* -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Bush -0.014** -0.012 -0.058*** -0.047
(0.005) (0.014) (0.021) (0.058)
Obama -0.094*** -0.074*** -0.395*** -0.308***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.045) (0.074)
Constant 0.429*** 0.451*** -0.285*** -0.194*
(0.016) (0.026) (0.066) (0.107)
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5090 1884 5090 1884
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < .01
Note: Table entries are OLS coefficients (Models 11 and 12) quasi-likelihood coef-
ficients (Models 13 and 14). Standard errors clustered on the agency are in paren-
theses. The proposed rule is the unit of analysis.
Robustness Checks for Recess Proportion Models
Again, the findings from these models are robust to a number of alternative specifica-
tions, including substituting alternate ideology scores in place of the Common Space scores
and using the House median rather than the congressional median (see Table 5.6).
Models 15 and 16 display the results using Clinton and Lewis’s (2008) agency scores.
In spite of the roughness of this measure, we still observe a positive coefficient for ideological
distance. Although this effect is not significant at traditional levels of statistical significance,
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Figure 5.4: Change in Predicted Values for Recess Proportion
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it nonetheless indicates that agencies are more likely to publish during a recess when they
are ideologically distant, as the theory suggests.
Finally, Models 17 and 18 replicate the main findings using the distance from the
agency to the House floor median rather than the distance between the agency and the
congressional floor median. Again, we see that the results are substantively quite similar
to Table 5.5 moving from the minimum to the maximum observed proportion results in an
increase in the proportion of comment days in a congressional recess of 9.8% for all rules,
and a 11.3% for significant proposed rules.
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Table 5.6: OLS Models of Recess Publication using Alternate Ideology Measures
(15) (16) (17) (18)
All Rules Significant Rules All Rules Significant Rules
β/se β/se β/se β/se
Clinton-Lewis Id Dist 0.011 0.030
(0.011) (0.018)
Agency-House Distance 0.169*** 0.196***
(0.029) (0.040)
Log CFR Words 0.004 0.003 0.006* 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Comment Days -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bush -0.015 -0.015 -0.014* -0.012
(0.008) (0.020) (0.005) (0.014)
Obama -0.106*** -0.079** -0.094*** -0.073***
(0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.018)
Constant 0.502*** 0.523*** 0.430*** 0.453***
(0.017) (0.033) (0.016) (0.027)
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3778 1290 5090 1884
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < .01
Note: Table entries are quasi-likelihood coefficients (standard errors clustered on the
agency are in parentheses). The proposed rule is the unit of analysis.
5.4 conclusion
The study of politics is replete with examples of how the details matter: for instance,
in their seminal paper Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show how the selection of an open or closed
floor rule can fundamentally alter bargaining outcomes in a legislature. The results presented
in this chapter provide evidence indicating that agencies are strategic when making decisions
about the public comment period, a seemingly mundane aspect of the notice-and-comment
process. Specifically, I have shown that agency’s public comment periods vary systematically
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in length and timing according to the agency’s ideological proximity to Congress.
This finding is important from a theoretical perspective. Starting with the work of
Weingast and Moran (1983), agencies have been deemed “responsive” to congressional control
efforts, including administrative procedures (like those instituted by the APA with respect
to rulemaking). Yet this chapter has argued—with empirical support—that the institution
of administrative procedures is not the end of the story. That is, agencies can work within
these procedures (and even manipulate them) to steer policy in their preferred direction.
Thus, rather than exclusively responding to congressional demands, agencies can preempt
congressional intervention. This suggests that administrative procedures may be less effective
tools of political control than previously thought. Further, the evidence of strategic use of
the comment period and publication timing presented here suggests a different take on the
notice-and-comment process than the traditional view of agency learning or capture often
advanced in the rulemaking literature.
On their own, the effect sizes for any individual result presented here are not enor-
mous, but this should not be taken as evidence that the factors that I have identified are
immaterial. There are two reasons for this. First, the tactics are necessarily nuanced; agen-
cies cannot be too heavy-handed in their exercise of them lest they call attention to the
strategies themselves. Second, the results are indicative of a larger pattern of agency behav-
ior. That is, this chapter has examined two specific choices that agencies must make with
respect to notice-and-comment process: the length of the public comment period and the
timing of the proposed rule’s publication. However, as previously discussed, these are but
two of many procedural choices that agencies make when managing the rulemaking process,
and taken in aggregate these procedures have the potential to pack a powerful punch. The
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nuances of how these additional choices in the rulemaking process - be it publication of
a pre-rule (ANPRM), hosting a hearing, engaging in the “negotiated rulemaking” process,
reopening or extending the public comment period, or restricting the format of comments
included in the docket - can be used to an agency’s strategic advantage is a fruitful avenue
for scholars to explore.
In the next chapter, I further deconstruct the details of the notice-and-comment
process by focusing in-depth on one particular rulemaking case. This approach demonstrates
the validity of several assumptions of the project to this point (including a key assumption
from this chapter), and also shows how the mechanisms I identify work in the context of one
particular rule.
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5.5 appendix: description of the data
The dataset used in this chapter was constructed according to the following process.
First, I identified a list of all proposed rules that were issued from 2000 - 2010 (inclusive),20
according to the Unified Agenda,21 an accounting of each agency’s rulemaking activity that
is published semi-annually in the Federal Register. I then matched each proposed rule listing
with its text, as published in the Federal Register.22 The purpose of this matching exercise
was twofold: first, to confirm the length of the comment period (much of this data is missing
or incorrect in the Unified Agenda); and, second to obtain the data for the variable log
CFR words. I used the proposed rule’s Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) to match
the text to its Unified Agenda listing. This was an imperfect matching strategy, as a rule’s
RIN can occasionally change from the time that it is listed in the Unified Agenda to the
time it is published in the Federal Register. Less frequently, but equally problematic, a
proposed rule was published without listing any RIN whatsoever. I made every effort to
recover each observation that suffered from one of these matching errors, including searching
for missing RINs on the Internet and constructing a list of alias RINs for each unmatched
case. Nonetheless, I was unable to find convincing matches for approximately 300 proposed
rules; accordingly, those cases are not included in the dataset.
Finally, I excluded the rulemaking activity of any agency that produced very few rules
during this timeframe (i.e., less than 50) or for which the relevant ideological scores were
unavailable. This resulted in the exclusion of ten agencies from the dataset: the Agency
20The range of the data was limited by the availability of the Federal Register texts in a structured XML
format.
21The Unified Agenda data were compiled and shared by Anne Joseph O’Connell and follow the conventions
laid out in O’Connell (2011).
22This data is available online at: https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1.
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for International Development, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Fed-
eral Crop Insurance Corporation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (prior to its
incorporation into the Department of Homeland Security), the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Gen-
eral Services Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The resulting dataset includes 5,090 proposed rules
from the 24 agencies listed in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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Chapter 6
The FDA and the Case of Menu Labeling
To this point in the dissertation, the arguments have operated at a fairly macro level,
showing how decisions are made at the agency level to help proposed rules survive. In
Chapter 3, I developed a formal model that showed how agencies write proposed rules in
the shadow of veto threats by Congress and OIRA. In order to dodge the regulatory veto,
agencies sometimes write a less desirable rule that is more palatable to political principals,
although this concessionary behavior happens less frequently than previous scholars have
posited. At other times, agencies offer proposed rules that represent their own preferences.
Chapter 4 provided empirical corroboration for this theory using a new dataset of OIRA
vetoes. And in Chapter 5, I showed how agencies work to protect to their proposed rule
“investments” after the writing is done through strategic use of the public comment period.
In this chapter, I use a case study to demonstrate how some of the key assumptions
undergirding my argument function with respect to individual rules. The purpose of this
analysis is to provide support for some of the theory’s foundational assumptions and also to
demonstrate how an agency invested in one particular rulemaking. The case in question is
a proposed rule on menu labeling written by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
response to a mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA,
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P.L. 111-148). The proposed rule was controversial, and therefore required the FDA to be
extremely conscientious in drafting it.
I use the case to demonstrate three key aspects of the broader theory. First, I consider
whether the FDA had an informational advantage with respect to OIRA and Congress.
In the signaling model in Chapter 3, I assume that agencies gather policy and political
information from stakeholders before they issue the proposed rule (this is the “signal” that the
agency privately receives). Although there are numerous studies that make this assumption
defensible, in this chapter I give the assumption additional credence by showing all of the
ways that the FDA went out and gathered information from menu labeling stakeholders
before the proposed rule ever made it to the Federal Register.
Second, I explain why the FDA’s congressional oversight committees were not the
only sources of congressional oversight with respect to this proposed rule. Many studies of
congressional control over bureaucratic agencies focus on how agencies change their behavior
with respect to shifts in the ideological composition of the oversight committees (e.g., Wein-
gast and Moran, 1983; Shipan, 2004). Yet, as I argue in Chapter 5, because rules affect such
a broad number of stakeholders agencies must consider a greater number of congressional
actors than just those members of the oversight committee. In light of this fact, in that
chapter I consider the congressional floor median and the House median as key pivot points
for agencies, instead of the oversight committee median. In this chapter, I demonstrate the
types of oversight that members outside of the oversight committee provided in the case of
the menu labeling rule.
And, finally, I show how the proposed rule can be considered an investment for the
FDA, an idea that goes to the crux of the argument in this dissertation (see Chapter 2).
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In the case of menu labeling, the FDA had taken numerous steps before the proposed rule
actually made it out the door, including multiple Federal Register notices, meetings with
external stakeholders, and obtaining buy-in from stakeholders within the agency. This all
occurred with a looming congressional deadline to issue the proposed rule, and the explicit
threat of lawsuits by affected interest groups. This evidence converges to suggest that the
proposed rule was a substantial investment that the FDA then worked to protect.
The nucleus of this chapter is a demonstration of these two assumptions and the
investment principle using a variety of primary source materials (Federal Register notices,
newspaper articles, and documents from the rulemaking docket) and interviews with officials
involved in the menu labeling proposed rule. The chapter begins with a discussion of case
selection and background on menu labeling and the political context in which the FDA
drafted the proposed rule. I then discuss how the FDA gathered information before writing
the rule, how congressional oversight on menu labeling has worked in practice, and how many
resources were devoted to the development of the proposed rule. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of other aspects of the argument that the case speaks to, as well as the
generalizability of menu labeling to rulemaking by other agencies and in other policy areas.
6.1 case selection
I selected the menu labeling rule for three reasons. First, the proposed rule was
high-profile and attracted a lot of attention from the media and interest groups. While
I argue that the mechanisms in this dissertation apply to a wide swath of rules, they are
most applicable to important rules that meaningfully change public policy (because those
are the rules that will involve a more substantial investment by the agency). Second, the
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rule was proposed by the FDA, a regulatory agency which is frequently the subject of studies
of regulation. Including an FDA rule here allows for comparisons with other studies of the
FDA to be drawn. Lastly, the rule is recent enough that key documents are electronically
available and interview subjects have reliable recall of the events and issues surrounding the
proposed rule.1
6.2 background: menu labeling in context
At the dawn of the new millennium, obesity in the United States had reached crisis
proportions, to the point that more than one-third of American adults were obese (CDC,
2014). To address this public health epidemic, policymakers across the country implemented
a panoply of programs, ranging from banning vending machines in schools to a requirement
that packaged foods disclose the amount of trans fat included. At the state and local level,
numerous jurisdictions began instituting requirements that restaurants provide nutrition
information on their menus on the theory that providing consumers with information about
nutritional content (calories, fat grams, etc.) would encourage consumers to choose healthier
options.2
1However, this last requirement on recency has proven to be a bit of a stumbling block. In spite of the fact
that the mandate for the rule was issued over four years ago and the proposed rule was issued over three
years ago, as of this writing (July 18, 2014) the proposed rule has yet to be finalized by the FDA. Although
this was not an outcome that I anticipated when the case was initially selected, it does not impede my
ability to analyze the project’s core arguments. My argument focuses on the early phases of the process,
including the process of drafting the rule and the publication of the proposed rule, and these phases have
already been completed for this rule.
2This approach is based on the behavioral economics theory of “nudging” consumers to make better choices
(Sunstein, 2013b; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) and can be traced back to ideas about using information
disclosure as a form of regulation, particularly in environmental, health, and finance arenas (see e.g., Kraft,
Stephan and Abel, 2011; Sage, 1999). However, research on the effectiveness of menu labeling remains
decidedly mixed (see e.g., Burton et al., 2006; Downs et al., 2013; Elbel et al., 2009; Gerend, 2009; Krieger
et al., 2013).
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Figure 6.1: Map of State and Local Menu Labeling Policies as of April 2011
Source: Center for Science in the Public Interest, 2011
The first large city to adopt a menu labeling ordinance was New York City in 2006,
but other cities and states followed suit in fairly short order as the policy idea diffused across
the country. See Figure 6.1 for a map of state and localities that had adopted menu labeling
policies as of April of 2011.
Since each locale tailored its menu labeling policy, restaurants with a national pres-
ence rapidly began running into compliance problems. For instance, the State of California
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requires chain restaurants with 20 or more locations to display calorie information, but
not other nutritional facts. The state’s menu labeling law excludes alcoholic beverages and
self-service buffet items. Meanwhile, Philadelphia, which is considered to have the tough-
est menu labeling law in the country, applies menu labeling to a lower threshold (15 or
more establishments). The city’s policy covers alcohol and buffet items, and requires disclo-
sure of nutritional information beyond calories (saturated fat, trans fat, carbohydrates, and
sodium).3 As one food industry official interviewed for this project summarized the problem:
We can’t keep up with the patchwork of 17 different laws and have 17 different
versions of calorie labeled menu boards. This is ridiculous. We all agree that
chain restaurants should be disclosing nutrition information to customers. Let’s
get a federal law out there that says all chain restaurants, 20 units or more,
have to provide nutrition information to their customers (Interview with industry
official, April 2013).4
Because of the costs associated with complying with so many different laws, restau-
rants and other food groups began lobbying Congress to enact a national menu labeling
standard that would preempt state and local laws.5 Meanwhile, at the same time that menu
labeling was becoming an issue at the federal level, a larger debate over how to reform Amer-
ica’s broken health care system was taking place on the national stage.6 While the exact
process that married these two issues together is beyond the scope of this discussion,7 when
the ACA was signed into law in March of 2010, it specifically directed the FDA to issue rules
3Menu labeling facts from CSPI (2011).
4To protect the anonymity of subjects interviewed for this case study, I provide only the most general
identification of the subject’s organizational affiliation and the month in which the interview was conducted.
5By some accounts, the National Restaurant Association (NRA) led the charge in lobbying Congress to get
a national standard for menu labeling enacted (Picket, 2013).
6For a thorough discussion of the debates surrounding health care reform in the lead-up to the passage of
Obamacare, see Jacobs and Skocpol (2012); Washington Post Staff (2010).
7But see Schulman (2010) and Stein (2011) for a background on menu labeling prior to the ACA.
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to set a national menu labeling standard to supplant the existing patchwork of state and
local laws.8
The legislative language in the ACA stipulated that the menu labeling rule should
apply to all chain restaurants with 20 or more establishments, should require restaurants
to disclose nutrition information on their menu boards (including drive-thru menu boards),
and that restaurants should determine calorie counts should be based on the FDA’s existing
“reasonable basis” standard for determining nutrition information.9 However, aside from
these broad mandates, the law directed the FDA to specify how menu labeling would work
in practice—and the law stated further that the agency must issue a proposed rule accom-
plishing this within one year of the law’s passage and that the agency must provide quarterly
updates to Congress on their progress in completing the rulemaking process.
This was a sizable task; as FDA Commissioner Hamburg would later say, it was one of
the thornier issues the agency had ever encountered (Associated Press, 2013). Menu labeling
represented a new foray for the FDA, as the agency does not typically regulate restaurants.
Further, the law was silent on a number of issues that would prove to be considerable sticking
points with powerful interests. For example, how would the agency handle the variability
associated with different types of food establishments, such as pizza delivery restaurants,
bowling alleys, carnivals and airplanes? Would the FDA extend its current honor system
approach for package labeling to menu labeling or would there be a more formal enforcement
8The ACA was a landmark legislative enactment and menu labeling was one of only one of dozens of issues
addressed in the law; only 9 of the 2,409 pages of the enrolled bill dealt with menu labeling.
9See Section 6.5 of this chapter for the text of Section 4205 of the ACA directing the FDA to develop
menu labeling standards. Notably, this section also directs the FDA to issue rules on labeling for vending
machines. Although menu labeling and vending machine labeling were issued as separate proposed rules,
much of the FDA’s work on vending machine labeling overlaps with its work on menu labeling. I focus on
menu labeling here because it is a much bigger and more contentious issue than vending machine labeling.
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mechanism? How much flexibility would the agency allow restaurants with respect to the
presentation of nutrition information? Would alternate forms of compliance (e.g., posting
nutrition information on an interactive tool next to the menu board) satisfy the requirement?
When the agency eventually published the proposed rule in April of 2011 (76 FR
19192, April 6, 2011)—nearly three weeks after the statutory deadline for issuing the NPRM—
it had taken a position on all of these issues. The proposed rule followed the basic honor
system framework associated with package labeling, meaning that the FDA would establish
regulatory standards for menu labeling but would not validate the quality of the nutritional
information provided (Neistat, 2013). Further, the proposed rule excluded establishments
whose “primary purpose,” defined according to whether 50% or more of a retailer’s floor
space is devoted to food sale or whether the establishment presented itself publicly (e.g., in
marketing materials) as a restaurant, was something other than food sales. The proposed
definition excluded movie theaters, bowling alleys, carnivals, airplanes, but included the sale
of prepared food at supermarkets. To address the issue of custom orders, the agency would
allow restaurants to provide calorie ranges with lower and upper bounds for all possible
variations of a particular order. Finally, the information would have to be printed on the
menu board; websites, smartphone apps, and other technologies would not be acceptable
substitutes.
In response to the proposed rule, the FDA received more than 900 written comments,
not an unusually high volume of comments for the agency.10 The real pushback, however,
came from those industries that felt the proposed rule would treat them unfairly, namely the
pizza industry and grocery stores.
10It was actually less than some agency officials had expected (Interview with FDA official, May 2013).
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The pizza industry took the position that the proposed rule’s one-size-fits-all approach
to listing nutrition information on menu boards unfairly burdened their industry. Because
there are more than 34 million different combinations of pizza orders (including toppings,
crust, pizza size, etc.) (ElBoghdady, 2013), the FDA’s proposal to include ranges for menu
items was essentially meaningless since ranges might well vary by thousands of calories.11
Figure 6.2 displays a mock-up of a menu board with wide calorie ranges that one pizza
company provided to the FDA prior to the publication of the proposed rule. The sample
menu shows ranges approaching 2,000 calories, the daily recommended caloric intake for
some adults.
11Furthermore, compliance would be costly for the industry; one Domino’s pizza official stated that the
proposed rule would cost their franchise owners $4,800 per year per store (Armour, 2013).
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To advocate for alternate compliance methods (including web-based calorie calcula-
tors and smartphone apps), a group of large national pizza companies banded together and
formed a new industry association, the American Pizza Community (APC). The APC was
launched in January 2012 with the specific goal of combatting the FDA’s approach to menu
labeling.12 The organization has been extremely active in lobbying against the menu labeling
rule. In addition to submitting comments and meeting numerous times with the FDA and
OIRA, APC launched an ambitious program to lobby Congress. In June of 2012, 2013, and
2014, the group launched a “fly-in,” bringing pizza franchise owners to Capitol Hill to meet
with lawmakers.
Grocery stores were similarly miffed by the proposed rule, although their concerns
stemmed not from the content of the proposed rule, but from the fact that it applied to them
in the first place. After all, the legislative text of Section 4205 of the ACA did not mention
grocery stores, so their inclusion owed entirely to the discretion of FDA bureaucrats. The
Food Marketing Institute, the chief lobbyist for grocery stores, indicated that the proposal
would cost the industry $1 billion in the first year, and Kroger, the largest grocery chain in
the country, indicated that its costs would amount to $15 million in upfront costs and $4
million in annual compliance costs (Armour, 2013). The grocers followed a similar strategy
to the pizza industry, including submitting comments and lobbying the FDA, the White
House, and Congress.
By some accounts, these opposition groups were successful (Kliff, 2013). The release
of a final rule has been considerably delayed and the FDA publicly pushed back the release
12The APC includes more than 20 national pizza firms, representing more than 20,000 restaurants nationwide.
Since its creation, the organization has taken on new issues common to the pizza industry (e.g., agricultural
policy, minimum wage policy), but menu labeling remains its core issue.
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date for the final rule numerous times. In addition, efforts to lobby Congress have yielded
the introduction of at least two bills in the House and two in the Senate (see Table 6.1 for
a timeline of these bills and other key events in the rule’s promulgation). The proposed
rule was not without its champions, however. For example, the NRA, the organization that
originally lobbied Congress for an unified federal standard, supported the FDA’s rule and
actually encouraged the agency to include a broader number of establishments under the
menu labeling rubric (Vinson and DeFife, 2011).13
13The NRA also requested more flexibility and a longer lead time for restaurants to implement the rule’s
requirements. However, as some commentators have noted (Thatcher, 2014) the NRA’s intent may be
to level the playing field between its clientele, restaurants, and competitors such as convenience stores
and supermarkets. Groups lobbying for regulation to protect an industry’s competitive interest is not an
uncommon story. Shipan (1997) discusses a similar case where commercial broadcasters, led by the National
Association of Broadcasters, lobbied the Federal Radio Commission to maintain barriers to obtaining radio
licenses and to prevent new stations from being created.
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Table 6.1: Timeline for Menu Labeling Rulemaking
Mar 23, 2010 Affordable Care Act signed into law. Section 4205 of the law
directs FDA to take up menu labeling.
July 7, 2010 FDA publishes a FR notice establishing an open docket for
interested parties to submit comments.
July 23, 2010 FDA publishes FR notice (required by the ACA) stating how
voluntary registration will work.
Aug 25, 2010 FDA publishes draft guidance explaining how firms can com-
ply with menu labeling in advance of binding rules.
Jan 25, 2011 FDA repeals draft guidance from August.
Mar 23, 2011 FDA misses the statutory deadline for the proposed rule.
Apr 6, 2011 Menu labeling proposed rule is published in the FR.
Jan 2012 American Pizza Community formed to combat menu labeling.
July 24, 2012 Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act of 2012 (H.R. 6174)
introduced in the House.
Sep 19, 2012 Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act of 2012 (S. 3574)
introduced in the Senate.
Mar 19, 2013 Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act of 2013 (H.R. 1249)
introduced in the House.
Nov 21, 2013 Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act of 2013 (S.1756) in-
troduced in the Senate
Feb 2014 FDA misses self-imposed deadline to issue the final rule.
Apr 3, 2014 FDA submits draft final rule to OIRA for review.
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In sum, the proposed rule set the stage for an epic fight between powerful interests
with the FDA wedged in the middle. While it is too soon to say how this fight will play
out (as of this writing, the final rule is under review at OIRA and is not publicly available),
the details of how the proposed rule was written—and defended—by the FDA serve as an
important case to illustrate many of the critical assumptions from the previous chapters. It
is to this task that I now turn.
6.3 parsing the menu labeling case
The menu labeling proposed rule presents an interesting real world laboratory to study
the theory advanced in this dissertation. The proposed rule was carefully followed by the
media—and the (forthcoming) final rule has the potential to impact the business practices of
thousand of restaurants and the menu choices of millions of Americans. In the sections that
follow, I consider how the FDA gathered policy and political information from stakeholders
in advance of publishing the proposed rule, a key assumption of the formal model from
Chapter 3. I then evaluate which congressional actors actually provided oversight on the
menu labeling proposal, and also consider the FDA’s expectations about oversight on this
rulemaking (see Chapter 5). Finally, I lay out an argument for how the FDA has treated
the menu labeling proposed rule as an investment (see Chapter 2).
Frontloading the Proposed Rule?
A core assumption underlying the signaling model I presented in Chapter 2 is that
agencies gather critical policy and political intelligence prior to the publication of the proposed
rule. The result of this front-loading is that the public comment period becomes less of a
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learning exercise and more perfunctory from the agency’s perspective. In the menu labeling
instance, this assumption can be illustrated in practice by examining the timing of the
stakeholder outreach that the FDA conducted when drafting the proposed rule.14
Following the passage of the ACA in March of 2010, the FDA took over a year to
draft and publish the menu labeling proposed rule.15 In that span of that time, the FDA
did its homework, conducting extensive outreach with industry,
To begin, in July of 2010, less than four months after the ACA was signed by President
Obama, the FDA published a notice in the Federal Register (75 FR 39026, July 7, 2010). The
three-page notice, which was entirely voluntary on the FDA’s part,16 established an open
docket where interested parties could submit comments on 26 open-ended questions posed
by the FDA on how to implement menu labeling. The notice was intended to give the agency
a lay of the land vis-a`-vis menu labeling. As one FDA official put it, the agency opened the
docket in order to “ask basic questions about things because quite frankly we haven’t really
worked with restaurants that much either so this was somewhat new to us on how they do
things” (Interview with FDA Official, May 2013). In response to this open-ended call, the
14I focus in this discussion on formal outreach conducted by the FDA on menu labeling (publication of
notices, etc.). However, the FDA almost certainly conducted informal outreach on the rule as well (e.g.,
chatting with stakeholders at a conference). I limit myself to formal outreach as it is possible to get a
fuller portrait of the agency’s behavior in this domain, whereas, definitionally, informal outreach is less
systematic and also less observable. However, this limitation is not particularly consequential, as it leads
me to understate the FDA’s outreach efforts, in essence making this a harder case.
15Of course, the FDA certainly could have begun planning for menu labeling prior to the passage of the ACA.
Given the uncertainty and haggling associated with the passage of that landmark law, for the purposes of
this analysis I assume that the FDA began planning to implement menu labeling immediately after the
law was passed in March of 2010.
16Section 4205 did require the FDA to publish a notice within 120 days of passage that included instructions
for how firms not subject to menu labeling could voluntarily comply with the law and register with the
FDA. This requirement was fulfilled through a separate Federal Register notice published on July 23rd (75
FR 43182).
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agency received 875 comments.17
Meanwhile, in addition to the establishing an open docket, the FDA began to hold
informal “listening meetings” with stakeholders. These meetings included regulated entities
(i.e., food establishments) and consumer interest groups, as well as some state and localities
that had already gone through the process of implementing menu labeling. The FDA took
a take-all-comers approach to these meetings, meaning that they met with any group that
requested a meeting, but did not explicitly seek out meetings on the agency’s behalf. Almost
all of the parties that participated in these informal meetings went on to submit comments
when the proposed rule was published in April of 2011 (Interview with FDA Official, May
2013).
As the FDA was working to draft its proposed rules based on all of this feedback,
it was concurrently working on a guidance document to explain how firms could comply
with menu labeling before the binding final rule was completed. After all, Section 4205
took effect immediately upon passage of the ACA, and the FDA needed to clarify to which
establishments the law applied and whether the agency would conduct any enforcement prior
to completing the rulemaking process. The FDA published draft guidance in August 2010,
indicating that the law would apply to a broad set of entities (e.g., movie theaters, grocery
stores, airplanes) and that the agency would publish final guidance in December of 2010.
That final guidance never came, as in January of 2011 the FDA withdrew the draft guidance,
stating that they would not finalize any guidance and would instead proceed apace with the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. The agency cited “extensive comments on the
draft guidance” and the need to “minimize uncertainty and confusion among all interested
17It is worth noting that this is approximately the same number of comments that the FDA later received
on the proposed rule.
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persons” as reasons for abandoning the use of a guidance document in this case (76 FR 4360,
January 25, 2011).
Finally, in March of 2011 the FDA submitted a draft proposed rule on menu labeling
to OIRA for review. During the 23 days that the rule was under review at OIRA, the FDA
got even more feedback from stakeholders as OIRA hosted two heavy-hitting meetings. As
shown in Table 6.2, one meeting was with restaurant industry officials and the other was with
public health advocates. While this was the first time that OIRA sat down with stakeholders,
it was far from the FDA’s first encounter with these groups. In fact, one industry official
present at the meeting with OIRA indicated that it was her organization’s third time meeting
face-to-face with the FDA to discuss menu-labeling (Interview with industry official, April
2013).
In sum, by the time the FDA published the menu labeling proposed rule in April of
2011, the agency had ample opportunity to learn how stakeholders lined up with respect to a
variety of menu labeling policy alternatives. The agency had received written comments on
a notice and on a draft guidance document. Additionally, the agency had met with dozens
of stakeholders in informal listening sessions and again when the draft proposed rule was
submitted to OIRA for preclearance. As a result of these interactions, the agency developed
a sense not only of how different options would affect different stakeholders, but also what
their political reaction might be. For instance, the draft guidance published in August would
have applied to a larger swath of food establishments (e.g., movie theaters, planes, trains)
than the proposed rule ultimately covered. In other words, between August of 2010 and
April 2011 the FDA had a considerable change of heart regarding the scope of applicability
for menu labeling. Given the extent of input received from external stakeholders during this
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Table 6.2: OIRA-Sponsored Stakeholder Meetings on Menu Labeling Proposed Rule
Meeting 1 Meeting 2
Restaurant Industry Public Health Advocates
3/15/2011 3/18/2011
Government Officials: Government Officials:
Food and Drug Administration (3) Food and Drug Administration (1)
Office of Management and Budget (4) Office of Management and Budget (3)
White House Domestic Policy Council (1) White House Domestic Policy Council (2)
Outside Attendees: Outside Attendees:
Brinker Intl (Maggiano’s & Chili’s) (1) American Academy of Pediatrics (2)
Domino’s Pizza (1) American Diabetes Assn (1)
Dunkin’ Brands (1) American Heart Assn (1)
National Council of Chain Restaurants (1) American Public Health Assn (1)
National Restaurant Association (1) Assn of State/Territorial Health Officials (1)
Yum! Brands (1) Center for Science in the Public Interest (1)
Nemours Foundation (1)
Source: Data is from OIRA’s records, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/.
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of individuals from each organization in
attendance at the meeting.
period, it is reasonable to conclude that this input played a role in the FDA’s decision to
change course.
The information that the FDA gathered prior to issuing its proposed rule was not
shared with members of Congress or OIRA. As West (2009, 577) notes, “outside participation
in prenotice rulemaking tends to be informal and idiosyncratic. As such, it is not usually
constrained by institutional assurances of inclusiveness and transparency.” This statement
certainly applies to the development of the menu labeling proposed rule, in that even though
the fact that the FDA conducted outreach is public, the substance of that outreach is not.18
18For instance, in the course of conducting this research, I requested copies of FDA’s logs so that I could
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This suggests that it would have taken considerable effort for congressional or OIRA staffers
to become as educated on the nuances of the proposed rule as FDA staff. Further, even
though OIRA participated in meetings with outside stakeholders on the proposed rule, these
meetings came at the tail-end of the process, and FDA staff were certainly able to anticipate
the types of concerns that OIRA staff might bring up at that late stage in the game.
Taken together, these facts suggest that the FDA had an informational advantage
over its congressional overseers and OIRA. The extensive informal and formal outreach that
the FDA conducted allowed the agency to gather critical policy-relevant intelligence from
stakeholders in advance of the publication of the proposed rule.
Whence the Congressional Hammer?
Another important assumption arises in Chapter 4, where I argue that the congres-
sional oversight on rulemaking does not necessarily originate from oversight committees.
Instead, I argue that rulemaking can create a variety of constituencies and that this encour-
ages oversight from various parts of the House and the Senate. Notably, this assumption
does not imply that congressional oversight committees do not matter to agencies, rather
it implies that other actors in Congress, in addition to oversight committee members, also
matter. In light of this, in the empirical analyses in that chapter I consider the floor median
(rather than the oversight committee median) as the agency’s focal point in Congress.
To demonstrate the validity of this assumption, I show how it would have been difficult
for the FDA to predict who in Congress would weigh in on menu labeling. Although the
see which groups attended the informal stakeholder listening meetings. I was told that those records
would only be made available to me after filing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, even
though such records are technically part of the public docket for the rulemaking. Similarly, the public
comments submitted on the agency’s draft guidance document have been removed from the public docket
on www.regulations.gov, even though the public comments on the proposed rule are posted there.
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FDA’s primary oversight committees have traditionally been thought to be the House Energy
and Commerce committee and the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP)
committee (Shipan, 2004), the FDA could not count on oversight to be restricted to the
membership of these two committees because of a lack of partisan cues, and because of the
broad applicability of the policy.
The FDA could not rely on partisan cues to predict who might provide oversight on
menu labeling due to two unrelated factors. The first factor had to due with the broader
political environment at the time the FDA was drafting the menu labeling NPRM. The ACA
was passed in March 2010 under a unified Democratic government.19 In the ensuing months,
as the FDA consulted and drafted, the political landscape in Washington changed dramati-
cally. In November 2010, Tea Party Republicans won more than 60 seats and took control
of the House. This major upset led to a change in the leadership in the House committees,
but not in the Senate (where Democrats still maintained control). Thus, political power
looked quite different in March of 2010 (passage of the menu labeling mandate) than it did
in April of 2011 (FDA’s promulgation of the menu labeling proposed rule). While some have
argued that agencies do best when responding to the current Congress, the agency only got
to write one rule and the current congress changed during that time. Further, even after the
new Congress took office in January of 2011, because the chambers were split, pleasing the
Republicans in the House could come at the price of aggravating Democrats in the Senate.
The shift in the political landscape was further complicated by the fact that key
stakeholders on menu labeling had connections to both Democrats and Republicans. Table
6.3 lists several key stakeholders and shows that, not only are these groups “regulars” on the
19Indeed, perhaps the most striking aspect of the law’s passage was that it received not a single vote from
a Republican.
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Table 6.3: Key Menu Labeling Stakeholders and Campaign Contributions
Organization Name 2012 Campaign $ % to Dems 2013 Lobbying $
Industry Stakeholders:
Brinker Intl (Maggiano’s & Chili’s) $230,787 21% -
Domino’s Pizza $12,568 16% $160,000
Dunkin’ Brands $108,316 37% $950,000
National Restaurant Association $1,038,781 19% $2,238,691
Yum! Brands $318,930 26% $690,000
Public Health Stakeholders:
American Academy of Pediatrics $4,000 100% $338,049
American Diabetes Assn $3,510 93% $933,000
American Heart Assn $10,172 81% $621,752
American Public Health Assn $4,165 100% $523,373
Center for Science in the Public Interest, - - $87,998
Nemours Foundation $1,350 44% $402,404
Source: Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).
Note: I include the stakeholders from Table 6.2 in this table only as illustrative cases. I
exclude the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials and the National Council of
Chain Restaurants because, according to CRP’s data, they did not contribute to congressional
campaigns in the 2012 election cycle or spend money on lobbying in 2013.
Washington scene (i.e., regularly providing campaign contributions and lobbying), but they
also have ties to both Republican and Democrats.20 Given that the opposing sides of the
issue both had strong Washington connections, even if the FDA was sure which party was in
control in Washington, it is not clear whether it would have behooved the agency to pander
to Republicans over Democrats (or vice versa). All of this political and partisan uncertainty,
made it unclear which parties, much less which committees would provide oversight.
In addition to the lack of partisan cues, the broad applicability of the proposed rule
20Perhaps unsurprisingly public health groups appear to be tilted towards Democrats, while industry groups
favor Republicans.
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created constituencies well beyond the oversight committees. That is, the proposed rule
had the potential to impact tens of thousands of chain restaurants, movie theaters, grocery
stores, airlines, and other venues that served food. These are the types of entities that are
present in every congressional district.
Consequently, members of Congress not on the key oversight committees were com-
pelled to provide oversight on the FDA’s menu labeling proposal. In July of 2012, Rep. John
Carter (R-TX) introduced the Common Sense Nutrition Disclosure Act of 2012 (H.R. 6174),
a bill that was designed to water down the FDA’s proposal for menu labeling. Only 9 of the
bill’s 48 cosponsors (19%) were members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
Later that year, Sen. Blunt (R-GA) introduced a companion Senate bill (S. 3574), which
included only 3 cosponsors (23%) from the Senate HELP Committee.21 A similar pattern
followed for mirror bills introduced in the House (H.R. 1249) and the Senate (S. 1756) in the
next congress. Only 11% of cosponsors of the Senate bill (again sponsored by Sen. Blunt)
hailed from the HELP committee. The House bill, however, was sponsored by a member
of the Energy and Commerce (Rep. Cathy McMorris-Rodgers (R-WA)), but only included
15% of cosponsors from that committee. Even though these bills did not proceed beyond
the committee stage, the FDA certainly took note of their introduction.
In addition to introducing and cosponsoring bills, some members took the extra step
of writing letters to the FDA. Table 6.4 lists the members submitting letters, their partisan
affiliation and whether or not the belonged to the key FDA oversight committees (i.e., House
Energy and Commerce committee or Senate HELP committee). Upon examination, the table
reveals that less than a third (28%) of the letter writers were members of the two committees
21Neither Senator Blunt nor Representative Carter is a member of the FDA’s main oversight committees.
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in question. Additionally, with two exceptions, all of the letter writers were Republicans.
In sum, in terms of oversight provided via bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship and
letters submitted to the rulemaking docket, many members outside of the FDA’s oversight
committees participated. And, in fact, in these alternate forms of oversight those not on
the oversight committee were more likely to weigh in than the members of the oversight
committees. In a sense, this is unsurprising since members of the Energy and Commerce
and HELP committee members had other oversight tools at their disposal and did not need
to avail themselves of these ancillary forms of oversight.22 Yet, the fact that the FDA received
so much input from those outside of its key oversight committees suggests that there was a
need for the agency to be more expansive in its view of where oversight might come from on
menu labeling.
Further, from the FDA’s perspective, it was not predictable in advance which members
of Congress might weigh in on the rule.While participation was skewed toward Republicans,
the changing political landscape in the House at the time of the rule’s promulgation, made it
unclear at the outset of the rulemaking process which party would obtain control of Congress
and what the partisan fall-out with respect to food labeling might be. As a result, when
considering who mattered in Congress, the FDA had to consider a wider set of preferences
than just the preferences of the oversight committee. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume
that the FDA applied more general heuristics (such as the floor median).
22As far as I’m aware, these committees did not hold any hearings specifically on menu labeling. However,
the subject of the menu labeling rule did come briefly in other hearings in which FDA Commissioner
Hamburg testified, such as the FY14 budget hearing.
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Table 6.4: Members of Congress that Sent Letters to the FDA on Menu Labeling
Member Name Party Member of Key Committee?
Sen. John Cornyn R No
Sen. Jerry Moran R No
Sen. Marco Rubio R No
Rep. Lou Barletta* R No
Rep. Dennis Cardoza D No
Rep. Steve Chabot* R No
Rep. John J. Duncan Jr.* R No
Rep. Stephen Fincher* R No
Rep. Cory Gardner† R Yes
Rep. Bob Gibbs* R No
Rep. Bob Goodlatte* R No
Rep. Sam Graves† R No
Rep. Bill Huizenga* R No
Rep. Walter B. Jones* R No
Rep. Leonard Lance* R Yes
Rep. Tom Latham* R No
Rep. Robert E. Latta* R Yes
Rep. Blaine Luetkemeyer† R No
Rep. Cathy McMorris-Rodgers* R Yes
Rep. Sue Myrick R Yes
Rep. Richard Nugent* R No
Rep. Alan Nunnelee* R No
Rep. Joseph R. Pitts* R Yes
Rep. Mike Pompeo* R Yes
Rep. Tom Rooney* R No
Rep. Mike Ross* D Yes
Rep. Austin Scott* R No
Rep. Jean Schmidt*† R No
Rep. Aaron Schock R No
Rep. Cliff Stearns* R Yes
Rep. Steve Stivers* R No
Rep. Tim Walberg R No
Source: Menu Labeling Rulemaking Docket (RIN 0910-AG57), www.regulations.gov
Note: Two letters in the menu labeling docket had multiple signatures. Co-signers of these
letters are indicated with a † and * for each letter.
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Menu Labeling as an Investment?
Lastly, the menu labeling case helps to illustrate how agencies regard the proposed
rule as an investment. While not quite an assumption (like the previous two sections), this
idea is foundational to the dissertation. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the idea of an investment
is that drafting a proposed rule involves considerable resources and also that stakeholders
become psychologically wedded to the policy offered in the proposed rule. While the lesson
of sunk costs suggests that an agency might better be served by walking away from the
proposal (e.g., ditching the proposed rule and starting again), agency bureaucrats instead
work to protect their investment on the proposed rule.
Drafting the menu labeling proposed rule was extremely resource-intensive for the
FDA. In the year following the passage of the ACA, the FDA issued two notices, a draft
guidance document, and a proposed rule. The agency received more than 2,000 comments23
from affected stakeholders and held dozens of meetings with outside groups. This all occurred
in a fairly short timespan (under a statutorily-imposed deadline), with the additional hurdle
that the FDA does not usually regulate restaurants (so this was a new policy domain for the
agency). All this suggests that a lot of resources went into creating the proposed rule that
was published in April of 2011. And even after the proposed rule was published the agency
continued to direct resources towards the proposed rule, combing through public comments
and conducting research.24
23The FDA received 875 comments on the July 2010 Federal Register notice, 80 comments on the draft
guidance from August of 2010, and approximately 900 comments on the proposed rule from April of 2011.
24For instance, in the text of the proposed rule, the FDA indicated that following the publication of the
NPRM, the agency planned to “conduct consumer research to evaluate how well consumers understand
the caloric information presented in each of the formats and whether mixed formats on a single menu or
menu board might be confusing to consumers” (76 FR 19209, April 11, 2011). The agency also promised
to conduct research on how consumers responded to statements about recommended daily calorie intake
(76 FR 19210). The FDA promised to make the results of their research publicly available prior to the
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Not only did the FDA invest a lot of resources in the proposed rule, but there was
a strong incentive for the agency to “get it right the first time” (West, 2009) despite the
tight turnaround. Because of the moneyed interests with a stake in the rule, the FDA simply
could not afford to take the proposed rule as cheap talk. The threat of lawsuits, which would
put the investment at risk of overturn and potentially send the agency back to the drawing
board, was ever present.
For instance, even though the NRA was broadly supportive of the FDA’s efforts to
apply menu labeling to a broad class of food venues, the association disagreed with the
strict standard the agency proposed for calculating nutrition values on menu items. The
FDA proposed to apply the so-called “80-120” rule that it uses for packaged foods to menu
labeling. Broadly, this standard states that certain listed “good” nutrients (protein, dietary
fiber, total carbohydrates, etc.) must be present in at least 80% of the stated amount, while
other “bad” nutrients (calories, sugars, trans fat, etc.) cannot exceed the stated amount
by 120%. In its public comment on the proposed rule, the NRA accused the agency of
overstepping the authority granted in the ACA:
The plain language of the statute sets forth a compliance standard that is clear
on its face... The Proposed Rule would place the judgment of FDA above that
of Congress, an outcome that would not withstand judicial review. We have not
attempted an exhaustive discussion, but would be pleased to discuss further with
FDA the additional legal infirmities of its proposed standard as judged against
the Administrative Procedure Act and the Constitution (Vinson and DeFife,
2011, 11).
In this statement, the NRA offers a not-so-veiled threat to sue the FDA if it did not
change its approach to the 80-120 policy in the final rule. However, the FDA had met with
publication of the final rule, but to my knowledge that information is not yet available.
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the NRA (and other like-minded stakeholders) prior to drafting the proposed rule (including
during the draft proposed rule’s tenure at OIRA) and was certainly aware of the association’s
opposition to this policy in advance of issuing the proposed rule. The FDA’s decision to apply
the 80-120 rule to menu labeling was thus a conscious choice, and the decision to proceed
was almost certainly discussed within the agency and with legal counsel before the rule was
released. As a result, the agency must have made every effort to make sure they were careful
in their writing and discussion of this particular point.25
The menu labeling case is a good illustration of the investment idea because the
proposed rule was so controversial and faced so much opposition from entrenched interests.
Arguably, the FDA would have been better off by scrapping the proposed rule and starting
all over again.Yet, this is clearly not the path the agency has pursued. The agency has
pushed on in spite of the controversy.
6.4 discussion and conclusion
The menu labeling case illustrates two assumptions and a guiding principle of this
dissertation. First, the case demonstrates the ways in which an agency can “do its homework”
by gathering information well in advance of the publication of the proposed rule. While many
of the channels I highlighted were formal routes of information-gathering, the agency most
likely engaged in (harder to observe) informal information gathering as well. Second, the
case demonstrates that an agency serves many masters in Congress, and that oversight on
rulemaking need not be limited to the agency’s oversight committee. Finally, through a
25The third pillar of the investment idea is that the agency becomes psychologically wedded to the proposed
policy. This is only observable if agency personnel are willing to admit as much, which few self-aware
bureaucrats are wont to do. Accordingly, I cannot show definitively that the FDA became psychologically
entrenched in its the menu labeling proposed policy, although it seems likely.
169
discussion of the resources involved in the creation of the proposed rule and the explicit
incentives for the FDA to “get it right,” the case substantiates the idea of the proposed rule
as an investment.
The case also serves to illustrate several other aspects of the arguments made in this
dissertation. A key tenet of the signaling model in Chapter 3 is that agencies consider
multiple avenues to accomplish a policy goal. An examination of the documents associated
with the menu labeling case reveals that the FDA considered multiple policy alternatives in
lieu of the set of policies contained in the proposed rule. Evidence of the FDA’s contemplation
of various policy alternatives can be found in examining the differences between the proposed
guidance document from August 2010 and the proposed rule from April of 2011 (76 FR
19192). For instance, the guidance document states that “alcoholic beverages are considered
food as defined in the [Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]... Therefore, the nutrition
disclosure requirements in section 4205 apply in cases where these foods are listed on a menu
or menu board.” However, eight months later, the FDA took a completely different stance
on alcohol in the proposed rule, stating that:
It is not clear that Congress intended for the nutrition information disclosures
required by section 4205 to apply to alcohol beverages, given that the labels of
the majority of alcohol beverages are regulated by [the Department of Treasury].
For the purposes of this proposal, FDA tentatively concludes that the new menu
labeling requirements do not apply to alcohol beverages (76 FR 19203).
This suggests that there was no one preordained way that the FDA approached menu labeling
and that the agency considered multiple policy alternatives when preparing the proposed
rule.26
26Another example of this behavior discussed earlier in this chapter is that the guidance document would
have covered airlines, trains, and movie theaters, while the proposed rule specifically excluded these types
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Additionally, the congressional bills discussed in this chapter—which would, if passed,
force the FDA to water down or altogether abandon the proposed policy— are illustrative of
the issues surrounding Congress’s regulatory veto discussed in Chapter 4. In that chapter I
explain how the congressional veto can be preemptive, meaning that Congress can issue the
veto before the agency has started writing a rule. In this case, the veto threats came before
the agency issued the proposed rule (but after the FDA had begun drafting it). Although no
veto has ever been issued, the introduction of these bills suggests that agency-curbing bills
may serve as an informative signal to agencies about congressional preferences (for a related
argument, see Clark, 2009), an argument that future work would do well to consider.
In many ways, the menu labeling rule is an exception. The rule was promulgated
as the result of an explicit legislative mandate (which included a promulgation deadline for
the proposed rule) and at a peculiar moment in the American political landscape. And the
rule was very controversial and generated a considerable amount of interest and lobbying
on the part of interest groups and attracted the attention of Congress and the media. Not
all agency proposed rules merit this same level of attention. Finally, the proposed rule was
written by the FDA, a regulatory agency with a lot of experience promulgating rules and
dealing with intense public scrutiny.
Yet, these caveats are not as limiting as they may seem. Many rules are issued based
on mandates from Congress, and many of these include statutorily-fixed deadlines. Of the
17,566 proposed and 21,841 final rules reviewed by OIRA between 1981 and 2013, 7.6% of
proposed rules and 7.8% of final rules included a statutory deadline. Further, the unique
political configuration at the time of the ACA’s passage and the subsequent Tea Party
of establishments from the menu labeling requirement.
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takeover of the House, is not actually all that unique to the menu labeling case. In 2010 and
2011, the years during which the FDA drafted and released the menu labeling proposed rule,
577 proposed and 494 final rules were published by federal agencies, suggesting that a lot of
other agencies were in the same boat as the FDA at the time. Further, House elections occur
every two years, suggesting a near constant potential for shifting oversight for agencies.
And while not every rule rises to the same level of public attention as the menu
labeling proposed rule, those that do not perhaps require less effort from the agency to
protect their investment. In other words, the menu labeling case may be an easy case in that
it is exactly the type of rulemaking in which we might expect strategic agency behavior to
occur. When a rule is less controversial or issued by a less experienced agency, the need for
such behavior is reduced.27
Nevertheless, we can learn a lot from the lessons of this case, not least because the
menu labeling case is exactly the type of rule that has substantial public policy implications
and thus has broad normative appeal. In this sense, the menu labeling case helps to shed
light on the substantive implications of the rulemaking process.
27These are the hard cases, where it is more difficult to observe the expected behavior because the agency
faces less opposition or is not cognizant of all of the strategies available.
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6.5 appendix: aca text on menu labeling
SEC. 4205. NUTRITION LABELING OF STANDARD MENU ITEMS AT CHAIN RESTAU-
RANTS.
(a) Technical Amendments.–Section 403(q)(5)(A) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (21 U.S.C. 343(q)(5)(A)) is amended–
(1) in subitem (i), by inserting at the beginning “except as provided in clause (H)(ii)(III),”;
and
(2) in subitem (ii), by inserting at the beginning “except as provided in clause (H)(ii)(III),”.
(b) Labeling Requirements.–Section 403(q)(5) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. 343(q)(5)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
(H) Restaurants, Retail Food Establishments, and Vending Machines.–
(i) General requirements for restaurants and similar retail food establishments.–
Except for food described in subclause (vii), in the case of food that is a
standard menu item that is offered for sale in a restaurant or similar retail food
establishment that is part of a chain with 20 or more locations doing business
under the same name (regardless of the type of ownership of the locations)
and offering for sale substantially the same menu items, the restaurant or
similar retail food establishment shall disclose the information described in
subclauses (ii) and (iii).
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(ii) Information required to be disclosed by restaurants and retail food establishments.–
Except as provided in subclause (vii), the restaurant or similar retail food
establishment shall disclose in a clear and conspicuous manner–
(I)(aa) in a nutrient content disclosure statement adjacent to the name of
the standard menu item, so as to be clearly associated with the standard
menu item, on the menu listing the item for sale, the number of calories
contained in the standard menu item, as usually prepared and offered for
sale; and
(bb) a succinct statement concerning suggested daily caloric intake, as spec-
ified by the Secretary by regulation and posted prominently on the menu
and designed to enable the public to understand, in the context of a total
daily diet, the significance of the caloric information that is provided on
the menu;
(II)(aa) in a nutrient content disclosure statement adjacent to the name of
the standard menu item, so as to be clearly associated with the standard
menu item, on the menu board, including a drive-through menu board,
the number of calories contained in the standard menu item, as usually
prepared and offered for sale; and
(bb) a succinct statement concerning suggested daily caloric intake, as spec-
ified by the Secretary by regulation and posted prominently on the menu
board, designed to enable the public to understand, in the context of
a total daily diet, the significance of the nutrition information that is
provided on the menu board;
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(III) in a written form, available on the premises of the restaurant or simi-
lar retail establishment and to the consumer upon request, the nutrition
information required under clauses (C) and (D) of subparagraph (1); and
(IV) on the menu or menu board, a prominent, clear, and conspicuous state-
ment regarding the availability of the information described in item (III).
(iii) Self-service food and food on display.–Except as provided in subclause (vii),
in the case of food sold at a salad bar, buffet line, cafeteria line, or similar self-
service facility, and for self-service beverages or food that is on display and
that is visible to customers, a restaurant or similar retail food establishment
shall place adjacent to each food offered a sign that lists calories per displayed
food item or per serving.
(iv) Reasonable basis.–For the purposes of this clause, a restaurant or similar
retail food establishment shall have a reasonable basis for its nutrient con-
tent disclosures, including nutrient databases, cookbooks, laboratory analy-
ses, and other reasonable means, as described in section 101.10 of title 21,
Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulation) or in a related
guidance of the Food and Drug Administration.
(v) Menu variability and combination meals.–The Secretary shall establish by
regulation standards for determining and disclosing the nutrient content for
standard menu items that come in different flavors, varieties, or combinations,
but which are listed as a single menu item, such as soft drinks, ice cream,
pizza, doughnuts, or children’s combination meals, through means determined
by the Secretary, including ranges, averages, or other methods.
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(vi) Additional information.–If the Secretary determines that a nutrient, other
than a nutrient required under subclause (ii)(III), should be disclosed for the
purpose of providing information to assist consumers in maintaining healthy
dietary practices, the Secretary may require, by regulation, disclosure of such
nutrient in the written form required under subclause (ii)(III).
(vii) Nonapplicability to certain food.–
(I) In general.–Subclauses (i) through (vi) do not apply to–
(aa) items that are not listed on a menu or menu board (such as condi-
ments and other items placed on the table or counter for general use);
(bb) daily specials, temporary menu items appearing on the menu for
less than 60 days per calendar year, or custom orders; or
(cc) such other food that is part of a customary market test appearing on
the menu for less than 90 days, under terms and conditions established
by the Secretary.
(II) Written forms.–Subparagraph (5)(C) shall apply to any regulations pro-
mulgated under subclauses (ii)(III) and (vi).
(viii) Vending machines.–
(I) In general.–In the case of an article of food sold from a vending machine
that–
(aa) does not permit a prospective purchaser to examine the Nutrition
Facts Panel before purchasing the article or does not otherwise provide
visible nutrition information at the point of purchase; and
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(bb) is operated by a person who is engaged in the business of owning
or operating 20 or more vending machines, the vending machine oper-
ator shall provide a sign in close proximity to each article of food or
the selection button that includes a clear and conspicuous statement
disclosing the number of calories contained in the article.
(ix) Voluntary provision of nutrition information.–
(I) In general.–An authorized official of any restaurant or similar retail food
establishment or vending machine operator not subject to the require-
ments of this clause may elect to be subject to the requirements of such
clause, by registering biannually the name and address of such restaurant
or similar retail food establishment or vending machine operator with the
Secretary, as specified by the Secretary by regulation.
(II) Registration.–Within 120 days of enactment of this clause, the Secre-
tary shall publish a notice in the Federal Register specifying the terms
and conditions for implementation of item (I), pending promulgation of
regulations.
(III) Rule of construction.–Nothing in this subclause shall be construed to
authorize the Secretary to require an application, review, or licensing
process for any entity to register with the Secretary, as described in such
item.
(x) Regulations.–
(I) Proposed regulation.–Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of
this clause, the Secretary shall promulgate proposed regulations to carry
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out this clause.
(II) Contents.–In promulgating regulations, the Secretary shall–
(aa) consider standardization of recipes and methods of preparation, rea-
sonable variation in serving size and formulation of menu items, space
on menus and menu boards, inadvertent human error, training of food
service workers, variations in ingredients, and other factors, as the Sec-
retary determines; and
(bb) specify the format and manner of the nutrient content disclosure
requirements under this subclause.
(III) Reporting.–The Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives a quarterly re-
port that describes the Secretary’s progress toward promulgating final
regulations under this subparagraph.
(xi) Definition.–In this clause, the term ‘menu’ or ‘menu board’ means the pri-
mary writing of the restaurant or other similar retail food establishment from
which a consumer makes an order selection.
(c) National Uniformity.–Section 403A(a)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. 343-1(a)(4)) is amended by striking “except a requirement for nutrition
labeling of food which is exempt under subclause (i) or (ii) of section 403(q)(5)(A)”
and inserting “except that this paragraph does not apply to food that is offered for
sale in a restaurant or similar retail food establishment that is not part of a chain with
20 or more locations doing business under the same name (regardless of the type of
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ownership of the locations) and offering for sale substantially the same menu items
unless such restaurant or similar retail food establishment complies with the voluntary
provision of nutrition information requirements under section 403(q)(5)(H)(ix)”.
(d) Rule of Construction.–Nothing in the amendments made by this section shall be construed–
(1) to preempt any provision of State or local law, unless such provision establishes
or continues into effect nutrient content disclosures of the type required under
section 403(q)(5)(H) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (as added by
subsection (b)) and is expressly preempted under subsection (a)(4) of such section;
(2) to apply to any State or local requirement respecting a statement in the labeling of
food that provides for a warning concerning the safety of the food or component
of the food; or
(3) except as provided in section 403(q)(5)(H)(ix) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act (as added by subsection (b)), to apply to any restaurant or similar retail
food establishment other than a restaurant or similar retail food establishment
described in section 403(q)(5)(H)(i) of such Act.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Notice-and-comment rulemaking has become a fixture of the modern bureaucracy.
Government agencies use the process to do everything from regulate the size of holes in
Swiss cheese (Skrzycki, 2003) to set out the standards for purchasing new F-14s. Once the
process is completed and a final rule is issued, the resulting policy carries the full force and
effect of law. This dissertation project has built upon two observations about this process.
First, rulemaking is carried out by unelected bureaucrats. These bureaucrats, including both
political appointees and career civil servants, are human beings with their own preferences
over the types of rules that their agency writes and, ultimately, enforces. While sometimes
bureaucrats’ preferences align with those of their political overseers in Congress and the
White House, often they do not. Within this space of disagreement, bureaucrats can exercise
their discretion to get their preferred policies enacted.
Second, if bureaucrats want to see their preferred policy enacted into law, they cannot
dally. Even though notice and comment affords an ostensible period for the agency to
deliberate and make changes to the policies contained in a proposed rule (i.e., the time after
the public comment period, before the final rule), agencies do not necessarily use this period
for its intended purpose. Rather, agencies face a set of incentives to “get it right” early on
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(West, 2009; Wagner, Barnes and Peters, 2011) and treat the proposed rule as if it were the
final, binding policy, not the starting point for negotiations. Counterintuitively, the actual
comment periods are then used to bolster this preferred position. These incentives stem
from the fact that the rulemaking process is resource-intensive and subject to considerable
litigation. In addition, psychological factors lead agency rule-writers to become wedded to
the proposed policy.
Neither of these observations is novel in its own right, as both have been recognized
in one way or another by previous scholars. The contribution I make in this dissertation is to
marry the two observations together and then unpack the implications. Specifically, I have
argued that because agencies treat proposed rules as “investments,” they act strategically to
defend them so that they can reach the binding final rule stage. To support this argument, I
have identified a number of strategies that agencies can employ early in the process to help
their favored policies eventually become law.
In Chapter 3, I consider how agencies strategically write proposed rules so as to
avoid a regulatory veto from OIRA or Congress (a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for a proposed rule to become a final rule). I examine how the regulatory veto shapes the
agency’s decision to draft a proposed rule that accurately represents their policy preferences,
versus when they scale the proposal back to a policy that is more acceptable to political
principals. To rigorously assess this relationship, I formalize the interaction between the
agency and a politician (a generic representation of either Congress or OIRA) in a signaling
model. Overall, the model suggests that the regulatory veto is not a strong constraint on
agencies; the equilibrium results show that agencies frequently propose policies that are
representative of their true preferences. When vetoes do occur, they are targeted at what
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I call “unconstrained” proposed rules, meaning those rules that lean toward the agency’s
preferences, rather than those of its political overseers.
To test the veto hypotheses that emerge from the model, in Chapter 4 I develop
a dataset of regulatory vetoes of proposed rules by OIRA from 1981–2013. The dataset
includes both “explicit vetoes” issued by OIRA via return letters and “quiet vetoes” where
the agency withdraws the rule from consideration before OIRA can make a decision on its
rule. Using these data, I show in a series of regression analyses that OIRA is more likely
to veto rules from agencies with whom it is ideologically distant and when the rule’s policy
area is less of a priority for the president. While these findings are not surprising on their
own, I show that interacting these factors results in an interesting outcome: a decreasing
rate of vetoes for ideologically distant agencies as a policy area becomes more of a priority
for the president. This effect does not hold for ideologically proximate agencies, for whom
presidential priorities are not an important moderating factor. In addition, the models show
that OIRA’s vetoes initially increase as public opinion in a policy area becomes more liberal,
and then decrease as opinion becomes more and more liberal.
These results offer strong empirical support for the model’s implications for regulatory
vetoes and, as I show in the chapter, they are robust to a number of alternate specifications.
Although I do not test the model on regulatory vetoes issued by Congress, I conclude the
chapter by sketching out a framework for what such tests might look like.
Chapter 5 extends the argument beyond the proposal-writing stage by exploring how
agencies actually implement the administrative procedures associated with the public com-
ment period for proposed rules. I argue that agencies anticipate and strategically preempt
congressional incursions into rulemaking during the public comment period. Somewhat iron-
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ically, they accomplish this using the very administrative procedures that were implemented
to ensure responsiveness. I identify two ways that agencies do this. First, I show that
agencies use the length of the public comment period strategically in order to engage with
stakeholders and build coalitions outside the agency. Second, I show that agencies time the
publication of their proposed rules to coincide with congressional recesses so as to make
intervention more costly for members of Congress. The net result of these tactics is that,
rather than responding to congressional demands by changing the volume or content of their
regulatory activity, agencies stave off congressional oversight as part of the process of creating
a new rule and secure policy gains along the way.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I use an in-depth case study of the FDA’s menu labeling rule-
making to demonstrate the validity of a number of the project’s key assumptions. Specifically,
I show how the FDA gathered key policy and political information from stakeholders well in
advance of the publication of the proposed rule, the primary assumption in the formal model
in Chapter 3 (and also a foundation of the idea of the proposed rule as an “investment”).
I also demonstrate how congressional oversight in this case came from a much broader set
of congressional actors than those on the FDA’s traditional oversight committees. This is
an important component of the empirical tests in Chapter 5. Finally, I show the inten-
sity and resources involved in drafting the proposed rule from the FDA’s perspective. This
helps to demonstrate the likelihood that FDA bureaucrats became invested in the proposed
policy. While the case illustrates a number of other aspects of the argument, primarily it
serves to demonstrate how the processes identified in the broader dissertation operate on the
individual rule level and offers a real world validity check.
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7.1 contributions
This projects makes several contributions to our understanding of the regulatory
process. First, I have shown that the institution of mechanisms of political control, like OIRA
review of draft regulations and the procedural steps associated with notice-and-comment,
is not the end of the story. The agency responds to those instruments of political control.
The account that I have given presents the agent (in the principal-agent model) as a coequal
strategic actor and the relationship between the two parties as a dynamic one. This approach
pushes the field to consider political control of the bureaucracy as a dynamic and ongoing
problem, not one that can be “solved” by the institution of control mechanisms, because
agencies will respond to those control mechanisms.
Second, I have deconstructed the rulemaking process and examined the details—how
an agency selects the type of policy to write, how long it sets the public comment period for,
etc. This allows me to develop a nuanced and bottom-up account of agency behavior that
focuses on particular mechanisms. The approach I take stands in contrast to the traditional
top-down view of rulemaking and political control taken in much of the political science
literature.
Finally, from an empirical perspective, the project offers many advances. Although
scholars have shown a renewed interest in rulemaking, few studies cover more than a handful
of agencies. The data used in this project span the rulemaking activity many agencies,
including both executive branch agencies and independent agencies, over a broad time period.
These data are matched with a set of cutting-edge agency ideal point estimates that have
yet to be widely adopted in studies of agency behavior. The net effect is that the argument
speaks to broad effects that exist outside of the narrow context of one agency or a small
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sample of rules.
7.2 directions for future research
This research introduces a number of interesting avenues for future research. First
and foremost, this project has identified a number of strategic actions that agencies can take
to protect their investments (proposed rules),1 but it has not examined the effectiveness of
those strategies. Rather, I have assumed that agencies would not engage in this strategic
behavior if they did not perceive it to be effective. Yet, this perception may not be borne
out in practice. It could well be the case that agencies misperceive the effectiveness of
their actions and engage in strategic behavior that does not enhance the prospects of their
proposed rules.
This suggests that an interesting direction for future empirical work would be to ex-
plore the effectiveness of these (and other) strategies in advancing proposed rules to the final
rule stage. This research is more complicated than it may initially seem, however, since the
effects of strategic behavior are often difficult to observe. A parallel can be drawn to the
campaign spending literature here. In that case, scholars struggle to make sense of the effects
of campaign spending on election outcomes, as the data routinely (and robustly) show that
the more incumbents spend on an election, the more likely they are to lose the election (see
Jacobson, 1990). This counterintuitive result can be attributed to a selection effect: candi-
dates tend to spend more in close elections than in non-competitive elections.2 As a result,
1The strategies I identify are illustrative and are by no means exhaustive of all agency strategies with respect
to proposed rule drafting or the public comment period.
2Jacobson (1990, 334) explains that incumbents “spend more the more strongly they are challenged, and the
stronger the challenge, the worse the incumbent does.” There has been spirited debate over the appropriate
method to determine whether this empirical puzzle can be interpreted to mean that campaign spending
does not matter (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994; Jacobson, 1978; Levitt, 1994; Erikson and Palfrey, 1998;
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it is not reasonable to compare campaign spending from competitive and non-competitive
elections to find the effect of campaign spending. Rather, the appropriate counterfactual is
to compare a competitive election with high levels of spending to that same election with
low levels of spending. Unfortunately, it is not possible to observe both outcomes in the
same case, but clever econometric techniques can help to identify the effects in such cases
(see Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Similarly, with rulemaking it may be the case that agencies
only employ the strategies I have identified for those rules that are more ambitious or are in
some way “at risk.” Accordingly, it is perhaps not appropriate to pool all rules in analyzing
the effectiveness of these strategies, and future work on effectiveness should proceed with
caution in light of this causal inference issue.
Second, this project has focused broadly on tactics that are available to all agencies,
without detailed consideration of the specifics of the agencies themselves or the availability
of different strategies across time.3 While this approach has been instructive as a first step,
it invites the question of variability across agencies. For instance, setting aside the causal
issues associated with rule finalization discussed above, Table 7.1 shows the rate at which
agencies finalize the proposed rules that they issue. Some agencies have higher “batting
averages” than others, meaning that they finalize a greater proportion of the rules they
propose. Independent agencies seem to be quite good at this, whereas regulatory agencies
seem to be no better than non-regulatory ones at getting rules from the proposed stage to
the final stage. While this high-level analysis masks important nuances of this process (like
whether some agencies are more cautious about issuing proposed rules in the first place),
Gerber, 1998).
3However, a key variable in my argument is the ideological distance between the agency and key political
principals, which is time-varying and agency-specific.
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there is clearly interesting agency-level variation here that wants for explanation.
Finally, by focusing on the proposed rule stage, the project falls short of creating a
unified theory of the entire notice-and-comment process. This leaves room for future work to
extend this project’s logic to other stages of the rulemaking process. As discussed in Chapter
3, much of the action with respect to congressional vetoes of rulemaking–both in terms of
invoking the CRA or introducing an agency-curbing bill—happens at other stages of the
process, either preemptively (before the agency has even initiated the rulemaking process)
or even after the agency has issued a final rule. Additionally, my focus on the initial stages
neglects the fact that agencies frequently do make changes to proposed rules at the final
rule stage, after the public comment period. While many scholars have addressed this stage
of the process empirically, a formal model that addressed this late-stage behavior from the
agency’s perspective would be a welcome addition. My hope is that this dissertation begins
a research agenda on how agencies behave strategically with respect to notice-and-comment.
7.3 normative implications
In closing, I draw several lessons from this project. I have repeatedly pointed to
the power and first-mover advantages that bureaucrats enjoy in the rulemaking process.
From a normative perspective, many observers have decried this as an abdication of the
responsibility of elected officials and the rise of an Orwellian administrative state. Yet, such
alarmist conclusions are not necessarily appropriate.
Bureaucratic discretion in rulemaking is not accidental, but the result of a design
choice. After all, rules not only address important policy areas, they often also address
difficult or complex policy problems, problems that legislators often do not have the time or
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Table 7.1: Agency Rulemaking “Batting Averages,” 2000-2010
Agency Name Agency Type Regulatory? Batting Avg Avg # of Rules
Envtl Protection Agency Executive Yes 61.2% 14.7
Small Business Admin Executive Yes 68.2% 37.0
Office of Personnel Mgmt Executive Yes 69.0% 12.3
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin Executive Yes 77.0% 12.6
Dept of Justice Cabinet Yes 77.3% 15.4
Dept of Treasury Cabinet Yes 80.1% 28.7
Dept of Labor Cabinet Yes 80.4% 23.1
Dept of Veterans’ Affairs Cabinet 81.7% 10.2
Dept of Health & Human Svcs Cabinet Yes 81.7% 57.4
Dept of Transportation Cabinet 82.0% 58.9
Dept of Agriculture Cabinet Yes 82.6% 46.1
Dept of Housing & Urban Dev Cabinet 84.1% 8.7
Dept of State Cabinet 84.5% 15.4
Dept of the Interior Cabinet 84.6% 5.1
Dept of Education Cabinet Yes 85.1% 7.0
Dept of Energy Cabinet 85.8% 59.0
Dept of Homeland Security Cabinet 87.2% 7.7
Dept of Commerce Cabinet Yes 88.5% 9.5
Nuclear Regulatory Comm Independent 88.9% 12.2
Securities & Exchange Comm Independent Yes 89.4% 8.1
Social Security Admin Independent Yes 90.9% 8.5
Fed Deposit Insurance Corp Independent Yes 91.2% 13.2
Cmdty Futures Trading Comm Independent Yes 93.0% 68.3
Nat’l Credit Union Admin Independent 94.6% 5.4
Note: Author’s analysis of data from Chapter 5. The second “Type” column indicates
whether the agency is a Cabinet-level agency, a non-Cabinet executive agency, or an inde-
pendent agency. The third column “Regulatory” indicates whether or not the agency’s core
function is regulation (i.e., it is a regulatory agency). Data for these two columns are from
Lewis and Selin (2012). The fourth and fifth columns indicate, respectively, the proportion
of proposed rules that were eventually finalized and the average annual number of proposed
rules issued by that agency each year.
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expertise to tackle themselves. In fact, bureaucratic expertise and knowledge are key benefits
of the rulemaking process (Harter, 1982), and we should think about how to harness and
direct this power, rather than circumscribe it.
Concerns about excessive bureaucratic power connote the image of anonymous, malev-
olent bureaucrats making decisions that are at odds with the public interest. Yet, research
suggests that bureaucrats tend to have fairly mainstream perspectives on politics (Water-
man, Rouse and Wright, 2004) and also tend to be motivated by a public service ethos
(Golden, 2000; Dilulio, 1994). Thus, it is worth stating that this may not be worrying from
a normative perspective; just because bureaucrats have power and employ it strategically
does not mean they are producing bad or ill-conceived rules. Rather, since there is no direct
electoral mechanism to ensure the rules produced align with the public’s preferences, we
must carefully evaluate the whether the rules produced (or not produced) are too moderate
or too extreme.
Lastly, bureaucrats are not doing anything wrong per se by responding to the incentive
structure with which they are presented. As the last three decades of work in political science
suggests, human beings respond to incentives created by the political process. Thus, to the
extent that we are concerned about the future direction of the rulemaking process, we should
pay careful attention to the incentives generated by the process, as I discuss in the next
section.
7.4 policy implications for notice-and-comment
The findings of this dissertation also have policy implications for the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process itself. In order to check bureaucrats’ power, numerous regu-
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latory reform ideas have been bandied about Washington. These proposals include a call
to increase the scope of OIRA’s review to include independent agencies,4 a requirement
that Congress approve all major regulations,5 suggestions to increase the staff and resources
of OIRA (Wallach, 2014; Sunstein, 2013a; Copeland, 2013), appeals for more rigorous im-
plementation of cost-benefit analysis (Carrigan and Shapiro, 2013; Wallach, 2014), and a
proposal to create a new office that would give Congress the ability to independently assess
the quality of regulations (Wallach, 2014).
Each of these reform proposals is predicated on the idea that increasing congressional
or presidential oversight will counterbalance agency power in rulemaking. They do not
involve changes to the basic structure of notice-and-comment process itself and, importantly,
they do not address the incentives that cause agencies to invest (and make decisions) prior to
the issuance of the proposed rule. In fact, by creating more ex post oversight, these reforms
may actually serve to reinforce the incentive structure that leads agencies to entrench early
on and often behind closed doors.
Other reforms with the potential to address the incentive problem seem unlikely to
gain traction, either because they are not on the policy agenda or because they lack broad
political appeal. For instance, regulatory negotiation, or “reg neg,” the process whereby
agencies formally negotiate a proposed rule with a set of nominated stakeholders prior to
the proposed rule’s publication, was a popular reform initiative in the 1990s, but has faded
into relative obscurity. Although reg neg is not without its critics (Rose-Ackerman, 1994;
4Bills to expand OIRA review to independent agencies were introduced in both the 112th (Independent
Agencies Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012) and 113th (Independent Agencies Regulatory Analysis Act of
2013) Congresses. Both were referred to committee and no further action was taken.
5This idea traces to a bill introduced in the 112th Congress called the Regulations from the Executive in
Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act which would require Congress to vote affirmatively any before any major
final rule ($100 million or more in annual impact) could take effect (Sonmez, 2014).
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Coglianese, 1997), it does formalize the opportunity for agencies to consult with stakeholders
in the rulemaking process (Langbein and Kerwin, 2000). It also reduces the potential for
eventual litigation by hostile groups (Harter, 1982), which in turn reduces the agency’s
incentive to get entrenched in a policy at the outset. In a law review article Gersen and
O’Connell (2009) offer a different reform proposal with the potential to address the incentive
problem by reducing agency discretion with regard to administrative procedures. They
suggest that in order to prevent agencies from strategically gaming the release of their rules,
agencies should “batch release” rules at predetermined times.
Fortunately, there are some promising incentive-related reforms on the horizon. Re-
cently, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), the advisory board that
provides guidance on how to improve the rulemaking process, released a report suggesting
that agencies increase transparency regarding ex parte communications (ACUS, 2014). The
ACUS recommended that agencies develop their own written policies about what constitutes
ex parte communication and how they will disclose such contacts. Interestingly, the report
encouraged agencies to continue to consult with stakeholders while drafting a proposed rule,
but suggested that agencies should be more transparent and even-handed about such con-
tacts. The report’s findings align with a recommendation from Wagner, Barnes and Peters
(2011, 43), who suggest that agencies be required to publicly disclose information about
which stakeholders they meet with about a rule before the proposed rule is published and
after the final rule is published. Adding sunlight to the preliminary stages of the process
is not the perfect disinfectant, but it may lead agencies to be more egalitarian in their pre-
proposal contacts, which in turn may influence the representativeness of the policy choices
that agencies make.
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No single policy reform is a panacea to the problems endemic to the current iteration
of the regulatory state. However, future reformers would do well to consider the incen-
tives facing agencies with respect to notice-and-comment. It may well be that altering the
incentive structure is a more efficient and effective way to reform the rulemaking process.
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